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Preface
This book is intended as a first exploratory inquiry into possible educa-
tional selectivity effects of the European Social Fund. It is the result of the 
Educational selectivity effects of the European Social Fund project, which 
was developed between July 2012 and December 2013 with the support 
of the Education Support Programme of the Open Society Foundations.
This is a comparative research project aiming to showcase the effects of 
the European Social Fund (ESF) in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia. The main hypothesis of the project is that the weak 
regulation via tender documentation generates four adverse effects in our 
country cases: 1) it leads to low propensities to form inter-institutional and 
inter-sectoral partnerships for organizing and delivering public services; 
2) it leads to a centralization of contractors to a small number of urban 
clusters, causing massive discrepancies in terms of geographical equity; 3) it 
leads to a convenience-driven purposeful selection of project beneficiaries 
that is also afflicted by an upward bias in the vulnerability continuum; and 
4) it leads to high propensities to develop convenient, rather than efficient 
and innovative projects. If confirmed this evidence would suggest that, 
under these circumstances, the social-service delivery contracting as an 
instrument of governance is no longer regulating against risks for benefi-
ciaries, but fuels increased social division in access to public services. The 
focus on these particular five countries is a natural one, as the European 
Social Funds is an instrument dominantly focused on Eastern Europe and, 
among other new EU members, these countries were perceived as not very 
good performers in terms of ESF implementation.
The project is divided into three research streams. The Public Stream 
focuses on the institutional setup of ESF-implementation in the five coun-
tries. The Contractors Stream focuses on how the uses of specific regulatory 
tools lead to specific responses from those competing for educational service 
contracts. The Beneficiaries Stream focuses primarily on the ways in which 
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contractors identify target groups and the overall impact of ESF-funded 
interventions on vulnerable groups. This book is the result of research 
conducted under the Public Stream of the project.
The project is a collective effort, involving a team of sixteen researchers 
in the five coutries. This book, reflecting a part of the project results, has 
benefited from the inputs and ideas of all researchers and from a series of 
meetings and workshops organized by the Education Support Programme. 
The editors would like to thank the governing board of the ESP for under-
standing the importance of a project dealing apparently only indirectly 
with education. Support, advice and highly valued comments came from 
Hugh McLean, director of the ESP. The project, the workshop and the 
book would not have been possible without the invaluable support of Laura 
Cziszter and Boglarka Fedorko. Elemér Könczey’s caricatures graphically 
describe the challenges of ESF implementation in Central and Eastern 
Europe and enrich the book. The editors would like to thank the contribu-
tors for their patience despite heavy editing and tight deadlines. Finally, the 
editors would like to thank their families for their support and tolerance 
towards laptops taken on holidays.
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Cristina STĂNUȘ and Daniel POP
1  Introduction: Conceptualizing educational 
service delivery markets created through the ESF
This book approaches domes-
tic policy tool choices concern-
ing the accomplishment of EU 
policy objectives, as embed-
ded in the European Social 
Fund (ESF), which result in 
the creation of a quasi-market 
for educational service deliv-
ery. It emphasizes the selectivity 
involved in policy decisions con-
cerning ESF implementation in 
five central and eastern European countries, with consequences in terms of 
differentiated access to the educational opportunities that the ESF creates.
The reliance of the public sector on a mix of non-state and multiple 
layers of public actors for the provision of public services is not new, and 
is linked with notions such as the limited capacity of contemporary states 
to provide certain services, and the superiority, in terms of the efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness, that non-state actors are able to provide. Sometimes 
labelled as a retreat of the state (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, Gilardi, Jordana 
and Levi-Faur 2006, Halligan 2010), this is not actually so, since the policy 
instruments used by the state to engage these actors in public service provi-
sion seem to extend the power and authority of the state beyond its formal 
limits (Dudley and Bogaevskaya 2006), as it manages to export some of its 
modus operandi to non-state actors, especially to third-sector organizations 
(Pestoff and Brandsen 2010, Radu and Pop 2014). A favorite instrument in 
many public service domains is the creation of markets or quasi-markets for 
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service delivery (Le Grand 2012, Struyven and Steuers 2014), based on the 
notion that competition among potential service contractors will improve 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. However, such markets or quasi-markets 
are unavoidably regulated, since the state is not in a position to abort its 
role as regulator and financer of public service delivery. Moreover, within 
most such markets, the state also retains its service-provision role. This 
leads to questions regarding the ability of the state to balance its three roles 
in the most democratic and accountable manner.
In the sphere of educational service provision, national programmes 
which are part of the European Social Fund create markets for service deliv-
ery. Within these markets, states act as regulators, financers (directly and 
indirectly), and service providers. The role of the state as regulator is par-
ticularly important since it involves much more than accommodating EU 
bureaucratic procedures with national administrative traditions. Member 
states actively define which educational services are to be provided (doing 
so more or less in accordance with national educational policy) and estab-
lish corresponding quality and quantity criteria. They also get to decide 
who is allowed to provide certain services and, consequently, compete for 
funding. Last but not least, they get to decide their own share in service 
provision. These decisions are made during the programming and com-
missioning processes. These processes happen in a very complex political, 
policy, and institutional context, only to some extent implied in the notion 
of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001).
Among ESF core objectives we find granting assistance to individuals 
and groups who are disadvantaged in getting a proper education or find-
ing a job; notions such as combating social exclusion are deeply embedded 
in all ESF interventions.1 At first glance, a question arises concerning the 
compatibility between the social inclusion goals embedded in the ESF 
and the (quasi-)markets for social and educational service delivery created 
by ESF-funded national programmes. This question becomes even more 
prominent if placed in the context of ESF implementation in the most 
recent EU member states in central and eastern Europe, given the difficulties 
inherent in accommodating national institutions to the workings of the EU 
and the significant social exclusion problems in those respective societies. 
1 See <http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=50&langId=en>. 
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With the exceptions of Poland and Slovenia, central and eastern European 
states seem to be confronted with significant technical and administra-
tive difficulties in ESF implementation. This leads to a questioning of 
the effects of these difficulties in terms of social inclusion. From an ESF 
economic ( human-resources development) effects perspective, it has been 
suggested that ESF implementation attends too much to an absorption 
logic, and too little to outcomes (Tomé 2012). In an analysis of the effects 
of EU-promoted local partnerships in terms of tackling social exclusion, 
Geddes (2000) points out that the positive effects of this instrument, deeply 
embedded in ESF operations, are limited because it avoids the structural 
social, economic and political implications of a full assault on social exclu-
sion. This raises questions concerning the effects of ESF implementation 
in central and eastern European countries in terms of social exclusion. The 
large share of ESF funding directed towards universities in Romania, or 
the recent shift of emphasis toward the education of gifted children in 
Hungary, could be arguments invoked in this respect.
This book makes a comparative study of ESF implementation in five 
central and eastern European countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. It looks at how ESF-funded national 
programmes are governed from a welfare markets perspective and it tries 
to assess the extent to which educational service delivery markets created 
through ESF funding are enabling environments to increase access to qual-
ity education for vulnerable groups. In the following sections, we discuss 
the context for this study and approach the theoretical underpinnings of 
this policy issue.
The context: ESF, education and social inclusion  
in the five countries
European structural policy presents (despite EU-wide goals) significant 
differences from one country to another. These stem from varied social, 
economic and political conditions across the EU. Such differences can be 
found in the implementation of the ESF in the five countries analysed here.
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Bulgaria and Romania have very similar approaches to ESF imple-
mentation, albeit with very different results. Both countries opted, during 
programming, to focus on components directly linked to the labor market. 
Thus, national programmes are focused on human-resources development 
and are founded upon the notion of capacity-building at the individual and 
community levels, with social inclusion and access to education pushed 
to the background. The problems faced since 2007 by the two countries 
in ESF implementation are to some extent quite similar: poor communi-
cation between public management authorities and service contractors; 
delays in assessment and contracting; and a strong emphasis in national 
public discourse regarding the issue of absorption. These problems were 
dealt with in quite different ways: Romanian authorities opted for higher 
formalization and bureaucratization of the programme, while Bulgarian 
authorities opted for changes in the opposite direction. In both coun-
tries, programming seems to have been hindered significantly by a lack of 
data, analysis, or coherent sectoral policies. In Romania, implementation 
problems were significant enough to lead to a temporary suspension of the 
programme and, in 2012, to an automatic correction of 25 per cent applied 
by the European Commission to the programme funds.
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia took a quite different 
approach to programming, which resulted in the development of ESF oper-
ational programmes dedicated solely to education in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia and the creation of a programme focused on ‘social renewal’ 
in Hungary. This significant difference in terms of programming may very 
well be the result of longer membership in the EU, and the experiences 
of the previous ESF cycle. At the same time, the three countries needed 
to approach these problems differently because the regions covering the 
capital cities fall outside the convergence objectives of the EU. Hungary is 
a very good case in point of the effects that political changes in a national 
government and the subsequent changes in national policy might have 
upon reaching EU-wide goals.
Within the broader framework of ESF, all the countries studied here 
emphasize the need to reform the national education system and include 
different elements of the reforms envisaged in national programmes. All 
countries have to cope with a certain degree of segregation in the national 
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education system, exacerbated in some countries by the inclusion of chil-
dren from ethnic-minority backgrounds in the category of pupils with 
special educational needs (see Fox and Vidra 2001, O’Nions 2010). In the 
Czech Republic, 4.8 per cent of pupils in compulsory education are edu-
cated in special classrooms using a reduced curriculum (see the country 
study in this book). This disproportionately affects Roma children and, in 
Bulgaria, children of Turkish origin. On a more general level, all countries 
face a problem of educational outcomes, the main symptom of which is the 
variation of results in the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) test (see Table 1-1). National policy documents concerning ESF 
implementation make constant references to this.
Table 1-1. PISA test results in the five countries, 2000–2009.
National 
score on the 
overall read-
ing scale
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Romania Slovakia
PISA 2009 429 478 494 424 477
PISA 2006 401 482 482 395 466
PISA 2003 did not participate 488 481
did not 
participate 469
PISA 2000 430 491 479 427 did not participate
Source of data: OECD and thelearningcurve.pearson.com
Besides differences between these countries in terms of educational out-
comes, there is the issue of how obvious educational inequality is distributed 
in the countries. Based on the 2006 PISA test results, it has been estimated 
that social inequality in education (measured as the dependence of pupils’ 
mathematical abilities on their individual social background) is lowest in 
Romania, among all the countries tested and all countries analysed in this 
book, and highest in Hungary (Schlicht et al. 2010).
Moreover, each country experiences problems of administrative and 
technical nature during the implementation process to different degrees, 
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sometimes leading to programme suspensions for various periods of time 
(Romania, Czech Republic) or even automatic corrections applied by the 
European Commission to all the funds disbursed through these programmes 
(Romania). The administrative capacity of national managing authorities 
and other national institutions is discussed frequently in each country.
The governance of service delivery markets and the impact  
of EU structural funds
The social sciences literature has approached EU structural funding from 
several perspectives. Among the most prominent is the governance perspec-
tive. EU structural funding is thought to present a very specific structure 
of governance, resulting from a mixture of management by results and 
bureaucratic rule steering, as well as rigidity of decision-making result-
ing from decision-making in a multi-actor constellation (Lang 2001). In 
other words, we have a mix between hierarchical, market and network 
governance (Meuleman 2011) which is inherent to EU structural funding, 
since it involves: applying a significant corpus of highly formalized public 
sector rules; managing networks in the process of strategy development; 
co-ordinating policy and implementation; and steering a public services 
market. As opposed to the national policies of most member states, EU 
funding is characterized by a sophisticated and differentiated system of 
monitoring, evaluation, and financial control, each element with its dif-
ferent orientation in terms of attainment of objectives versus compliance 
with rules (Lang 2001: 14).
A second perspective focuses on the extent to which EU structural 
funding manages to achieve its goals. Most of the analyses concerning the 
role and impact of structural funds are focused on regional development 
funds and their role in reducing economic inequalities (a few examples are 
Aiello and Pupo 2012, Bateira and Ferreira 2002, Bradley 2005, Lennert 
and Robert 2010, Varga and in’t Veld 2011). Several of these studies point 
out positive outcomes and a significant impact of dealing with EU rules 
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and regulations over national institutional structures and modi operandi. 
They also point out mixed results in terms of achieving development (cohe-
sion) policy goals, as well as a lack of uniformity in implementation from 
one country to the next. Institutional factors are frequently blamed for 
failures in achieving goals.
The experience of Ireland and southern European countries sug-
gests that three elements are extremely important in exploring differ-
ences between countries in terms of the impact of structural funds in 
general: 1) institutional and organizational aspects; 2) the procedures 
and instruments associated with EU funding; and 3) the interrelations 
of monitoring, evaluation, and management of public funds ( J. Bradley 
2005: 178). The institutional and organizational aspects are comprised of 
horizontal (the degree of social partners’ involvement) and vertical (size 
of country, strength of regional government, degree of centralization) ele-
ments ( J. Bradley 2005: 179). Higher on the institutional ladder, a report 
commissioned by the DG Regio suggests that the measures adopted by 
the EU to improve the management of funds are partially responsible for 
failures, because they have tended to overrate the importance of quantity 
as opposed to the quality of spending (Barca 2009). It has been suggested 
that, beyond these aspects, a key element is the domestic policy enacted 
to accomplish EU policy objectives (Aiello and Pupo 2012). This would 
include policy directly related to the disbursement of EU funds, but also 
the extent to which states address structural inabilities (the quality of 
institutions).
A third perspective, specifically focused on the ESF, emphasizes the 
notion of social mechanisms which help us better understand ESF outcomes 
(Verschraegen, Vanhercke and Verpoorten 2011). ESF implementation is 
shown to have a catalytic effect in three areas: the innovation of domestic 
activation instruments; the governance of employment policies; and policy 
framing. This is achieved through three different mechanisms: leverage 
(strategic use of ESF by domestic political actors); aid conditionality; and 
policy learning (Verschraegen, Vanhercke and Verpoorten 2011). This sug-
gests that, beyond its dependence on the characteristics of the national 
institutions and policies, the implementation of EU structural-funds pro-
grammes shapes those very institutions and policies.
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A fourth perspective, linked with governance, stresses the informal-
ity surrounding EU structural funds, usually embedded in the notion 
of partnership (Peters 2006, Piattoni 2006). Partnership is a dominant 
concept in service delivery, as it conjures up a relationship and a discourse 
one cannot dismiss: it seems to embody values; it appears pragmatic; and 
it sounds inclusive (Fenwick, Miller and McTavish 2012). The EU and the 
national governments are dependent on lower-level communities and a 
wide array of social actors for the implementation of their goals, which 
is why partnership is being used as both a governance mechanism and as 
a project methodology. As a governance mechanism, partnership helps 
public sector actors cope with the challenges of programming for social 
change and the implementation of EU structural policy. Partnership is for-
malized (usually embodied in the monitoring committees of EU structural 
programmes), yet informal relations which spun around formal procedures 
(Piattoni 2006: 58) are equally important. Informality may be the most 
suitable response to the volume of the decisions that need to be made 
and the complexity of conflicting goals which need to be accommodated.
The emerging literature on welfare markets (see Gingrich 2011) could 
also provide a very useful angle on EU structural funding. Contemporary 
service organization is hybrid in character (Vincent-Jones 2008), with 
welfare provision being increasingly a matter of both state and non-state 
organizations (private companies, third-sector organizations). The argu-
ment against this hybrid character emphasizes that the public sector stands 
for more than just service provision: it stands for legality, due process, and 
legal security. This raises the question of whether and when this ‘publicness’ 
can be delegated outside the public sector (Pierre 2011). The involvement of 
private companies, especially, is regarded with doubt (see Schwittay 2011); 
while third-sector organizations are increasingly considered a solution to 
the contemporary problems of social and educational service provision. 
Welfare markets, just like any other markets, produce externalities; they 
may suffer from information asymmetries and imbalances between demand 
and supply; they may prohibit the entrance of new actors on the market; 
or they may lead to an increase in costs for consumers. Markets in public 
services vary systematically and policy-makers can manipulate this varia-
tion strategically (Gingrich 2011).
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Education markets are essentially local in nature (Waslander, Pater and 
Weide 2010), yet are usually shaped by national policies. Any approach of 
the issue of educational (quasi-)markets needs a double perspective: eco-
nomical and social (Adnett and Davies 1999). Beyond concern for overall 
costs and cost-effectiveness, the issue remains as to the societal benefits 
of education and the democratic control over public services. In terms of 
effects, research has indicated that quasi-markets built on policy approaches 
using decentralization, deregulation, greater levels of autonomy, compe-
tition and choice, may encourage innovation both in how education is 
organized and how school content is delivered (Lubienski 2009). Other 
results link the introduction of educational quasi-markets in countries like 
the U.K. with improvements in exam performance at the end of compulsory 
education (S. Bradley and Taylor 2010).
The specific goals of ESF open the doors for the involvement of a 
wide array of actors in the provision of social and educational services 
throughout the EU. The logic behind ESF is pretty much the same logic 
that led to decentralization, deregulation and outsourcing reforms of 
public services in western European states. It places states in the triple 
role of regulator, financer, and provider of services. ESF implementa-
tion involves the creation and management of a welfare market via the 
mechanisms of programming and commissioning. Beyond the set of gen-
eral rules imposed by the European Commission, these are governed by 
domestic policy. Domestic policy choices are instrumental in translating 
ESF overarching goals and rules into operational national policy objec-
tives and implementation rules. Usually perceived as rather technical in 
nature, these domestic policy choices actually shape a market for social 
and educational service delivery, since they determine what services are 
to be provided (operational policy objectives), by whom (what actors are 
allowed on the market), and in what conditions. The very same decisions 
are supposed to take into account issues such as competition within the 
market, information asymmetries, imbalances between demand and supply, 
and the consequences for the consumers/beneficiaries. In the following 
section, we build on the literature of emerging welfare markets and previ-
ous empirical research centred on EU structural funding. This is done in 
the form of an analytical framework which enables us to assess the effects 
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of these domestic policy choices on educational service provision in the 
five countries under study.
Analytical framework
ESF implementation involves quite a complex institutional structure, one 
which is supposed to ensure proper commissioning, monitoring, evalua-
tion, and financial control, and is ostensibly predetermined by the EC. This 
structure involves a separation of implementation, payment, and control 
(auditing of expenses and evaluation) activities. A key institutional structure 
is the managing authority designated/created for each of the ESF national 
programmes, structured to exercise broad prerogatives in terms of implemen-
tation – ranging from programme structure and objectives to technical and 
administrative rules concerning implementation. This managing authority 
(an independent entity or a separate unit within a national institution) has, 
on paper, broad prerogatives in terms of programming and commissioning.
Managing authorities are, despite the obvious role of politics in pro-
gramming and commissioning, the key actors in shaping the quasi-markets 
for social and educational service delivery associated with the ESF. This 
analysis focuses on these authorities along two dimensions: the institu-
tional dimension (the different set-up of ESF funded programmes in the 
five countries at the macro-level) and the bureaucratic discretion in imple-
mentation dimension (how national management authorities enact their 
role). The first dimension covers some of the aspects of the programming 
process, while the second is focused on national commissioning processes. 
We will detail each of these dimensions in the following paragraphs.
The institutional dimension covers the design of the ESF implementa-
tion framework created via domestic policy decisions, as well as the manner 
in which some of the national structural inabilities (quality of institu-
tions/administrative capacity) are approached. There are both formal and 
informal aspects to this dimension. Formal aspects refer to the different 
organization of the management of ESF funding in these countries (types 
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of programmes and their foci, relationships between national managing 
authorities and the so-called intermediate bodies, and the place of man-
aging authorities within the broader national institutional framework). 
Also, they refer to the organization of drafting of calls, which has a deep 
influence on the content of these calls and consequently shapes the market 
for educational service delivery.
Informal aspects refer especially to institutional role orientations devel-
oped by the managing authorities, the governance of partnership (imple-
mentation of the EU partnership principle), and the accommodation of 
complex public sector goals.
In terms of institutional role orientations, it is important to know 
what types of rules the managing authorities shape for themselves, be they 
formal and informal, and how these rules translate into action. How does 
the managing authority describe itself and its place among national institu-
tions? Does it describe itself as an implementation agency merely comply-
ing with EU and national rules, or as a policy-maker (compliance versus 
goal orientation, or an emphasis on results)? All this becomes a question of 
how national authorities use a mixture of formal rules and informal policy 
instruments to steer such programmes (and the society as such) in a certain 
direction. As far as EU structural instruments are concerned, this mixture 
is mostly visible in bureaucratic decision-making.
In terms of the governance of partnerships, one important aspect is 
how the principle of partnership laid by the EU at the foundations of ESF 
is translated into national formal rules and informal patterns of interac-
tion between the central government and managing authorities on one 
side, and relevant societal actors on the other side. What was the signifi-
cance of partnership during programming? What societal actors were in a 
position to significantly influence the content of programming? What is 
the significance of partnership in the monitoring and evaluation of ESF-
funded programmes?
Thirdly, there is the matter of accommodating complex goals. The 
public sector needs to steer society, while balancing a series of policy goals 
with different degrees of importance. Peters (2011: 7–8) classifies public 
goals as follows: 1) sweeping goals such as democracy and efficiency; 
2) cross-cutting goals such as environmental protection and gender equality; 
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3) goals directed at a strategic level for social and economic services which 
affect all or most members of society (such as attaining a certain health 
status in society); 4) goals of individual organizations and programmes, 
whose pursuit is tentatively autonomous and consequently may produce 
co-ordination problems; and 5) goals selected indirectly through the choice 
of policy tools. ESF itself is a complex policy issue, given the complexity 
of social problems to be approached, the programmes designed to address 
them, and the instruments used for implementation. In the case of manag-
ing authorities for ESF-funded programmes, the balancing of sweeping, 
cross-cutting ad strategic goals with the specific goals of the organization/
programme is of paramount importance.
The bureaucratic discretion dimension reflects the regulatory decisions 
made by the managing authorities during the commissioning process, with 
a special emphasis on the educational selectivity consequences of these 
decisions. Bureaucratic discretion is manifest in the implementation deci-
sions, instructions and recommendations that govern the relationship 
between the managing authority and contractors during the application, 
contracting and implementation of project stages. Most of these decisions 
are reflected in the calls for applications which the managing authorities 
issue when exercising their role.
Two types of decisions and their relative weight in day-to-day opera-
tions of the managing authorities are of particular interest. First, we have 
decisions concerning technical-administrative aspects, such as those con-
cerning reporting and accounting procedures, the fiscal-financial eligibil-
ity criteria of potential contractors, or the administrative exclusion of 
applicants during the commissioning process. Second, we have regulatory 
decisions concerning the substance of the programme, such as: the types of 
activities and contractors which are eligible under certain calls; restricting 
certain activities to certain types of potential contractors; or restricting/
expanding the group of potential beneficiaries. These could be labelled 
as programme-targeting decisions. Given the complexity of ESF-related 
technical and administrative procedures and the relative inexperience of 
national managing authorities with these procedures, we can reasonably 
expect that managing authorities pay a disproportionate amount of atten-
tion to the first category of decisions.
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The programme-targeting decisions focus on the design of the educa-
tional and social services required and the shaping of the supply structure. 
In terms of services design, the emphasis falls upon the choice of services 
which are subject to competition on the market, the specification of qual-
ity outcomes for these services, and, in the special case of educational ser-
vice delivery, the extent to which there is co-ordination between national 
education policy and the ESF-funded programme. In terms of shaping the 
supply structure, or market articulation and segmentation, the focus falls 
on several aspects of the decisions made by managing authorities during 
the commissioning process. Who are the actors (users, specific categories of 
providers, state bureaucracies) being empowered, and what are the specific 
incentives (eligibility and selection criteria, required partnership structures) 
used to empower them in educational services delivery under ESF fund-
ing? What are the effects in terms of access to educational opportunities 
for the most disadvantaged groups in society?
Methods and data
We approach this topic doing a case-oriented comparative study (Ragin 
1987), which involves actively looking for similarities between the cases 
studied, linking the similarities to the phenomenon of interest, and using 
them to formulate a general proposition. Several methodological and 
evaluation choices and assumptions are embedded in this design. First, 
and most importantly, we focus our analysis on the impact of variables 
which are explicitly under the control of domestic policy-makers and the 
management authorities, in the direction suggested by Stake (2002). While 
it would be easy to focus our explanations on, for example, cultural differ-
ences, it is most important that we provide results that can be translated 
into policy as early as the next budgetary cycle of the European Union. 
Second, and equally important, our preoccupation with the notion of 
educational quasi-markets does not involve a bias for or against either 
market or state. A third important aspect stems from evaluation studies 
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emphasizing that EU structural funds have a too complex set of objec-
tives, which results from the preferences, interests and interpretations of 
the actors involved, to actually be able to effectively approach them all 
(see Lang 2001: 11–12).
The first component of the research design is the qualitative analysis 
of the by-laws of the management authorities and of the executive deci-
sions of the management authorities. We focus on one ESF-funded pro-
gramme in each country: the Human Resources Development Sectoral 
Operational Programme in Bulgaria (BG-OPHRD); the Operational 
Programme Education for Competitiveness in the Czech Republic 
(CZ-ECOP); the Operational Programme for Social Renewal in Hungary 
(HU-SROP); the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development in Romania (RO-SOPHRD); and the Operational 
Programme Education in Slovakia (SK-OPE). Among the documents 
analysed, we have national strategic reference frameworks, descriptions of 
the national programmes under ESF, by-laws of the management authori-
ties, ex-ante and interim evaluation reports, annual implementation and 
reports, information on the websites of managing authorities (MAs), and 
other relevant documents.
The second component of the research design is a content analysis 
of the applicants’ guides issued by the managing authorities under all calls 
 concerning education and social inclusion, focusing on mapping the struc-
ture of incentives the management authorities use to shape the quasi-market 
of educational services. This stage covers the five countries under all calls 
relevant from an educational vulnerability point of view. Due to the rather 
indeterminate nature of the phenomena that we intend to investigate, we 
used ethnographic content analysis (Altheide 1996) to develop the coding. 
The patterns, emphases, and themes identified were then used to analyse 
the calls for applications launched in the five countries on topics related 
to educational service delivery for disadvantaged groups.
Data were collected between October 2012 and January 2013. The 
qualitative analysis component of the research design involved drafting 
a report for each of the five countries in accordance with a set of guide-
lines. These reports were used along primary data sources in the analysis 
of the institutional settings. The content analysis component involved 
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the selection of a total of eighty-five calls, concerning ISCED 0–3 educa-
tion provision for disadvantaged groups. Given the small number of cases 
and the fact that half were from one country (Hungary) the analysis of 
the data is limited to descriptions of quantitative variables and focuses on 
string variables.
In two of the countries analysed in this book, Hungary and Slovakia, 
the main components of the research design were complemented with 
in-depth interviews with experts. Interviews were structured alongside 
the main points of the comparative analytical framework detailed above.
The structure of the book
This chapter is followed by five country case studies, structured alongside 
the common framework for analysis, and one comparative concluding 
chapter. Each country chapter approaches key aspects on the institutional 
and bureaucratic dimensions of ESF implementation, while also pointing 
out national specificities.
The chapter on Bulgaria showcases the importance of how national 
institutions and national policy processes play out in practice in explain-
ing how the implementation of structural funds programmes actually 
works. Thus, the author points out that the challenges identified in the 
Bulgarian case are not specific to ESF implementation; they are underly-
ing factors of how the public sector works in a new democracy in condi-
tions of austerity.
The discussion on the lessons learnt in Bulgaria is followed by the 
case of the Czech Republic. The author problematizes the ways in which 
ESF implementation in the Czech Republic is largely determined by the 
particular interpretations the Czech state has adopted when defining the 
notions of vulnerable groups, special educational needs, and educational 
inclusion. The chapter is unavoidably built around the most important 
aspect distinguishing the Czech Republic from the other countries, the fact 
that social disadvantages are part of the definition of special educational 
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needs and many Roma children in the Czech education system are directed 
towards special educational programmes for children with mild mental 
disabilities, a questionable construct of special educational needs in and 
of itself. Studies of education equity and special education have found that 
cultural or racialized understandings of ability and disability have perpetu-
ated segregated education or the use of special education for racial/ethnic 
resegregation in some countries (Ferry and Connor 2005; Artilles et al. 
2011). This, in turn leads to beneficiary miscategorization and programme 
targeting challenges.
The chapter on Hungary showcases how ESF implementation plays 
out in practice when significant political and policy U-turns happen in a 
country. The author places special emphasis on how the education of vulner-
able groups is approached by the Social Renewal Operational Programme 
(HU-SROP). The analysis points out a series of structural problems, cul-
minating with the failure to implement a mutual inter-linking mechanism 
supposed to ensure consistency between system-level and grassroots-level 
interventions funded by the HU-SROP. Among other aspects, the report 
shows that the management of the commissioning cycle has seriously dis-
advantaged third-sector organizations, especially those with expertise on 
Roma issues, while leaving room for disguised interventions of for-profits. 
Moreover, the calls for applications for projects dealing with education 
for vulnerable groups have faced targeting issues, only partially due to the 
sensitivity of ethnic identification in Hungary. The author concludes that 
there are significant questions concerning the educational selectivity of 
ESF funding in Hungary.
The chapter on Romania focuses on how domestic policy choices 
concerning ESF implementation in Romania have helped shape a mixed 
quasi-market for educational service delivery. It particularly points out 
the effects of increased rule-rigidity as a result of public and political 
pressure exerted over the managing authority of the Sectoral Operational 
Programme Human Resources Development (RO-SPOHRD). The chap-
ter argues that the institutional framework and the modus operandi of the 
central government agency in charge of programme implementation have 
had a significant impact on the providers of educational service delivery, 
and may have contributed to increased social division in access to educa-
tional services.
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The chapter on Slovakia argues that the institutional framework for 
the implementation of structural funds in the country can be generally 
characterized as extremely complicated and unstable, with serious conse-
quences (especially financial) for the contractors. Among the main features 
of the use of the EU Structural Funds in Slovakia the author points out 
extreme formalism, rigidity of rules and the lack of a result-oriented logic. 
More specifically, the chapter emphasizes that the reform policies aimed at 
the inclusion of Roma and other disadvantaged groups are implemented 
through centrally planned and commissioned national projects, which tend 
to substitute national funding for school operation and modernization, 
rather than innovative demand-driven projects bringing an added value 
to the mainstream educational system.
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Sashka DIMOVA
2  Linking ESF implementation with low 
administrative capacity: The case of Bulgaria
Building sustainable and effi-
cient administrative structures 
that will administer EU funds 
and establishing competitive 
markets are essential elements 
for ensuring successful imple-
mentation of the EU-funded 
programmes and a fair alloca-
tion of EU funds. Both national 
managing authorities and the main national policy documents play an 
important role in the European Social Fund implementation. Thus, it is 
necessary to have a closer look at how managing authorities work and how 
they were designed to work in order to identify potential problem areas in 
the disbursement of EU structural funds.
This chapter reviews the work of the managing authority and the 
broader policy framework of the Operational Programme Human Resource 
Development in Bulgaria (BG-OPHRD), with a special emphasis on the 
educational sector. Thus, we evaluate the programming and the manage-
ment of the calls for applications for educational projects alongside a review 
of different national strategies and programmes. We employ a step-by-step 
strategy to underline potential problematic areas in the initial stages of 
BG-OPHRD implementation, with potentially significant consequences 
for the overall effectiveness of the programme and for reaching the social 
and educational goals of ESF.
The key problem areas in ESF implementation in Bulgaria in 2010, 
as identified by the Committee for European Affairs and Oversight of 
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European Funds (BG-CEAOEF) of the Bulgarian legislative body, con-
cern the implementation of public procurement procedures for EU-funded 
projects and the capacity of the different administrative units involved in 
operational programmes’ management and implementation – managing 
authorities, or MAs, intermediate bodies, or IBs, specific beneficiaries, 
and municipalities (CEAOEF 2012). The main institutional deficiency 
identified is the limited capacity of the managing authorities to implement 
and manage the operational programmes (CEAOEF 2012). The manag-
ing authorities play the most important role in transforming the strategic 
planning objectives into the desirable social outcomes of the particular 
programme. Therefore, in this chapter, we restrict our analysis to the capac-
ity of this type of institutional unit.
Even though the MAs are important for the successful management 
of the ESF-funded operational programmes, and in particular for the effi-
ciency of the commissioning process, there is lack of explicit criteria for 
assessing their administrative capacity. Furthermore, the existing literature 
provides scarce evidence of the key problem areas and even more limited 
discussion on how to tackle them. This chapter contributes to the exist-
ing literature by aiming to shed some light on key problematic areas of the 
ESF managing authorities in Bulgaria. The chapter looks at the efficiency 
of the managing authority in different stages of implementation of the 
operational programme, so as to assess its administrative capacity. More 
specifically, the tendering process and the design of the funding schemes 
are evaluated, with special emphasis on the efficiency of the calls in sup-
porting fair competition among potential contractors.
First the programme under focus is introduced. This is followed by 
an evaluation of the capacity of the managing authority in two different 
respects: programming and management. From here the focus is turned to 
the capacity of the managing authority to implement an effective commis-
sioning process. A specific section evaluates the structure and the potential 
drawbacks of the commissioning process, by looking at specific calls under 
a specific priority axis of the BG-OPHRD. Last but not least, we address 
potential opportunities and threats that should not be overlooked in the 
design and the implementation processes of future schemes under the 
ESF in Bulgaria.
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The Operational Programme Human Resources  
Development in Bulgaria
The strategic aim of this programme is to develop human capital in order 
to ensure higher employment, income, and social inclusion (BG-OPHRD 
2007). The programme aims to improve the quality of life of people in 
Bulgaria through the enhancement of human capital, the achievement of 
high employment levels, productivity improvement, access to high-quality 
education and lifelong learning, and strengthening social inclusion. To 
achieve its aims, the operational programme is focused on the implemen-
tation of the seven different priority areas. Education is embedded within 
the fourth priority axis of the programme. The main goal of reform in this 
area is to help raise the skill levels of the workforce and to contribute to 
better interconnection with the modern development of society and with 
employers’ requirements and needs.
The implementation of the operational programme aims to fulfil the 
main horizontal principles of the European Social Fund: gender equality 
and non-discrimination; innovation and mainstreaming; partnership and 
empowerment; sound programme and project management; and sustain-
able development. A 2007 peer review compared operational programmes 
combating discrimination across different countries.1 According to this 
review, Bulgaria does not have a specific programme on discrimination, but 
is rather implementing a horizontal approach to the problem of discrimi-
nation. Funding for BG-OPHRD, for the entire 2007–13 programming 
period, is set at EUR 1,031,789,137.
The capacity of absorbing EU funding in the local economy in Bulgaria 
is very low compared to other EU countries. At the end of 2011, the rate of 
absorption of structural funds in Bulgaria was 18.8 percent. The detailed 
situation of absorption for each operational programme indicates that 




(MLSP 2012). In comparison with ESF-funded OPs in other countries, 
this is very low. Correspondingly, between 2007 and 2009, the number of 
signed contracts was very small, with the first contract signed in late 2008, 
and thirty-nine projects, with a total budget of EUR 37.4 million, running 
at the end of May 2009 (MLSP 2008, 2009, 2010).
Furthermore, the financial crisis has affected the ability of Bulgaria to 
provide matching funds for projects. According to MA data, by the end 
of 2010, 5,495 project proposals had been submitted, out of which, 1,754 
contracts at a total value of approximately EUR 596.8 million were signed 
(MLSP 2011). Therefore, almost half of the total programme budget had 
been contracted. The 2010 implementation report shows that 47.36 per 
cent of the total programme budget had been contracted on 31 December 
2010. Effective payments under the programme exceed EUR 108 million, 
accounting for an absorption level of around 10 per cent. Payments under 
the programme registered significant growth in 2010 compared to 2009. 
Until December 2010, the managing committee approved the selection 
criteria for ninety-four calls for applications, totalling EUR 1.2 billion in 
value. Thus, at the mid-term of the programming period, an accurate time-
frame and financial framework for the effective absorption of 98 per cent of 
allocations to the programme was in place. According to the report of the 
MA, the higher absorption rates can be attributed to the capacity-building 
efforts undertaken in 2010 to improve the tendering process on several 
different dimensions (MLSP 2011, 2012). Namely, a trend to shorten the 
time necessary to give a final reply to a submitted application was observed.
At the start of the BG-OPHRD implementation, most of the calls 
for applications involved grant schemes. For example, only in 2007, the 
Ministry of Education and Science (BG-MES) announced four grant 
schemes, for a total amount of BGN 23,176,586.
Regardless of the success of the grant schemes, after 2008 the MES 
began to limit their share of the total number of calls for applications 
announced: only three out of nine operations were opened as grant schemes, 
the rest involved the direct financing of institutions previously nominated. 
For instance, the grant schemes that were opened in 2008 for Support of 
PhDs, post-doctoral students and young scholars and Developing school and 
university practices, as well as the programme for out-of-school activities 
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(but this time with double the budget), were designed for direct financing. 
This pattern persisted in the following years, too. Most schemes are now 
open for direct financing without any public calls for applications. This 
has made the commissioning process in Bulgaria less competitive.
The management of the OP is centralized and belongs to the manag-
ing authority, although there are voices calling for more decentralization 
of the management of structural funds. One key concern in the 2007–13 
cycle is that programme planning was incidental and not well structured. 
For instance, for various programmes in Bulgaria, small local organizations 
or NGOs were not eligible contractors, even though they had the required 
skills and expertise. At the programme level, NGOs are just associated 
members of the Monitoring Committees of OPs, without voting rights.
Another important aspect of the BG-OPHRD is that, in comparison 
will all other OPs, it targets the most diverse beneficiaries. The evidence 
suggests that under the BG-OPHRD, the number of potential beneficiar-
ies is around 100,000 and they fall into one of the following categories: 
Ministry of Education and Science; educational and training institutions; 
NGOs; the Centre for Educational Integration of Children and Pupils 
from Ethnic Minorities; municipalities; resource centres; vocational train-
ing centres; and off-school pedagogic institutions.
The following section analyses the institutional dimension of ESF 
implementation in Bulgaria, based on an in-depth analysis of national 
policy documents, and attempts to highlight key problem areas.
The institutional set-up of ESF in Bulgaria
The analysis of national strategic documents is an important step in evaluat-
ing the management and programming aspects of domestic policy-making. 
Furthermore, such an analysis is essential in determining if there is a gap 
between the main goals summarized in the national and EU regulations. 
One of the main programming principles is complementarity. Therefore, 
a review of different national strategies and programmes, along with their 
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interconnection with the OP priorities, is important for understanding the 
BG-OPHRD. In the next section we look at the national strategic refer-
ence framework, the main BG-OPHRD description, ex-ante and interim 
evaluation reports, and annual implementation reports. By analysing these 
documents, the chapter attempts to evaluate the policy discretion of the 
MA, as well as to what degree the MA can influence the final outcomes 
of ESF in Bulgaria.
Formal decision-making
The implementation of the EU-imposed mechanisms is directly related to 
the capacity of the national administrative units. Similar to the other EU 
member countries, in Bulgaria the national institutions have to be developed 
in accordance with the EU framework. However, in the implementation, 
financial arrangements, control and monitoring of the operational pro-
grammes, the direct involvement and control of the EU is limited. Namely, 
for each OP, the design and development of the managing institutions is 
entrusted to the national government. Even though the EU is promoting 
decentralization in the member countries, in the case of Bulgaria, the EC 
has not objected to the centralized mechanism for co-ordination. Moreover, 
to satisfy the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion (Council of the 
European Union 2006), the BG-NSRF has created a mechanism to co-
ordinate the Bulgarian public authorities on the central, regional, district 
and local levels (Government of Bulgaria 2007). This mechanism limits 
the participation of the municipalities in the programming process. Under 
such a mechanism, the municipalities can only be beneficiaries in the imple-
mentation of projects. It can be concluded that the inclusion of local and 
regional units in programming and commissioning is only formal.
The administrative units responsible for designing the procedures, as 
well as for the assessment process and the contracting of the projects are 
structured in a centralized way. Under the BG-OPHRD, these roles are 
performed by the Managing Authority (the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Protection) and by three other intermediate bodies: the Social Assistance 
Agency, the Employment Agency and the Ministry of Education. For each 
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of the seven different priority axes under the BG-OPHRD, the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Protection has delegated authority within the area 
of competence to the respective intermediate body.
The adoption of multi-level governance approach in the regional devel-
opment is an important measure for the establishment of the EU cohesion 
policy at national level. The EU had an incentive to adopt such an approach in 
order to design institutions that would be able to meet the common European 
objectives. According to existing research, in this way the EU indirectly influ-
ences the formation of certain institutional units. The EU creates a regulatory 
framework that forces the member states to comply with EU cohesion goals 
(Molle 2005, Baun and Marek 2008). The adoption of multi-level governance 
in Bulgaria has been specified within the National Development Plan (BG-
NDP) and the National Strategic Reference Framework (BG-NSRF). These 
are the two major documents for the management of the structural funds in 
Bulgaria for the 2007–13 budget cycle. The strategic document, BG-NSRF 
is based on the BG-NDP and is approved by the European Commission. 
It defines the national parameters of the EU Cohesion policy: the opera-
tional programmes, some institutional specifics, and financial planning for 
the implementation of the structural funds in Bulgaria. The BG-NSFR 
accommodates the national strategies as defined within NDP and it aims to 
sustain growth in the following areas: infrastructure development; human 
potential; social inclusion; and development of a better business environment 
(Government of Bulgaria 2007, Agency for Social Analysis and Forecasts 
2005, Virtanen, Uusikylä and Chatzinikolaou, 2006). Furthermore, these 
areas are matched with planned actions that will be further developed at the 
operational level. The greatest asset of the BG-NSFR is that it contains a full 
description of the projected administrative structure, along with mechanisms 
for implementation, roles, and responsible institutions.
The role of intermediate bodies in implementation
Different intermediate bodies (IBs) are included in the programming 
process to a different extent. The BG-MES has been participating only as 
a consulting body for the BG-HRDDOP working group. The BG-MES 
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has not been actively involved in the development of the BG-OPHRD. As 
defined by Milo (2007), the pace under which the terms for the different 
calls are set and then evaluated is of crucial importance for the program-
ming stage. According to Molle (2008), a higher degree of involvement 
of the IBs will contribute to a more accurate and effective overall strategy. 
It is also very important how quickly the evaluation is performed. If the 
process of collecting and evaluation is shorter, the absorption rate will be 
higher. The work of the IB is very important in this stage. Their work has 
a direct influence on the pace of project selection.
The BG-MES was not an active designer of the key human resources 
development strategy. It carried out the country socio-economic analysis, 
the SWOT analysis, and financial planning but it did not frame clearly the 
main priorities of the different programme components ( Jilkova 2009); 
instead, the BG-MES has delegated responsibility to the IBs. Moreover, the 
BG-MES started using existing administrative offices within the country 
after the BG-OPHRD launch. These bodies employ an expert in each of 
the regions and are part of the structure of the Directorate of Education. 
The main task of these experts is to monitor the project implementation 
process: however, they are not involved in the programming process.
In the decision-making process and in the programming of the OP, 
other institutions and public organizations can be involved in accordance 
with the principle of partnership. There is also a Central Co-ordination unit 
and Auditing unit. The government has direct control over their work, since 
the government appoints the executive branch of these units. Therefore, 
independent monitoring on the work of these units will be an important 
element in ensuring transparency of the entire implementation process.
The representation of stakeholders
Different stakeholders are represented on both the monitoring and evalua-
tion boards of the BG-OPHRD. However, only a few stakeholders on the 
boards are NGOs, and they were only included after specific recommenda-
tions from the European Commission. Following these recommendations, 
NGOs became members of the Monitoring Committee of the National 
Linking ESF implementation with low administrative capacity 29
Strategic Reference Framework. However, in the first years of implemen-
tation they did not influence any of the decisions made by the committee 
simply because there were so few representatives of the NGO sector. The 
main reason for the small number of NGO representatives were the strict 
eligibility requirements imposed by the government. For instance, only 
three NGOs were selected to take part in the election of observers, on behalf 
of the so-called social organizations (a category that included ‘organizations 
working for the integration of minorities and migrants’). These were the 
EKIP Foundation, the International Society for Sustainable Development 
and Co-operation and the Amalipe Center. They were selected by a com-
mission nominated by the Minister of Finance. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Finance defined the rules for the participation of NGOs in the Monitoring 
Committee of the NSRF. The procedure included two stages: expression 
of interest by NGOs to participate in the election of the observers, fol-
lowed by the election of observers by NGOs selected on the basis of the 
criteria envisaged in the rules. These criteria included: the effective and 
efficient work of the organization during the last three years; participation 
in developing, implementing and monitoring of strategies and policies; 
and experience in implementing projects financed by the EU (Amalipe 
2008). The candidates had to place themselves in one of the following 
three categories: organizations working in science, education and culture; 
environmental organizations; and social organizations (including minority 
organizations). Each category of organization had to elect its own observer. 
Although there were expressions of interest from many capable organiza-
tions, the commission established by Ministry of Finance selected only the 
three organizations mentioned above as covering all requirements within 
the group of the social organizations (Amalipe 2008).
The procedures for the election of an NGO observer in the Monitoring 
committee of the BG-OPHRD were discussed and the election of the 
NGO observer was only approved at the end of April 2008, during the 
regular meeting of the Committee. The aim of the procedure was to guar-
antee an open and transparent mechanism for the participation of the civil 
society in the process of managing and monitoring resources from the 
European Social Fund. The procedure is similar to the one already adopted 
by the Ministry of Finance regarding the National Strategic Reference 
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Framework. The procedures target organizations in six fields: protection 
against discrimination; education; Roma integration; health care; science; 
and social issues. This procedure is favourable for ensuring higher repre-
sentation of different stakeholders.
However, even though different stakeholders are represented, the 
direct influence of the monitoring committee on the implementation of 
the BG-OPHRD is very small and many of its responsibilities are purely a 
formality. It has only small influence in the programming and management 
stage of the OP. The board meets only when it is mandatory to meet in order 
to approve the annual report for the implementation of the BG-OPHRD 
and the Communication Plan of the Programme. During these meetings 
a report on the ongoing schemes is presented and forthcoming operations 
are introduced. However, the board does not have decision-making power 
on the call design for future schemes.
The availability of information
The main source of information for gathering, analysing and processing 
information on granted projects related to education under the Structural 
Funds in Bulgaria, is the managing authority of the BG-OPHRD. 
However, the directorates of operational programmes in Bulgaria, with 
the exception of OP Regional Development, do not collect and main-
tain information differentiating between different policy sectors, as the 
programmes have a horizontal principle of operation. The BG-MES is a 
beneficiary for some of the programme areas, but does not monitor and 
follow all the information related to the use of the structural funds in the 
educational sector.
One of the goals of the information and publicity measures outlined 
in the Communication Plan of the BG-OPHRD is to promote ESF and 
BG-OPHRD. These measures aim at gaining the support and active 
involvement of many different parties and the greatest possible number 
of people. This is done by guaranteeing the transparency of the manage-
ment process. That is a fundamental step-stone in building trust in the 
responsible institutions.
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The printed and electronic media can play a very important role in 
familiarizing the general public with the goals of BG-OPHRD and its 
diverse range of schemes. They need to act as a partner of the Managing 
Authority for promoting the operational programme among the general 
public, potential beneficiaries, and target groups. However, the BG-MES is 
not actively co-operating with media; even though this can be an important 
warranty mechanism for the transparency of the implementation process 
and an additional channel for feedback and bridge for communicating the 
needs and expectations of the beneficiaries and society.
In order to facilitate direct access to information to the wide range of 
target groups, the MA and IBs have established a BG-OPHRD Information 
Center. This centre will stay open until the end of the programme imple-
mentation in 2015. The initial idea was to use this as a centre that can provide 
comprehensive information on all issues related to the BG-OPHRD, as 
well as a place to connect potential beneficiaries and beneficiaries with MA 
and IB representatives. Regardless of the establishment of the information 
centre, the practice of the MES has been to refrain from effective commu-
nication with the beneficiaries of the projects, in order to be perceived as 
independent in the public eye. Undoubtedly, the IBs need to stay unbiased, 
but development and improvement of the schemes is conditional on strong 
communication with the contractors and the beneficiaries.
The following section of the chapter moves on to the next step and 
analyses in-depth bureaucratic decisions concerning ESF implementation 
in Bulgaria in the area of educational inclusion.
Shaping the market for educational service delivery using calls 
for applications under BG-OPHRD
In this part of the chapter we attempt to analyse the call design of the 
schemes under BG-OPHRD. Specifically, this part focuses on calls for 
applications for projects that aim to enhance the education levels of vulner-
able groups by supporting access to educational services and by improving 
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educational attainment. The success of the interventions in this area is 
measured in terms of one or more of the following outcomes: decreas-
ing the percentage of children dropping out from school; increasing the 
number of children that join the educational system; reducing the risk of 
exclusion of vulnerable groups in the educational system; increasing stu-
dents’ motivation; increasing literacy rates among vulnerable groups; and 
providing better opportunities for these groups.
The priority axis that covers educational intervention with specific 
focus on vulnerable groups and increasing the quality of education is the 
fourth priority axis, mproving the access to education and training, with 
a total budget of EUR 194,219,132. This is about 16 per cent of the total 
OP budget for Bulgaria. Within this area, this analysis is restricted to 
two key areas of intervention, focused on children and youth, described 
in Table 2-1.
The expected outcomes of the above-stated interventions are measured 
by the direct effect of the interventions on the following result indicators: 
number of pupils with special educational needs integrated into general 
education; the number of drop-outs reintegrated in the educational system; 
the number of pupils participating in out-of-school activities; the number 
of students receiving scholarships. These outcome indicators are impor-
tant measures of success of the calls for applications. However, it is equally 
important to go several steps backwards to look at the entire tendering 
process, since it affects the success of these calls and the OP.
The way the terms for commissioning are defined has a direct influence 
on who the potential contractors are. For many of the schemes, the call 
design indirectly renders potential contractors. It is important to under-
stand the degree to which these calls shape a non-competitive contractor 
market, where only a few contractors have the power to carry out projects, 
and few eventually use the ESF funding. In the next sections, the chapter 
attempts to look at the level of competitiveness that is guaranteed by the 
call design. This can be assessed by looking at who are potential contractors, 
partners, and beneficiaries. Other important aspects are also the interven-
tions and the call design itself. They are also analysed in the next section, 
since they are the tools that can enhance competitiveness and the fair and 
effective distribution of funds.
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Table 2-1. Key areas of intervention concerning the educational interventions with a 
focus on vulnerable groups, BG-OPHRD: Synthesis.
Key area of intervention 4.1. Access to 
education and training for disadvantaged 
groups
Key area of intervention 4.2. Children and 
youth in education and society
Target groups: persons with special 
educational needs, representatives of 
vulnerable ethic groups (Roma and 
Turkish), orphans, migrants, young 
children (3–6 year-olds) and their 
parents, dropouts, teachers, principals, 
pedagogical councillors.
Target groups: Children, students
Potential contractors: MES, educational 
and training institutions, kindergartens, 
NGOs, Centre for Educational 
Integration of Children and Pupils 
from Ethnic Minorities, municipalities, 
resource centres, vocational training 
centres, off-school pedagogic 
institutions.
Potential contractors: MES, educational 
and training institutions, municipalities, 
NGOs, community centres, off-school 
pedagogic institutions, Centre for 
Educational Integration of Children and 
Pupils from Ethnic Minorities, sports 
clubs and youth organizations.
Key activities: provision of the necessary 
conditions and resources for the 
implementation of the ethnic-minority 
groups’ integration process through the 
desegregation of children in schools 
with prevailing Roma pupils, and the 
reintegration of pupils into regular 
schools. Another key element is the 
provision of the necessary conditions 
and resources for the integration of 
persons with special educational needs. 
Furthermore, the calls under this scheme 
aim to provide educational services and 
activities for potential dropouts, and 
pupils not covered by the educational 
system.
Key activities: expansion of out-of-class 
and out-of-school forms of learning; 
setting up mechanisms and provisions 
for student scholarships and loans with 
the aim of facilitating access to higher 
education, This area of intervention is 
targeted at a more extensive coverage 
of children and adolescents into the 
educational system, establishing better 
conditions for their creative expressions, 
and developing their future potential for 
successful advancement.
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We analyse the commissioning process and associated bureaucratic deci-
sion-making for 13 calls for applications launched under BG-OPHRD to 
this date. Out of the 13, seven correspond to key area 4.1. and six to key 
area 4.2.
Who are the potential contractors?
The potential contractors vary for the calls. However, in most of the cases 
municipalities, schools, NGOs, central administration or other institutions 
that perform educational activities are listed as potential contractors. There 
is no significant difference in who the potential contractors can be under 
the two key areas of the fourth priority axis of the BG-OPHRD. Even 
though the main goal attainment of these calls can be very diverse there is 
a small difference in the eligibility requirements for potential contractors. 
The calls that are analysed cover the territory of Bulgaria.
For six of the analysed calls, the potential contractor is only the cen-
tral administration, even though the participation of, or partnership with, 
other organizations or NGOs could be meaningful in understanding the 
real needs of the beneficiaries. Significant resources have been allocated 
to the Ministry of Education and Science, while other actors (schools, 
NGOs, municipalities) have been restricted from participation in many 
of the schemes.
This tendency can harm the efficiency of the BG-OPHRD for at 
least two reasons. First, the administration will not be able to perform 
efficiently if is responsible for many schemes at the same time. There are 
obviously schemes that should be implemented by national institutions, 
such as schemes designed for policy-making. But when it comes to pro-
viding different social services, distribution of information and so on, the 
guiding role of the administration is ungrounded. Most of the schemes 
for direct financial allocation approved by the BG-OPHRD include types 
of activities which should be realized among vulnerable groups. However, 
very often the NGOs or other organizations that have direct contact with 
the groups are neither potential contractors, nor allowed in the partner-
ship structure. For example, in some of the calls targeting the Roma, the 
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participation of Roma or pro-Roma NGOs is not allowed or is limited to 
the status of member in the partnership structure implementing a project. 
None of these organizations is ever listed as primary partner or main con-
tractor. As a matter of fact, some of these schemes were not even designed 
as grant schemes and it is hard to explain why. This is because the par-
ticipation of organizations aiming to serve some of the most vulnerable 
groups is highly recommended throughout the entire programming and 
implementation project cycle, from identifying priorities, contributing to 
operational programmes, and work plans, and the membership of moni-
toring committees.
Second, the direct allocation of funds in most of cases puts the 
real implementers of activities in an unequal position. For instance, the 
Educational services for students lagging behind and gifted student scheme 
mostly includes organizing additional lessons with these children. It is 
obvious that these lessons will be organized by the schools or out-of-
school branches. However, the contractor for this scheme is the Ministry 
of Education. If this measure were opened as a grant scheme, this would 
have provided the real implementers with the right for equal participa-
tion not only at the implementation stage, but also at the planning stage. 
Through the direct allocation of funds, the role of the schools is dimin-
ished without real reason.
The number of contractors that are eligible to apply for funds in the 
calls under KAIs 4.1 and 4.2, after the specific financial, partnership, and 
activities criteria are met, is small. The evidence on these calls suggests that 
their design is unspecific, but also is framed with strict criteria. Together, 
these do not create favourable circumstances for a fair competition.
It is important to ensure that the range of potential contractors is 
broad, and that they are chosen based on their expertise, sustainability, 
and ability and skills. However, in Bulgaria, the same organizations are 
contractors under different schemes, and very often organizations that 
can offer innovative solutions and have the needed expertise are not eligi-
ble to apply. For example, many small organizations can never apply due 
to financial or some other call requirements. Concerns about the limited 
availability of structural funds to small organizations and NGOs has been 
raised in Brussels too, with Commissioner Andor specifically stating that 
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more attention to vulnerable groups should be given in programming 
2014–20 structural instruments in Bulgaria. One of the most important 
things in the design of the OPs is to find the balance between administra-
tion and the structures of civil society, as well as to find the best possible 
role for each actor. The schemes for direct financial allocation might not 
be the right mechanism for finding this balance. Therefore, it will be good 
if they are limited to the cases when the role of the given institution should 
lead imperatively. In all other cases, it would be better to use schemes that 
will allow many organizations to act as main contractor, and not overload 
the administration with activities that should not be under its scope of 
responsibilities.
However, what the tendering process omits to recognize are the real 
needs of the educational system in Bulgaria. Clearly, there is a lack of com-
munication between the managing authority, the intermediate bodies, 
and the potential contractors. Therefore, there is limited understanding 
of what are the least developed schools or regions and which are the actual 
vulnerable groups in the educational system.
Partnership structures
Applying the principle of partnership and empowerment is a key element 
of all structural-funds interventions. The main goal of this principle is to 
ensure the inclusion and access of the socio-economic partners and other 
stakeholders in the preparation, implementation, monitoring, and evalu-
ation of ESF support.
In the BG-OPHRD, the partnership principle extends its scope over 
all actions and covers all project cycle phases. In addition, the principle of 
partnership is considered both centrally and locally. Applying this principle 
should improve the mechanisms for experience- and knowledge-sharing 
among stakeholders; it should build up opportunities for more creative ways 
to address problems; allow a more effective management of actions based 
on multiple dimensions (involving a wide range of stakeholders or perspec-
tives) and multiple levels of intervention (national, regional and local); and 
guarantee a high level of compliance of selected actions with real needs.
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The partnership principle has been promoted in almost all calls. In 
many calls, partnership among local and central units has been encouraged. 
However, in several schemes, the partner is pre-set, even though there is 
not enough information and evidence to justify the exclusion of other 
potential partner organizations. In many of the schemes, project partner-
ship is a compulsory element. For most schemes, schools are the most pre-
ferred partner. After schools, NGOs appear in the partnership structure in 
many of the submitted projects, mainly due to their expertise in terms of 
writing projects and their experience in dealing with ethnic minorities. In 
some calls, one of the partners has to be the municipality. Bearing in mind 
the nature of some calls, it is understandable to include the municipality 
as a partner, instead of other institutions, since it is able to enhance the 
needed institutional support. However, in many cases and comparatively 
speaking, other organization could offer more innovative programmes, 
due to their expertise. For example, for the schemes, whose main goal is 
to create an integrative environment for socially vulnerable children such 
as Roma and their preparation to enrol in desegregated schools, it will be 
important to have as a partner an NGO that has been working with this 
high risk group. However, they are never specified as being a primary or 
mandatory partner in any way.
There are 264 municipalities in Bulgaria, which means that roughly 
more than half of them were actively involved in ESF tendering processes. 
Out of 2,000 educational NGOs in Bulgaria, around one tenth participated 
in the disbursement of ESF funding for education and provided services. 
That is indicative for NGO sustainability in the country: most non-profit 
establishments have a lifetime as long as the project duration; others are 
simply not that active in tendering procedures due to not having a good 
network infrastructure or resources (technical, human or financial) to 
apply for funds.
Partnership can be formed either by geographical location, by area of 
expertise, or on the basis on the number of partners allowed in the call. 
From a geographical perspective, the most common partnerships are local, 
since for many schemes, the municipality has to be a partner. For some of 
the calls, cross-regional partnerships are also formed. However, the calls 
neither specify precisely what is considered a cross-national structure, nor 
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are there bonus points for forming such partnership. In many cases, partner-
ships are formed in such way that smaller regions have little or no power 
in shaping the programmes. In cross-regional partnerships, the primary 
contractors are well-grounded organizations located in a big city, while the 
secondary contractors are local actors from different target regions. Such 
an example of a network, spreading over five target NUTS III regions, 
is that of a private secondary school in the capital, Sofia, which invited 
twelve partners to implement out-of-school activities. All the partners 
are academic and vocational schools from Sofia, Yambol, Burgas, Veliko 
Tarnovo, and Gabrovo.
It can be concluded that for most schemes, the main contractor 
has to partner with the municipality, an educational institution or an 
NGO. These partnership structures are common. In future, the specific 
partnership structure requirements should receive increased attention. 
Comparatively it would be an advantage to ensure that organizations that 
have expertise in working with the beneficiaries are involved, as they can 
address more easily the problem areas and offer innovative solutions. So 
far, the expertise of these partner institutions can vary but in most of the 
cases they are from the educational sector. Another forms of partnerships 
should be explored and encouraged. One good example of a partnership 
between many different entities with essentially the same expertise was 
the case when the Business Agency Varna association was the main con-
tractor and had eight different partners: two sport clubs; one academic 
ISCED 2–3 school in Varna; two vocational schools in Varna and Burgas; 
one lower-secondary school in Varna; one professional association in 
Varna; and one NGO. Even though it is never clearly suggested in the 
scheme, a similar partnership network appears in most instances. When 
the NGO appears as the main contractor, in 40 per cent of the cases it 
partners with schools, and in 20 per cent of the cases with kindergartens. 
NGOs are less likely to form partnerships with other NGO. When two 
NGOs partner with each other, a school is also involved in the network. 
Similarly, when the main contractor is the municipality, schools appear 
as partners in most of the cases. In about 20 per cent of cases, municipali-
ties invite an NGO (usually providing social services or working with 
minority groups).
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Who are the potential beneficiaries?
The main aim of the interventions of the Priority Axis 4 is to address the 
weaknesses of the educational system and pay special attention to the prob-
lem areas and to the most vulnerable groups. The analysis of the educational 
system reveals a poor performance and more pronounced educational- 
attainment problems among the ethnic minority groups. The minority 
groups have relatively insignificant participation and are still not integrated 
into the educational system. The problem is rather serious among children 
of Roma origin, as the psychological and socio-economic living conditions 
have a big influence on educational outcomes. To give these high-risk groups 
support in their opportunities for future work and educational attainment, it 
is important to foster their higher integration in the educational system from 
the youngest ages. Additionally, the high rate of early school dropouts is wor-
rying. The administrators of these interventions also need to look into the 
educational needs of children with special educational needs. The students 
with learning deficiencies, including those with physical disabilities, require 
permanent care to attain progress in education. In order to assist children 
who are absent from school at the very beginning of the education and are 
lagging behind students of the same age, various programmes have been 
designed to provide regulatory, financial and organizational conditions for 
supplementary education. However, the beneficiaries are not always specified.
In order for the EU Structural Funds to be used effectively to support 
Roma education, Roma need to be identified as a priority group in the 
operational programmes. However, many of the calls analysed here use 
very broad definitions of the potential beneficiaries. Roma children are 
defined as a priority group in only two of the calls for applications: the grant 
schemes Creating a favourable multicultural environment for the practical 
implementation of intercultural education and upbringing and Let’s make 
school attractive for young people. Both are targeted towards the educational 
integration of the most vulnerable social groups, with an emphasis on Roma 
children. The approval of projects within these two schemes is an impor-
tant step towards the process of educational integration of Roma children.
It is even more important to enlarge the scope of the organizations 
that will deal with the problems of this minority group. For years, the circle 
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of those promoting the educational integration of vulnerable groups such 
as Roma children has been limited to a few NGOs and a few individual 
experts. Therefore, there is a general feeling that there is lack of innova-
tive ideas. Many of the interventions towards Roma children have been 
exhausted and have been mechanically replicated over the years and are 
of questionable quality.
Unfortunately, it would be hasty to expect that the two above-named 
schemes designed under the BG-OPHRD have the financial capacity and 
innovative design to guarantee the educational integration process of Roma 
children. First, the maximum amount of EUR 50,000 for a single project 
is rather small if the purpose is to achieve full educational integration in 
any municipality.
Second, both calls do not have a clear draft of prioritized activities, 
supposed to assist the entire process of educational integration of these 
groups. In the first call, support for desegregation activities is embedded. 
However, the call either does not provide definitions, or it provides very 
unspecific ones. The experts from the BG-MES made a very interesting 
clarification during the application process, stating that even a school with 
1 per cent Bulgarian students and 99 per cent Roma students is considered 
to be integrated and ethnically mixed.
Third, there is a lack of active policies of the BG-MES for the edu-
cational integration of Roma children. There are no specific measures for 
Roma children specified among the activities of the MES for renewing the 
Bulgarian educational system. Both calls insist that the projects under the 
schemes should implement the national educational policy in the given 
municipality. So, the project should apply the BG-MES policy at the local 
level without any possibility for innovative models or the prospect for these 
to be multiplied at a national level. This vicious circle is not promising for 
the significant educational integration of vulnerable groups.
A fourth problem accompanying these schemes is the trend to allocate 
money to projects for schools for children with special needs. This trend 
causes concern for two different reasons. Firstly, one such school is cur-
rently participating in three projects, the goals of which are to integrate 
children from the special-needs school into mainstream schools. This 
example is evidence that the tendering process is not very competitive if 
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the same organization wins grants over and over again. However, it is fair 
to admit that it could only mean that this school has the needed expertise 
and has been applying with innovative projects.
Second, and more importantly, it is a public secret that the special 
schools still continue to enrol Roma children without any disabilities. 
Thanks to the BG-OPHRD projects and the finance allocated to the 
special schools, the parents of Roma children have even higher incentives 
to send their children to these schools, even though they should attend 
mainstream schools. The practice of sending children without special 
educational needs to the special schools is thus reinforced.
Finally, when looking at the beneficiaries, is important to mention 
that the calls almost never specify a primary target amongst potential ben-
eficiaries. For instance, in one of the calls, whose main goal is to help dis-
advantaged students who are lagging behind, potential beneficiaries can 
be students, children, parents and teachers; a primary beneficiary is never 
specified. This broad definition of potential beneficiaries will not guaran-
tee in any way that the funds are going to be used by the groups that need 
them most. However, it can be noted that this problem was understood by 
the MA and was addressed by creating more specific calls where the circle 
of potential beneficiaries was very small. For instance, under the call that 
aims to support integration of children and students from ethnic minorities 
in the education system, only children from the minority groups and their 
teachers can be beneficiaries. Also, under the grant scheme Support for the 
education of children and students with special educational needs, the funds are 
directed towards children with special educational needs, with an emphasis 
on younger children in this group and personnel in the special schools.
Designing educational services
The calls for applications analysed here seek to develop interventions that 
will facilitate higher access and motivation for participation in education 
of the vulnerable groups. The main beneficiaries under these schemes are 
drop-outs, students at risk of early school-leaving, minority groups and 
children with special educational needs. However, the scope of these calls 
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is not so wide, and their number seems insufficient to substantially reduce 
the number of drop-outs and sustain higher education participation and 
integration of the minority groups.
One caveat of the way that most calls are designed is that there is broad 
specification of the eligible activities under one scheme. Consequently, 
funds are not utilized in the best possible way. The gain of the most vul-
nerable group is not always high. How effective the listed activities are, 
and to what extent they can help tackle the weak points in the educational 
system is questionable. On average, according to the calls for applications, 
the projects can cover 20–35 per cent of possible activities. Therefore 
diverse sets of projects targeted towards many groups can meet the eligi-
bility requirements.
The benefit of having long lists that target many different activities is 
that the applicant can play an important role in the design of the projects, 
and can be innovative. The danger with having a list of very broad activi-
ties is that this can be manipulated in the allocation of funds. Funds can 
be allocated to activities that will not directly help the most vulnerable 
groups, but rather the schools or some other organization. For instance, in 
the scheme BG051PO001/07/4.1-01, whose main aim is higher integration 
of the ethnic groups, any activity that aims to contribute to achieving the 
horizontal principles of the BG-OPHRD is eligible.
The conclusion from the analysis of the calls issued under the Priority 
Axes 4.1 and 4.2 of the BG-OPHRD is that there is not much differen-
tiation between calls issued under the same key area of intervention. The 
number of activities that differ between different schemes is very small. 
In order to ensure that specific groups will benefit from one scheme is 
important in order to define very specific list of activities. For example, 
under the Support for children lagging behind education scheme, the main 
measures contemplated are very broad and include research activities into 
school drop-out rates, the training of teachers working with children from 
the target groups, and information campaigns, all at the same time. This 
is just one of the many schemes for which the MA issues catch-all calls.
Another point of concern is the quality of the activities mentioned 
in these calls. There is no solid explanation or monitoring system that will 
secure the quality of the proposed activities.
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Call design
The call design is structured in similar way for all schemes. In the first sec-
tion the call introduces the operational programme its scope and goals. 
Furthermore, each call comprises the general implementation conditions of 
the BG-OPHRD. This section is almost identical in all calls. Unfortunately, 
the practice of drafting the calls in the same manner is easily noticeable, 
even in the call-specific sections of each scheme.
Even though the eligibility requirements differ for each scheme, it is 
not a significant difference. The specification of the responsibilities of the 
main contractor, as well as the potential conditions and requirements for 
partnership, is very long, but the content can be sometimes misleading. 
One of the reasons for this is the fact that a clear line between the specific 
and general requirements is not always drawn. The outline of the finan-
cial requirements is lengthy but not very detailed. Furthermore, none of 
the calls set out specific rules concerning how much of a project’s budget 
should be directly allocated to the primary target group; for example the 
minimum amount that needs to be allocate to Roma causes is never defined. 
Therefore, from the call design itself, it is unclear how much each vulner-
able group will benefit.
While trying to create a more inclusive spectrum of activities, the 
calls very often fail to make specific mention of priority groups who face 
a higher risk in the educational system. The document defines broad sets 
of activities, whose main goal is improving education amongst the vulner-
able groups, but does not set specific target groups or expected outcomes. 
Likewise, other sections of the calls are very lengthy but very broad.
Other aspects of the commissioning cycle
Even though there are still problems in the commissioning process and 
the absorption rate of funds is still low, there have been certain reforms 
and these are reflected in the design of the calls. Important measures are 
those that help to shorten the time for conclusion of projects. Since 2010, 
the time the IB has to review applications has decreased. Furthermore, 
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since 2010, more precise documentation for the project proposal evalua-
tion was introduced and the MA has made additional efforts to help more 
potential contractors to be successful in the tendering process. It can be 
seen that the schemes that have been opened for applications from 2010 
onwards require a smaller number of documents to be submitted by the 
applicant. Also, since 2010, the MA has offered the potential contractors 
the possibility to have their documentation checked prior to submis-
sion. This measure has prevented the rejection of a significant number 
of project proposals in the administrative compliance-assessment phase. 
Furthermore, in order to facilitate a more efficient tendering process, 
the requirement for the submission of monthly reports by contractors 
has been removed. The information is now submitted in the interim and 
final reports only.
At the start of BG-OPHRD, most of the schemes announced were 
grants. For example, in 2007 the Ministry of Education and Science 
announced four grant schemes for a total amount of BGN 23,176,586. In 
total, 157 applications were submitted within the grant scheme 4.1 (Creating 
a favourable multicultural environment) and of these, sixty-seven were 
selected. The largest share of projects were managed by NGOs (twenty-
seven) followed by twenty-one school projects, fifteen municipal projects, 
and four others. Within the second grant scheme, 4.2. (Let’s make school 
attractive to youth) interest has been higher. In total, 689 project propos-
als were submitted and 256 of these were approved: eighty-three NGO 
projects, 149 school projects, eighteen municipal projects, and six others. 
Together, these covered around 85,000 children. These grant schemes 
involved the participation of many different organizations and allowed 
different stakeholders to be involved in many different projects.
Regardless of the success of the grant schemes, after 2008, the BG-MES 
has started to limit their share in the total number of calls for applica-
tions announced: only three out of nine operations were opened as grant 
schemes; the rest were reserved to directly finance previously nominated 
institutions. For instance, the grant schemes that were opened in 2008 for 
Support of PhDs, post-doctoral students and young scholars, Developing school 
and university practices, as well as the programme for out-of-school activities, 
were designed for direct financing. This pattern persisted in subsequent 
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years, too. In general, most of these schemes are open for direct financing 
without formal announcements of calls for proposals. This has made the 
tendering process in Bulgaria less competitive.
Conclusion: Ups and downs in the commissioning cycle
The main goal of this chapter was to assess the founding processes of 
domestic policy implementation and the capacity of the managing units 
in Bulgaria to accommodate the EU Cohesion policy objectives. The pro-
gramme under focus is the BG-OPHRD, while the area of particular focus 
is education. The chapter assessed the capacity of the managing author-
ity, the design of the calls, as well as the national policy documents. The 
analysis suggests that in order to enhance the success of the structural 
funds in Bulgaria, by increasing the managing capacity of the national 
institutions, it is important to take action across different stages of the 
commissioning cycle.
Some conclusions are provided by a tentative analysis of the sunset/
sunrise areas (Bradley 2005), which looks specifically at the two key areas 
of BG-OPHRD which targeted the educational sector in Bulgaria. During 
implementation, several sunset areas were identified. First, municipali-
ties are beneficiaries for all operational programmes in Bulgaria, but are 
not actively involved in the decision-making and distribution of fund-
ing for cultural projects on local and regional levels. The centralization 
of the operational programmes is an important problem, as is the full 
exploitation of the potential of different regions and efficiently using 
local resources. Second, the overall strategic position of the MES related 
to the utilization of the ESF for education is still unclear. The Ministry 
is mainly a beneficiary of the programmes and not an active initiator of 
directions of funding, strategies, tools and funding priorities under the 
BG-OPHRD. Third, the BG-OPHRD aims to support minority groups 
and the most vulnerable groups in the educational system; yet it does not 
contain specific plans to motivate organizations whose main aim is to 
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help these groups to apply. Also, BG-OPHRD does not seem designed 
to reflect the specificities of the educational sector. Fourth, the existing 
curricula of education and training across the country does not focus well 
on the regional dimensions of the educational policy in the country, nor 
on the EU integration process (including the connections between the 
Structural Funds and other EU-funded programmes). Fifth, there are 
missing links between the administrators working in the cultural sector 
and institutions responsible for the elaboration of the operational pro-
grammes for the next planning period. The development of the national 
cultural policy does not seem well synchronized or connected with the 
opportunities provided by the priorities of the EU Structural Funds for 
the next planning period.
During implementation, there were also positive developments. Also, 
some areas require little interventions in order to attain significant improve-
ment. First, projects in the field of intercultural education and training, 
cultural diversity, building understanding between different ethnic groups, 
and the integration of minority groups into the educational system through 
cultural events, and intercultural events for youth and children, have been 
supported under the BG-OPHRD, which suggests some progress is being 
made in reaching the social and educational inclusion goals of the ESF. 
Second, investment strategies connecting education with culture indirectly 
support the overall concept of ‘intercultural education’, which is one of 
the major topics in Europe, especially related to the education of youth 
and children. The need to invest in intercultural projects, especially in 
areas of diverse population and ethnic groups, and focusing on youth and 
children, is considered a priority. Third, the overall information related 
to the aims, procedures and deadlines of the Operational Programmes 
can be made more transparent, and be better announced across the coun-
try and accessible to all organizations. This can be maintained by regular 
communication and control on the activities of the selected contractors 
and service providers regarding the implementation of the schemes. Also, 
communication with other stakeholders (institutions, social and economic 
partners, non-governmental organizations, etc.) should be ensured, with 
regard to the implementation of joint initiatives aimed at the ESF and 
BG-OPHRD promotion.
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3  Balancing ESF goals with established national 
policy on special education: The case of the 
Czech Republic
ESF implementation in 
the Czech Republic hap-
pens in a context largely 
determined by how the 
Czech state defines the 
notions of vulnerable 
groups, special educa-
tional needs, and edu-
cational inclusion. The 
striking aspect is the 
fact that many Roma 
children in the Czech 
education system are 
directed towards special educational programmes for children with ‘mild 
mental disabilities’. This chapter approaches the institutional and bureau-
cratic dimensions of ESF implementation in the Czech Republic having 
in mind this particular issue and its linkage to the overarching goals of the 
European Social Fund. After briefly describing the national context, the 
chapter describes ESF-funded programmes in the Czech Republic. Later 
on it analyses the institutional set-up of the largest ESF-funded programme 
focusing on the education of vulnerable groups, as well as the manner in 
which bureaucratic decisions shape the market for educational service 
delivery in the country.
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The context: Roma children in the Czech education system
Within the Czech system of basic schools (providing students with com-
pulsory education), there are special basic schools designed for pupils with 
various disabilities and there are special-needs classrooms in mainstream 
schools. The Education Act of 2004 enacted that special schools were 
renamed basic schools or practical basic schools, and they are currently sup-
posed to provide their students with proper basic education and give equal 
educational opportunities. However, students in these schools may be edu-
cated according to the Supplement to the Framework Education programme 
for Children with Mild Mental Disability. This reduced curriculum places 
an emphasis upon practical activities (thirty-five lessons vs. nine lessons for 
students in mainstream schools) and reduces the content of other subjects 
(e.g. four foreign language lessons vs. 21 lessons in mainstream schools). In 
2009/2010, 4.8 per cent of compulsory school students were educated in 
special schools or classrooms. Students are placed in special schools on the 
basis of an examination in a pedagogical-psychological guidance center, 
often attached to the practical school, and with parental consent. After 
finishing compulsory education, special school students can, in principle, 
apply to go to any upper secondary school. However, they most often go 
on to one- or two-year vocational schools where they finish their studies 
without a vocational certificate.
The place of Roma children in the Czech education system is largely 
defined by a legal definition (Act no. 561/2004, section 16), which stipulates 
that individuals with ‘health impairments, health disadvantages or social dis-
advantages’ should be classified as having special educational needs This clas-
sification automatically directs these children towards special schools. Most 
of the children in this category, including Roma children, achieve insufficient 
education and graduate with low or even no qualifications, which is also 
one of the causes of social exclusion. No official statistics on the educational 
attainment of Roma children are available. Research shows that successful 
completion of upper secondary education is very rare for these children.
The annual report of the Czech School Inspectorate (CZ-CSI) 
for the academic year 2009/2010 describes many problems regarding 
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the mechanisms for the assignment of students to schools or classrooms 
(Czech School Inspectorate 2010) where they are educated according to 
the Supplement to the Education programme for Students with Mild Mental 
Disability. The report disclosed weaknesses in the diagnostic procedures 
and in receiving parental consent. CZ-CSI also states that students educated 
according to the programme for students with mild mental disability have 
very limited opportunities to return to mainstream education. Many Roma 
students were recommended to practical basic schools by counseling cent-
ers without a diagnosis of mental disability or any other disorder. CZ-CSI 
highlights that 35 per cent of Roma students are classified as mentally 
disabled, and describes this fact as discriminatory.
However, the system of special schools was challenged by a complaint 
of Roma citizens to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
According to a 2007 decision of the ECHR, the Czech Republic violated 
the right to education for eighteen Ostrava Roma that were wrongly sub-
jected to special schools (EHCR 2007). The court ruled that socially 
disadvantaged Roma children without mental disabilities must no longer 
be placed into educational programmes for children with mild mental 
disabilities.
This was the first time the court had considered a nationwide pat-
tern of discrimination. In this case, the court shifted its focus from the 
violations of the individual applicant’s rights to systemic discrimination. 
A complaint was first filed on their behalf in the Czech Constitutional 
Court by attorneys from the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) 
and local attorneys. The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a 
Grand Chamber, unanimously dismissed the government’s preliminary 
objection and held, by thirteen votes to four, that there had been a viola-
tion of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. 
The decision in this case has had an impact on the Czech Republic. On 
November 15, two days after the rendering of the final judgment in the case, 
the European Commission called on the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic to take measures preventing future discrimination against Roma 
children in education (Devroye 2009).
In April 2009, a report from the Czech government on the measures 
related to the Judgment of the ECHR related to this case was submitted 
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to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Report was 
approved by a resolution of the government. The resolution included the 
requirement to submit to the government by January 31, 2010 a proposal 
for a National Action Plan of Inclusive Education (CZ-NAPIE 2010). 
This task was fulfilled and the proposal was accepted by the government in 
May 2010. CZ-NAPIE does not just deal with selective practices towards 
children with special educational needs, but influences the education of all 
children and aims at maximizing the chances of each and every individual 
learner by removing barriers to his/her best performance in its widest sense.
Due to a change of government and many organizational changes in the 
CZ-MEYS, the action plan was for several months in what could be called 
a standby mode. In January 2011, CZ-NAPIE activities started again. As 
the Czech Republic and the former Czechoslovakia have had an extensively 
developed system of special schools, it is difficult especially for practition-
ers to accept the idea of inclusive education. There are few institutional 
incentives that make inclusion possible, and widespread prejudice against 
the Roma continues to support the social construction of ‘mild mental 
disability’, which is in and of itself highly problematic. It is thus not clear 
whether CZ-NAPIE would be implemented in its full scope or whether it 
would be reduced to partial measures focused on specific groups of special-
needs students (Straková et al. 2011). In this context, how the social and 
educational inclusion goals of the ESF are pursued is of utmost importance.
ESF-funded programmes in the Czech Republic
In the 2007–13 programming period, the Czech Republic managed, in the 
frame of the European Social Fund (ESF), a relatively large number of opera-
tional programmes. Three deal, to some degree, with vulnerable groups. 
Whereas the Operational Programme Human Resources and Employment 
is targeted on strengthening the integration of persons endangered by 
social exclusion, or who are socially excluded as a whole, the Operational 
Programme Education for Competitiveness (CZ-ECOP) focuses mainly 
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on education and pays much attention to the handling of the social exclu-
sion of children and youth. The third relevant programme, Operational 
Programme Prague – Adaptability (CZ-OPPA), is more complex in char-
acter and targets both the above-mentioned aspects of social vulnerability 
in the region of the Czech capital.1
The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS, or MŠMT in 
Czech) was designated as the managing authority (MA) for the CZ-ECOP, 
as it is responsible for public administration in education, for developing 
educational, youth and sport policies, and international co-operation in 
these fields. The global objective of the CZ-ECOP is the development of 
an open, flexible and cohesive society, and the strengthening of the com-
petitiveness of the Czech economy through partner co-operation, resulting 
in improved quality and modernization of the educational system in the 
complex framework of lifelong learning, and in improving conditions in the 
area of research and development. CZ-ECOP (MEYS 2007b) is composed 
of five priority axes: 1) Initial education (initial training, in some docu-
ments cited in this chapter); 2) Tertiary education, research and develop-
ment; 3) Further education; 4) System Framework for lifelong learning; 
and 5) Technical assistance. CZ-ECOP falls under the multi-objective and 
thematic operational programmes financed by the European Social Fund, 
in particular under the Convergence objective (NSRF Czech Republic 
2007–13). The global objective of the CZ-ECOP is particularly consistent 
with the first and basic priority of the strategic document Europe 2020 (the 
‘Youth on the move’ initiative which enhances the performance of educa-
tion systems and facilitates the entry of young people to the labour market).
The managing authority of the CZ-OPPA is the Capital City of 
Prague. The global objective of CZ-OPPA is to raise Prague’s competi-
tiveness by promoting the adaptability and efficiency of its human resources 
and by improving access to employment for all. Fulfilling this objective 
1 In the frame of structural policy, EU regions are classified according to the GDP 
of the region. The region of Prague belongs under the Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment objective; the rest of the country under the Convergence objec-
tive. Therefore, Prague may not use EU funding intended for the rest of the Czech 
Republic, and vice versa.
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contributes to strengthening the sustainable social economic development 
of the region and increasing the importance of the capital city in the central 
European region, as compared with the capitals of other member states.
This chapter will deal mostly with the CZ-ECOP and how it treats 
the issue of education for children with special needs. The support for 
pupils with special needs is relatively broad within the CZ-ECOP. There 
is a selection of measures that, in theory, should serve those pupils very 
well. All these measures are incorporated in priority axes 1 and 4. Priority 
axis 1 was initially implemented through three complementary areas of 
intervention (measures or areas of support).
The support for children and pupils with special educational needs 
is most significantly incorporated in Priority Axis 1 nitial Education and 
specifically in the key area of intervention 1.2 Equal opportunities for children 
and pupils, including the children and pupils with special educational needs. 
The supported projects focus on helping pupils with special educational 
needs to overcome their problems, and on enabling their involvement in 
the educational process. The vulnerable target groups are mostly defined 
by physical or social-cultural criteria. One defined group of potential ben-
eficiaries comprises children with special educational needs from nursery 
schools and preparatory classes for admission to primary schools. In real-
ity, this target group is formed to a large degree of Roma children. Two 
other key areas of intervention focus on quality improvement in education 
and the improvement of the skills of teaching and non-teachign staff in all 
schools, without a special focus on educational inclusion.
Within the CZ-ECOP, two other key areas of intervention were des-
ignated. KAI 1.4 is intended for basic schools (ISCED 1 and 2) and KAI 
1.5 for secondary schools and conservatories (ISCED 3). Both KAIs are 
constructed on unit costs – or a system of templates. Each group of tem-
plates is focused on one specific area (for example mathematics, literacy 
or sciences). One group of these templates deals also with inclusion topics 
and, for example, enables schools to hire special education teachers, teach-
ing assistants or school psychologists. These KAIs have only one type of 
potential applicant. Every registered school in the Czech Republic (exclud-
ing those in Prague) has a fixed, allocated amount of money, based on the 
number of pupils who could apply. Therefore, these two KAIs actually 
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do not involve real competition. The implementation of templates for 
primary schools started in 2010, whereas the launching of KAI 1.5 was 
enabled later by reallocations from one priority axis to another (approved 
by the monitoring committee of the CZ-ECOP in June 2011), since there 
were not enough funds in priority axis 1 at that time.
The biggest implementation problem of the CZ-ECOP became the 
repetitive organizational and personal changes, not limited to the leader-
ship of the Ministry of Education,2 but also including the group that is 
responsible for managing assistance from EU structural funds. As a result, 
there were delays in the implementation of the programme structure, and 
in resolving legal relations between the Managing Authority, Intermediate 
Bodies in thirteen regions of the country, and other stakeholders.
An important risk is connected to these changes. According to evalu-
ation reports, there is a lack of co-operation, co-ordination and division 
of responsibilities between the CZ-MEYS departments responsible for 
non-fund agenda and CZ-MEYS departments belonging to the implemen-
tation structure, the managing authority and, above all, the departments 
responsible for implementing individual national projects. The co-ordina-
tion and co-operation between entities is insufficient. Due to these issues, 
the programme is included among the most problematic structural funds 
programmes implemented in the Czech Republic. The 2010 report of the 
European Court of Auditors exhibited one of the highest error rates of 
submitted projects within the Member States. This fact led to the suspen-
sion of payments for the CZ-ECOP in January 2012. After the approval of 
the list of measures to be undertaken by the Czech authorities, payments 
were resumed in December 2012.
The annual reports discussed the issue of the poor quality of indi-
vidual assessments of applications. When externally evaluated, the assess-
ment of applications provided by the individual evaluators did not match 
programme requirements. The evaluators had to rework their assessments 
2 Since 1989, the Czech Republic has had 15 ministers of education, with their aver-
age time in office being ten months. A change of minister is often accompanied by 
changes of all top ministry officials.
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or supplement them, and the third individual evaluator (supposed to be 
exceptional) often had to be utilized, because the results of the first two 
assessments of the same application were too different. Evaluators had to 
be retrained in problem areas and further co-operation continued only 
with those whose work results were of a high quality and in accordance 
with the established rules and requirements of the OP.
Another issue appeared in connection with the first calls for applica-
tions launched, as the definitions of compulsory monitoring indicators, 
which should have clearly described their meaning and fulfilment, were 
not available. For this reason, many applicants understood differently (and 
wrongly) what the individual indicators really meant. There were situations 
when, due to an inaccurate understanding of the problem, the indicators 
were incorrectly set by the applicants. There were also problems with the 
estimated values of indicators. This led, in later phases, to many requests 
for substantial changes in the set of indicators used. Many contractors had 
to apply for substantial changes to the indicators they had originally set 
out in project proposals. In 2011, a new guide for indicators was approved 
and the situation improved.
The administration of applications was, in the first years of CZ-ECOP 
implementation, greatly affected by the poor stability of the monitoring 
systems (Benefit and Monit, see MEYS 2008, 2009b, 2010, 2011, 2012).
Last but not least, the low administrative capacity of the MEYS and 
its departments led to the rejection of national (system) project propos-
als by the European Commission. The lack of a conceptualized approach 
may be another explanation for an unsatisfactory drawing of the finances.
Progress in CZ-ECOP implementation by 2012
The CZ-ECOP became operational on October 12, 2007 following final 
approval by the European Commission. During 2007, the Implementation 
Document for the CZ-ECOP was finalized (MEYS 2007c). Furthermore, 
in that year the complete detailed documentation for the Implementation 
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of the CZ-ECOP manual with annexes and guidelines was prepared. These 
documents describe in detail the rules and procedures which have to be 
observed and which actually influence the application and implementa-
tion processes tremendously. Also, in 2007, a call for the first global grant 
for regions in measure 1.2 was launched.
In 2008, significant progress was achieved, especially in launching the 
calls and in approving projects (MEYS 2009b). The CZ-ECOP published 
a total of fifty-seven calls, of which four were for global grants for regions. 
The regions subsequently published forty-two calls in total – for the PA 
1 and for the measure 3.2 – for the submission of grant projects, which by 
the end of 2008 reached a total of 502 projects. The remaining eleven calls 
were published by the Managing Authority: for the presentation of other 
individual projects (five calls), individual national projects (four calls), and 
technical assistance projects (two calls). A total of forty-eight projects for 
technical assistance and six individual national projects were approved. In 
all, the OP processed 2,856 project applications and approved 556 grants, 
for a total of 112,218,460 EUR (not including global grants).
In 2009, projects for a total of 614,762,111 EUR were approved, which 
represents 29 per cent of the funds for the programme, out of which 
178,278,075 EUR (8 per cent of the funds allocated) was paid to beneficiar-
ies. In 2009, a total of fifty-seven calls were published. Regions announced 
and administrated fifty-two calls for submission of grant projects. The 
remaining five calls were announced by the Managing Authority for the 
submission of further individual projects (MEYS 2010). Calls for national 
individual projects and technical assistance continued.
In 2010, 871,761,196 EUR for individual projects and global grants 
were contracted, which represents 41 per cent of the programme alloca-
tion (MEYS 2011). Contractors were reimbursed with 354,831,108 EUR 
(16 per cent of the allocation for the programme). In total, 3,370 projects were 
approved. A total of 65 calls were announced for IP and GP (580,776,435.5 
EUR in total), of which seven were for individual projects (461,386,218.6 
EUR) and fifty-eight calls for global projects (EUR 119,390,216.9).
In 2011, significant progress in the implementation of CZ-ECOP was 
achieved and a number of measures for further acceleration were adopted 
(MEYS 2012). The biggest success was KAI 1.4 (improving education at 
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basic schools), as discussed in a previous section. The call for applications 
was launched in the spring of 2010. By the end of 2011, 3,580 project applica-
tions were submitted, which counts for more than 90 per cent of all eligible 
applicants. The main objective (the participation of elementary schools in 
the absorption of ESF funds) was reached. In particular, small schools had 
until then only a limited possibility to raise the money using more tradi-
tional channels, as the administrative procedures were very complicated.
The institutional set-up of ESF in the Czech Republic
Before the CZ-ECOP launch, there were two main strategic documents 
defining the position of children and pupils with special educational needs 
in the Czech educational system. The first one is the National Education 
Development programme – White Paper (MEYS 2001) and the second 
one is the Czech Republic Long-term Development Plan for Education 
and the Educational System (MEYS 2002, 2005a). Their objectives and 
intentions are fulfilled primarily by the preparation of legal regulations, 
concepts and methodologies for changes resulting from strategic directions. 
The White Paper initialized the curriculum reform, and its implementa-
tion was one of the main objectives to be dealt with within the CZ-ECOP. 
The main objective of the reform was a qualitative change in educational 
practices and approach to pupils; it introduced the framework educational 
programmes for schools at levels ISCED 0 to ISCED 3. Each school in the 
system was supposed to prepare its own School Educational Programme, 
based on framework programme for the specific type of school.
During the implementation of the CZ-ECOP, the Czech government 
has further modified the Czech Republic Long-term Development Plan 
for Education and Educational System (MEYS 2007a, 2009a). The last 
version is intended for the period until 2015, which will affect the next 
programming period for ESF 2014–20.
One document specifically focused on children from socio- culturally 
disadvantaged environments and for children with low cultural and social 
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status (and for their families) is the Early Childcare Concept (MEYS 2005b). 
This concept covers, in particular, the period from the age of three years 
until the start of mandatory school attendance. One of the Concept’s main 
objectives is to improve the conditions for educating these children within 
pre-school education, including the implementation of programmes that 
focus on the pilot screening of early care projects. Projects also supported 
the integration of pupils with disabilities into regular schools. According 
to the statement in the CZ-ECOP, the positive development has been 
observed primarily in special schools (schools established for pupils with 
special educational needs).
The last call for proposals for other individual projects within KAI 1.2 
(not yet evaluated) took into consideration the new Strategy for combating 
social exclusion for the period 2011–15 (Agency for Social Inclusion 2011). 
This strategy points out the necessity of strengthening existing instruments 
for inclusive education and reducing the number of children from socially 
excluded localities that are educated in practical schools outside the main 
stream of education. The strategy aims to promote pre-school education 
of these children as well.
Formal decision-making
The main principle when using the resources from the European Social Fund 
for achieving the CZ-ECOP objectives is a strict separation of implementa-
tion, payment and control (MEYS 2007c). The CZ-MEYS has authorized 
the Section for Managing the Structural Funds IV/I of MEYS to ensure the 
function of the CZ-ECOP Managing Authority by the decision from the 
Minister of Education, Youth and Sports on the implementation of structural 
funds within the ministry. The National Fund Department of the Ministry 
of Finance has been authorized to act as the Paying Authority and Certifying 
Authority of the Education for Competitiveness OP by a decision from the 
Minister of Finance. The Audit Authority is established in Article 59 of the 
Council Regulation (EC) no. 1083/2006. The Ministry of Finance has been 
authorized to act as the Audit Authority by Government Resolution no. 
198/2006 of February 22, 2006. The Minister for Finance has decided to 
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entrust this function to the Audit Authority (Central Harmonization Unit 
Section), which is functionally independent of the CZ-ECOP Managing 
Authority and the Payment and Certifying authorities.
The Managing Authority (as mentioned above) is an integral part of 
CZ-MEYS. Therefore, all significant adjustments of ministry policy should 
be approved by the MA as well (MEYS 2007c). Due to the financial crisis 
and the reduction of the budget that the government allocates to educa-
tion and related activities, the role of ESF support is immense. Therefore, 
the quality of implementation can really influence the educational reality 
in the Czech Republic. The role of the MA depends on personal situa-
tions within the management of MA. It is worth mentioning that, over 
the years, the situation has improved and recently, functional co-operation 
between different parts of CZ-MEYS was established and the preparation 
of new programming period is being realized across the ministry. Due to 
many administrative and personal changes in the Section for Managing the 
Structural Funds, the departments responsible for assessment and evalu-
ation, as well as implementation of projects, had various difficulties with 
competencies as revealed in the external evaluation report Annual review 
of progress of CZ-ECOP, 2010 (MEYS 2011b).
Calls for national individual projects, as well as for other individual 
projects, are prepared by the MA; calls for grant projects within the global 
grants are prepared by Intermediate Bodies, but are subject to prior approval 
by the MA. During the call preparation, other stakeholders and experts may 
be addressed. When the call is being prepared, round tables are organized 
where important stakeholders can send their representatives. Whether the 
broader discussion is organized or not partly depends on the current situ-
ation or atmosphere at the MEYS. However, regions are always included.
The representation of stakeholders
Relevant stakeholders are represented in the Monitoring Committee (MC), 
which monitors the fulfilment of the programme and its effectiveness 
and proper implementation. The MC also participates in evaluating and 
approving the drafts regarding the CZ-ECOP Implementation Document, 
implementing the programme, approving changes and reallocating the text 
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of calls in some cases. The MC is based on the partnership principle and its 
members are representatives of the MA, partner ministries, regions, social 
partners, non-governmental non-profit organizations, Paying Authority, 
and Certifying Authority. As almost half of the members are regions (thir-
teen members out of thirty), the greatest impact is felt in regions that are 
perceived as being influential members of the MC. NGOs have only two 
representatives in the MC; therefore, their influence is not very strong.
Promotion of partnership
Partnership is defined in implementation documents (MEYS 2007c) as the 
relation between two or more subjects that is based on joint responsibility 
and co-operation during preparation and implementation of the project. In 
the case of partnership without financial contribution, activities such as con-
sultation, piloting of innovative materials, co-operation between schools, and 
professional guarantees are accepted, but there is no financial contribution 
provided to the partner for participation in the project implementation. In 
the case of grant projects and individual projects (submitted by the entities 
that are allowed to establish financial partnership by legal regulations), the 
participation of partners with financial contribution is possible, on the fulfil-
ment of defined criteria (i.e. the expenditures that incur to the partners of the 
applicant, which participate in the creation and implementation of material 
activities of projects, and are part of recognizable costs of the project). For 
the purpose of defining the partners’ share in project implementation, it is 
necessary to come to an agreement between the applicant and the partners.
Shaping the educational welfare market  
in the Czech Republic
This section of the chapter showcases how two very specific sets of bureau-
cratic decisions, concerning the types of grants to be awarded and pro-
gramme targeting, shape the achievement of ESF social and educational 
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inclusion goals in a very difficult national context. The analysis is focused 
on the calls for applications launched under the key area of intervention 
1.2 Equal opportunities for children and pupils, which includes support for 
children and pupils with special educational needs.
The decision to award certain types of grants is essential in terms of 
ensuring the weakest actors in the Czech education system have access to 
funding which could help them address equality and quality of education 
issues. The support in the frame of the CZ-ECOP programme is imple-
mented through three types of projects: grant projects supported in the 
framework of global grants, other individual projects, and national projects 
(MEYS 2007b).
The global grants represent a decentralized system of support at 
regional level. The calls for applications for global grants are launched 
by the MA after negotiating with the regions and other stakeholders. 
These grants should refer to approved Long-term Development Plans for 
Education and Education Systems prepared for every single region,3 and 
thus react to specific situations and problems in the regions. As each region 
has its own representative in the Monitoring Committee (MC), there is 
an unclear definition of the competencies of the Intermediates Bodies (the 
Czech regions). Also, the MA conditions in the form of global grants have 
a complicated administration. This aspect of implementation was repeat-
edly questioned in evaluation reports. Each of the thirteen Czech regions 
has prepared, within priority axis 1.2, two global grants, from which so-
called grant projects were supported. Grant projects are usually projects 
of a smaller extent and are always implemented within the territory of one 
region. These projects focus mainly on the implementation of services for 
target groups of individuals and organizations, on the basis of demand 
specified by the beneficiaries and resulting from the analysis of target-
group needs.
3 Regions are responsible for education in their territories. Regional authorities develop 
long-term policy objectives for their specific region in compliance with the national 
strategic plan every four years. 
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Other individual projects are subject to calls for applications launched 
by the MA. Unlike the global grants, these other individual projects are 
administered at the central level. The basic condition for the projects is 
that they must be multi-regional. The only exception is when the applicant 
is the region itself and its project focuses on solving a specific problem in 
the area of that region. The projects should focus on the development of 
national policies and on curriculum modernization.
National individual projects are system projects with only two eligible 
applicants – the CZ-MEYS and the Czech School Inspectorate. These 
projects should have an impact on the whole education system. In this 
category, for example, we can include the implementation of standardized 
examinations in primary and secondary education, the development of 
standards for the teaching profession, and the implementation of national 
comparative surveys. Also, there have been several projects aiming to reduce 
educational inequalities, mainly through counselling services.4
Who are the potential contractors?
The spectrum of potential contractors is quite broad within the above-
mentioned key area of intervention. All of the following are allowed to 
compete for funding: governmental agencies (those organization directed 
by CZ-MEYS); regions and other regional governments; schools and 
school facilities (public and non-state); universities (public and non-state); 
research institutions; NGOs delivering educational services; certified pro-
viders of professional training for teachers; trade unions; and private com-
panies (if they have been providing educational services in the two years 
4 For example: the development of school-counseling centers; the prevention of drop-
ping out of education; the support for the secondary education of pupils from socio-
culturally disadvantaged backgrounds; the validation of non-formal education and 
informal learning in the network of schools providing adult education; minority 
integration centers (development of guidance, education and support services for 
socially disadvantaged pupils); and inclusive education support centers.
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before applying). Provided that churches run schools or school facilities 
(for non-formal education, for example), they are also eligible.
The most frequent contractors in key area of intervention 1.2 are 
NGOs, schools and educational institutions (i.e. legal entities carrying 
on the activities of schools, and educational institutions in the schools 
register), universities, and organizations engaged in the area of leisure-time 
activities for children and youth.
Partnership structures
Partnership is generally supported and regulated by a guide for project 
applicants from the CZ-ECOP. The scrutinized calls refer in this matter to 
the guide and do not include any more specific requirements or incentives 
for project partnership. Partnership structures in the case of the projects 
funded under key area of intervention 1.2 do appear; nevertheless this 
comprises a minority of projects. There are no special provisions supposed 
to stimulate the participation of public-sector institutions in partnership 
structures. However, under key area of intervention 1.1 (which is aimed at 
all pupils in ISCED 1–3 schools) we find several projects where a school 
has established a partnership with a public organization directly supervised 
by CZ-MEYS.
Who are the potential beneficiaries?
The main target group in the grant projects implemented within the frame-
work of global grants and in other individual projects under KAI 1.2 are 
pupils with special educational needs The supported projects focus on 
helping pupils with special educational needs to overcome their problems 
and to involve them in the educational process. The vulnerable target 
groups are mostly defined by physical or social-cultural criteria. The calls 
(with two exceptions, calls 14 and 43) do not explicitly target Roma pupils 
and students. However, references to social disadvantages indirectly raise 
demand for the involvement of this ethnic minority in projects.
Balancing ESF goals with established national policy on special education 65
The origin of problems connected to children and pupils of Roma 
ethnicity is understood as a consequence of the low social capital of families 
and an insufficiently supportive societal-cultural background. The indirect 
naming of this group as ‘socially disadvantaged’, ‘with different societal-
cultural background’ or ‘living in a socially excluded locality’ in project pro-
posals signals the belief that vulnerability in education does not apply to the 
whole minority group. There is, of course, the issue of ethnic identification, 
as during the census, more and more Roma declare themselves to be Czech.
One clearly defined group of potential beneficiaries comprises chil-
dren with special educational needs from nursery schools and prepara-
tory classes for admission to primary schools. In reality, this target group 
is composed of many Roma children. Last but not least, another target 
vulnerable group, supported by most of the calls, comprises gifted and 
talented pupils and students who are not noticeably supported by Czech 
education policy. It is also worth mentioning that the calls analysed in this 
report supported a large number of projects aiming to prevent racism and 
xenophobia, whose beneficiaries were pupils and students, regardless of 
any special educational needs.
The secondary target group in most projects are teachers and other 
persons working with the primary target group (e.g. often employees of 
NGOs).
Based on the analysis of the texts of calls, it is very difficult to assess 
which potential beneficiaries were eventually chosen. Most of the calls 
include a long list of potential recipients, and applicants are thus given a 
large scope for choice. The possibility to target projects on problem groups 
through their specific selection in the texts of the calls has therefore been 
rather unused by the managing authority of the CZ-ECOP.
Designing services
The most frequently implemented activities in grant projects and other 
individual projects under key area of intervention 1.2 focused, among others, 
on the application and improvement of organizational forms of tuition 
and teaching methods supporting equal access to education (including the 
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creation of individual school framework programmes, use of information 
and communication technology – ICT, and e-learning applications), special 
pedagogical and psychological services for pupils defined as having special 
educational needs, non-formal education, teacher training, and the timely 
provision of the minimum guaranteed care for socio-culturally disadvantaged 
children. With respect to supported activities, during implementation, a posi-
tive trend in their definition in calls can be observed. While some of the first 
calls include very general formulation of the activities supported, in the fol-
lowing ones gradual refinement and their detailed description can be found.
As regards projects implemented by schools, we identified projects deal-
ing with pre-school children and the transition from nursery to basic schools, 
and projects based on work with individual pupils and their families (often 
containing mentoring or remedial education). In a second group we have 
projects focusing primarily on developing an ‘inclusive school’ (by education 
of teachers and other pedagogical workers, developing new methods and 
forms of teaching etc.). In the third group we have projects for special and 
practical schools (schools with reduced curriculum). In their projects, NGOs 
mostly covered the following activities: remedial education and mentoring, 
counselling for pupils and families, and street-work and leisure activities.
Adjustments made during the comissioning cycle
Several problematic areas were identified. First, the low volume of certified 
funds, and the potential risk of non-fulfilment of the n +3 / n +2 rule, is iden-
tified as the main risk factor in CZ-ECOP implementation. In this context, 
the managing authority adopted a series of measures designed to minimize 
automatic de-commitment (see MEYS 2008, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2012). The 
programme has been streamlining the process of absorbing funds. Measures 
relating to the optimization of monitoring systems and the professional train-
ing of staff were taken, and guidelines for applicants and beneficiaries were 
amended. The same happened to monitoring indicators and the adminis-
tration of payments. Second, one area of concern is definitely the quality of 
monitoring system MONIT7+ and the low quality of services related to 
this system. The total time for processing the requests is two to six months 
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in average, which does not correspond to the needs of implementation. 
Spontaneous and unwanted changes in functionality are another drawback. 
Third, most employees of the managing authority are graduates without 
previous experience, which is another element of insufficient administrative 
capacity. The managing authority and the intermediate bodies struggled 
with this lack of expertise. However, over the years, the quality of training 
has improved. Fourth, during the administration of calls, large differences in 
the quality of the individual evaluators were found. Therefore, in 2009, the 
MA tightened the conditions for the selection of evaluators and extended the 
certification. Within each new call, specific training is provided. Furthermore, 
a new method for the assessment of applications was introduced.
When tracing developments and changes in the commissioning cycle 
over the analysed period, we can observe the efforts of the MA for improv-
ing the processes and refining the texts of the calls for applications, espe-
cially in the areas of assessment criteria and requirements for integrated 
approaches.
Assessment criteria valid for all calls from the operational programme 
are included in the guides for applicants, while specific criteria which relate 
directly to a specific call are included in its annexes. As some eligible activi-
ties are more desirable and more complicated in terms of implementation 
(the inclusion of children and pupils with special educational needs in main-
stream education, including non-formal education, for example), the project 
that has such an activity as a main goal will gain extra points (for example, 
a maximum of seven points within the call 08). The second example of an 
application of specific criteria is from call 43, where projects that would be 
implemented directly in social-excluded localities (explicitly defined within 
the call) were rewarded with four points during the assessment of the applica-
tion. Of the one hundred points on the applications’ assessment scale, eighty-
five fall to the criteria applicable to the entire operational programme and 
fifteen to specific criteria. This ratio did not change in the analysed period. 
Nevertheless, there have been changes in the set of assessment criteria in the 
guide for applicants and some more specific criteria were developed. For 
calls launched after 2011, the financial criteria were evaluated by more points 
(twenty-three points) than before (twenty points). Over time, there has been 
a fluctuation of points awarded for the experience of the applicant (between 
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two and eight points). If we evaluate the development of specific criteria, we 
can say that, over time, they were refined, they have become more detailed 
and through them, the MA placed additional requirements on applicants 
(e.g. call 43 contained a specific criterion – Applicant implements project in 
schools in socially excluded localities or in their neighbourhood – which was 
awarded four points and implicitly guided applicants to prepare a project 
for pupils and students from the Roma ethnic group).
In time, the requirement for an integrated approach appears more 
often and more binding. While in the first calls (no. 8, the first call for 
applications for global grants) this requirement is not mentioned at all, in 
calls 14 and 27 (the second and third call for global grants) it is explicitly 
recommended. Among the supported topics of call 14, we find ‘Integrated 
and comprehensive programmes of specific primary prevention’, while in 
call 43 it becomes compulsory. Projects must address issues systematically 
in accordance with strategic goals and objectives.
Also, very few changes between older and newer calls in terms of 
market-shaping can be identified. There have not been any major differ-
ences, not in the case of potential beneficiaries, nor of potential contractors. 
The only exception worth mentioning is the exclusion of trade unions, 
employers’ associations, professional associations, and private companies 
from the categories of potential contractors. While call 8 (CZ-ECOP) 
allowed these groups to apply for support, the following calls excluded 
these stakeholders from applying and implementing projects under KAI 
1.2. As was already mentioned above, the definition of supported activi-
ties (but not necessarily the activities themselves) in scrutinized calls has 
become more detailed and robust over time.
Conclusion
Czech education policy is characterized by a lack of steering and continu-
ity. This situation makes the efficient use of ESF funds in education very 
difficult. Experience shows that a large proportion of ESF money has been 
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spent on partial issues with limited usefulness. The most serious danger, 
however, lies in insufficiently premeditated national projects that were 
launched just because of ESF money (in the situation where there was 
not sufficient expertise available). This may result in products that will 
be harmful for the system long after the period of European Structural 
Funds. Good examples of such projects are teacher standards or standard-
ized assessments.
The projects are designed and implemented in isolation from each 
other and, sometimes, national education policy and, thus, in many cases 
do not have the desired impact. This is true also for the big ‘national pro-
jects’ carried out directly by the Ministry of Education. The ‘project nature’ 
of ESF activities encourages the carrying out of isolated activities rather 
than implementing a premeditated and consistent education policy. It has 
proven to be difficult to continue with the activity once an ESF project is 
over. The national rules for the ESF framework preclude proper prepara-
tion and the diligent development of instruments and thorough discussion 
in the education community, because the development is hurried to meet 
the timelines of a project. It also makes it impossible to adjust processes 
according to deficiencies that are discovered, because ESF projects have to 
be planned in detail in advance and it is difficult to implement substantial 
changes during their realization. The implementation of ESF projects in 
the area of education has the same deficiencies as the implementation of 
projects in other areas of public policy (Potluka et al. 2010). The problems 
are not related to an incorrect recognition of important topics, but to the 
inability to plan and implement a consistent educational policy, either 
with the help of ESF money or without it.
Nevertheless, slight positive trends can be observed in the preparation 
of calls which, with better timing and more detailed requirements for the 
applicants, make references to other public policy documents and research 
findings, and ask contractors for complex and systematic solutions. Also, 
some of the initial problematic issues with administration of projects were 
resolved and improved. The positive influence was undoubtedly because 
of recommendations and criticism from the European Commission, but 
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4  ESF-funded education delivery under arbitrary 
rule-making: The case of Hungary
This chapter approaches ESF 
implementation in Hungary 
between 2007 and 2012, plac-
ing an emphasis on how 
the education of vulnerable 
groups is approached by the 
Social Renewal Operational 
Programme (HU-SROP). The 
analysis takes into account the 
changing political context in 
which HU-SROP implementation happens and the consequences of 
political change in terms of bureaucratic decision-making concerning the 
commissioning of educational services for vulnerable groups. The chapter 
is divided into three main sections. The first one describes the programme 
under focus, the second one analyses the institutional set-up of ESF imple-
mentation in Hungary as reflected by national policy documents, while 
the third takes an in-depth look at how administrative decisions concern-
ing implementation actually shaped the delivery of educational services to 
multiply disadvantaged children.
Alongside the methods employed in investigating the same set of 
issues in the other countries included in the Educational selectivity of the 
European Social Fund project, the analysis on the Hungarian case is also 
based on several interviews with key actors in the managing authority of 
the HU-SROP and the policy community. Interviews were focused on: 
identifying their interpretation of the defensible purpose of the manage-
ment authority; identifying rules in-use governing the development of 
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guidelines for applicants; day-to-day interactions with contractors during 
all steps of the commissioning process; the incorporation of the results 
of the interim evaluation into the management of the programme; their 
manner of dealing with sunset/sunrise situations; and their risk-averse/
risk-taking behavior.
The Social Renewal Operational Programme
The comprehensive goal of HU-SROP is to increase participation in the 
labour market. In order to realize this goal, the programme implements 
measures that influence the supply side of the labor market and improve 
human resources. The programme takes an inter-sectoral approach, includ-
ing interventions in the field of employment, education, training, culture, 
healthcare and social affairs, and it seeks to improve the conditions of equal 
opportunities (HU-SROP 2007). The programme is realized along seven 
professional and two technical aid priority axes.
HU-SROP is a heterogeneous programme, characterized by a dual 
approach: a part of priority axes is directly linked to the comprehensive 
goal of labor market participation (especially priorities number 1, 2 and 6 
contain objectives related to the stimulation of employment), while other 
priority axes are associated with sectoral objectives, projects and interests, 
contributing to the programme’s goals in an indirect manner.
Planning was made difficult by the incidental lack of sectoral concep-
tions and strategies, or the uneven development of such conceptions and 
strategies at distinct standards and with very different time scales, mostly 
without any standardized elements of development policies. Comprehensive 
sectoral strategies spanning across ‘governmental cycles’ and nationwide 
analyses which would provide their bases are lacking. Therefore, planning 
is often ill founded, impairing the coherence of priorities, as well as the 
actual content of calls (TÁRKI 2010).
Under the New Hungary Development Plan (HU-NHDP 2007, 
the Hungarian title of the National Strategic Reference Framework), 
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centrally managed development programmes in Hungary between 2007 
and 2013 were determined in biannual action plans. As opposed to the 
previous practice during the three-year programming cycle of the Human 
Resources Operational programme (HU-HRDOP), where only the 
framework of interventions was provided, these biannual action plans 
specify the tasks of strategic projects and the content of individual calls 
in detail.
As a matter of fact, during the course of planning, the conditions of 
implementation – legal background, the accurate specification, functional-
ity and conditions of use concerning materials and products to be realized, 
financing of the sustainability of products to be elaborated, consideration 
and calculation of the extra expenditure concerning involved normative 
support – were mostly disregarded, impairing the smooth operation, pro-
ductivity, and long-term sustainability of all innovation results.
The original design of the programme was based on mutually inter-
linking programme elements that, at the beginning, were originally profes-
sionally sound, well founded and coherent. However, mutual interlinking 
was not enforced during implementation and – partly because of bad time-
management – programme elements became dislocated (Expanzió Human 
Consulting 2011). As a result, the entire system became dysfunctional: 
while institutional tenders and adaptations should have been based on 
the results of strategic developments, the results of such strategic devel-
opments were not available at the time of launching the project. Hence, 
the institutions have very often been unaware of the implications of their 
undertaking at the time of submitting their application. Some of the calls 
were halted, while others failed to even launch, causing severe obstacles 
in programme implementation. As a result, the refined modular structure 
collapsed and, in switching strategies, the operations of the institutional 
system then focused on correct implementation and absorption, pushing 
professionalism and efficiency objectives to the background. At the same 
time, the capacity of the intermediate bodies and the human resources has 
been insufficient to ensure smooth administration, significantly contribut-
ing to delays in payments and decision-making.
While meticulous planning and high-level professional elaboration 
could, in theory, contribute to the timely accomplishment of development 
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tasks and the efficiency of the system, the quality and success of the entire 
development structure has in fact been seriously jeopardized in several 
ways: poor planning, the concomitant frequency of modifications of the 
content of constructions/calls, and (resulting from the accruing delays) 
the lack of time necessary for the professional realization of the projects 
have proven to be destructive. The system had already collapsed at the 
beginning of the cycle. Due to interventions from sectoral professional 
supervision, the lack of planning or project-management capacities, and 
frequent restructuring, the institutional system had to be re-engineered 
several times, which fractured the professional and substantial aspects of 
implementation.
The frequent modification of action plans not only made implementa-
tion confusing but also inscrutable. Calls issued constitute a complex and 
ever-changing system that is hard to understand, even for professionals 
working in planning and implementation. Hence, social and professional 
supervision (i.e. democratic control over the OP) has become virtually 
impossible. As confirmed by our interviewees, the National Development 
Agency is interested in reinforcing the technical character of evaluations 
and analyses that are almost incomprehensible even for journalists, for 
which reason, only a handful of comprehensive news reports that man-
aged to stir public opinion have been published about the HU-SROP. 
Therefore, very few people are able to see its content and operation, and 
thus understand its anomalies. At the same time, the tendering system is 
a hotbed of corruption: starting with the obligation to involve particular 
partner organizations according to the terms and conditions of individual 
calls, to the background agreement of winning companies, many stories 
have spread in closed circles.1
1 The civil association K-Monitor (targeting corruption, public money, public procure-
ment, cartels), publishes information and letters from anonymous sources reveal-
ing such anomalies. In one contribution, a staff member of an application-writing 
company reveals how they hack into the public-procurement procedures (<http://
www.k-monitor.hu/bejelento/palyazatiras>).
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Progress in HU-SROP implementation
The programme became operational on September 13, 2007, with the 
approval of Commission Decision C(2007)4306. The first call was 
launched on March 6, 2007, which is much earlier than in other central 
and eastern European countries. As shown in Table 4-1, there seems to be 
significant progress in terms of implementation.
Table 4-1. Data concerning HU-SROP implementation 2007–2012.
Year




















2007 9 54,933,527 1%
3,777,935,943 2,933,459,718
2008 46 338,904,544 9%
2009 112 490,764,180 13%
2010 83 451,758,356 12%
2011 34 166,491,655 4%
2012 129 510,483,707 14%
Total 413 2,013,335,970 53% 100% 78%
The amount contracted each year from 2007 to 2013 varies accordingly 
from one to 14 per cent, and between EUR 54,933,527 and 510,483,707 
per year. 53 per cent of the total budget of HU-SROP is contracted, but 
78 per cent of the total budget is still spent by the end of 2012.
There is a striking imbalance between different key areas of interven-
tion under HU-SROP, which suggests that funds spent on educational 
integration (HU-SROP 3.3 and 3.4) were far less than those destined for 
other purposes. 8.7 per cent of the funds allocated to Priority Area 3 were 
spent for key area of intervention 3.3; 7.86 per cent were spent for key area 
of intervention 3.4, with the rest going to the first two areas of intervention. 
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These focused more generally on supporting the dissemination of compe-
tence-based education and improving the efficiency of the public education 
system, developing innovative solutions, and co-operation.
The institutional set-up of ESF implementation in Hungary
National policy documents depict a complex and constantly changing 
framework for ESF implementation in Hungary. Changes are visible both 
in terms of policy priorities and organizational structures.
Formal decision-making and institutional role-orientations
In terms of formal decision-making structures, until 2010, the responsibility 
of planning measures in the area of education for vulnerable groups was 
divided between the Managing Authority and various departments within 
the Ministry of Education. Managing the tendering processes in this area 
would have required a well-functioning development policy co-ordination 
mechanism, which, however, proved to be weak. Determined priorities 
were not sufficiently focused, and priorities constantly changed during 
the process. As a result, the educational development system became so 
complex that it endangered successful implementation.
With the adoption of a government order on the rules of procedure 
concerning the use of Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds (Korm. ren-
delet a 2007–13 … 2011) previously scattered regulations concerning tenders 
were concentrated in one piece of legislation and deadlines were intro-
duced at several stages of the process. Coinciding with the publication 
of the action plans, the introduction of the new regulations implied mas-
sive changes. Fundamental rules of procedures were defined, like require-
ments concerning professionalism, simplicity and co-operation to be met 
by organizations participating in implementation, while the right to fair 
administration and the right to timely decisions, as defined by law, was 
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ensured for beneficiaries. At the same time, a broader understanding of 
fairness – that had never been enforced, yet which potentially could have 
influenced procedures – was ruled out.
In Hungary, the managing authorities of ESF-funded programmes 
have a well-defined, mainly technical role. According to official statements, 
MAs implement and do not initiate (i.e. make policies). Their role is to 
know what the roles prescribed by Brussels are, and make sure that every-
thing is in line with them. However, latitude is not that limited. Based on 
the lessons learnt from our interviews with present or former HU-NDA 
(National Development Agency) officials, there is an iterative process 
between the government and the HU-NDA, not involving one-way com-
munication. It would be an over-simplification to suggest that the govern-
ment has intentions, while the HU-NDA and the MAs provide the rules. 
It is true that the knowledge about what is possible is with the HU-NDA, 
but professional competence is not a privilege of the ministries. In many 
cases, there have been fierce professional debates upon certain topics, where 
the HU-NDA acted more than as simply an implementer. The outcome 
of such debates, however, depends very much on the political situation, on 
the personal competences of the participants, and the time-specific con-
text. There have also been situations when HU-NDA staff with adequate 
experience, competence, and commitment, realizing that there is a chal-
lenge the government has to meet and the tools are available in the system, 
initiated something feasible and the government approved it; this is how 
the Multiply Disadvantaged Regions scheme was born.
The representation of stakeholders
The co-operation of local stakeholders is considered essential from the 
point of view of adaptability as well as concerning the contribution of 
HU-SROP actions to the formulation and implementation of local poli-
cies. Hence, HU-SROP intends to promote social dialogue and partnership 
between governmental agencies and civil/non-governmental organizations 
and other stakeholders. In acknowledging the role of non-profit, non- 
governmental organizations in service provision, particular attention is paid 
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to intensifying their participation in partnership structures and processes, 
as well as to their interest enforcement role. Instruments to achieve these 
objectives include capacity development and reinforcement of professional 
background, facilitating the access of concerned organizations to resources. 
It is expected that civil organizations will contribute to improving the qual-
ity and accessibility of services and satisfying the growing and ever-more 
differentiated demand for services, particularly in the case of regions and 
social groups where state organizations and their institutions are unable 
to provide adequate services.
In early 2005, some of the leading Hungarian NGOs interested in 
public consultation on the National Development Plan realized that the 
National Development Office responsible for the planning process was not 
willing to make the plans public. They set up an informal working group 
with the aim of monitoring the public consultation of HU-NDP II, called 
NGOs for the Publicity of the National Development Plan (HU-NPND 
2008). After 2005, they issued a monitoring report on the public consul-
tation process every year, and they also provided an analysis on the situ-
ation from the point of view of the legal and technical background and 
formulated recommendations for the future work.
Apart from the important fact that a public consultation process did 
start, the most significant statement is that nothing happened the way it 
had been planned (HU-NPND 2008). There were delays and changes 
in the schedule, the name, and the type of documents to be evaluated. 
The texts of the Action Plans published on the website changed several 
times without any notification. There were also several modifications 
regarding the methods of consultation, information about the changes 
being passed at the very last moments. The second important obser-
vation of the group is that the planning documents were made public 
only at the end of the planning process (HU-NPND 2008). The titles 
of documents also changed frequently, going from the National Strategic 
Reference Framework to the New Hungary Programme, and later on to 
the New Hungary Development Plan. And the bodies responsible for 
particular fields changed, too; new bodies were set up, and from time to 
time, totally unexpected changes occurred in the responsibilities of the 
different agencies.
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After 2007, the process changed: after the approval of the planning doc-
uments – the National Development Policy Concept (HU-NDPC 2005), 
adopted by parliament in 2005 for the next 15 years; the New Hungary 
Development Plan (HU-NHDP 2007); Operational Programmes – it 
became concerned with the preparation of the calls themselves. HU-NPND 
concentrated on HU-SROP (TÁMOP) and HU-EEOP (Environment 
and Energy Operational Programme) and examined the monitoring com-
mittees and the Call Preparatory Working Groups (HU-CPWG), and 
found that the tenders were delayed, especially those where the potential 
contractor was an NGO.
Having managed to participate in the preparation of programmes and 
calls as well as in controlling planning procedures, civil organizations set 
out to gain access to implementation mechanisms. A key instrument to 
become involved in implementation is provided by a specific type of project, 
the so-called global grant. The Global Grant scheme has a long history 
in Hungary: NGOs, especially those working on local development, pov-
erty, community and minority issues, started active negotiations in 2006 
about the possibilities of the implementation of this type of programme 
in Hungary. For a while, it looked like a real success story: by 2007 the 
National Development Agency elaborated the codes of practice, together 
with the NGOs with a long record of grant-making. In this scheme, inter-
mediaries break down large European funds into small, absorbable parts 
using simplified and flexible procedures targeting disadvantaged areas; and 
they also provide intensive help-desk type of support to the contractors. 
From 2007 on, it is possible to use this method in Hungary; however, the 
first call of this type was withdrawn on the very day of its launch without 
any further explanation. Since then, the introduction of a global grants 
system has not been attempted. That is, it is not actually in use in Hungary.2
2 At the same time, there are examples which prove that the global grant type of breaking 
large amounts of financial support into small pieces to provide adequate amounts for 
local projects works. Just to mention two examples: both the Autonomia Foundation 
in the field of poverty, ethnicity, and the Environmental Partnership foundation in 
the field of environmental projects operated this way from the early 1990s until the 
early 2000s. They broke down private foundation money to make them absorbable by 
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The availability of information
As long as information available on the site of the National Development 
Agency is considered the measure of transparency, the workings of this 
agency can be characterized as transparent: there is a lot of information 
posted on this site, and also a report-generating programme that enables 
the user to select data according to his or her preferences to create vari-
ous kinds of analysis. At the same time, this feature is useful especially for 
professionals familiar with the jargon of EU tenders. According to experts 
interviewed, there are already far more evaluations, studies and impact 
analyses posted on this website than an average person or even a journal-
ist can make use of or understand. At the same time, information in plain 
language is not published on the website.
The predominance of excessively professional and technical informa-
tion inhibits the formation of opinion and thus the articulation of criticism. 
An illustrative example is that an evaluation report, concerning the bias 
of allocations favoring mayors loyal to the government, posted on the site 
during the previous government cycle went completely unnoticed until an 
insider called the attention of a journalist, who published the story that 
later became the source of an interpellation at the parliament.
The assessment of applications
An important change that concerns our inquiry relates to the assessment 
of projects: the joint order 16/2006 (28 December) issued by the Office of 
the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Financial Affairs prescribed that 
the pre-evaluation of applications for support over HUF 50 million has to 
be accomplished by two experts. In case the scores given by the two evalu-
ators differed significantly (by more than twenty points), the Intermediate 
local communities. A recent example is the distribution of European Economic Area 
and Swiss development funds to local NGOs by a consortium of NGOs (<http://
norvegcivilalap.hu/en>; <http://www.svajcivil.hu/hu/in-english>).
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Body ordered a new pre-evaluation. When the Evaluation Committee 
disagreed with the recommendations of pre-evaluators, if providing a writ-
ten justification it could request the re-evaluation of the application, and 
make its suggestions based on this new evaluation. In case the decision of 
the Evaluation Committee differed from the recommendation given by 
experts, it had to explain it in detail in a written statement. The last stage 
of the process was decision-making at the HU-NDA, where the recom-
mendations of the committee were approved or changed (in the latter case, 
the decision, again, had to be supported by a detailed written statement).
This government order did include prescriptions regarding the experts; 
the responsibility was with the Intermediate Body that had to follow the 
rules defined by the NDA. The pre-proposal committee is not tied by 
the opinion of experts; it could make recommendations concerning the 
support of the project, including conditional support, decreased amount 
support and refusal. Thereupon, the NDA approved or disapproved of the 
recommendation of the pre-proposal committee within five days. While 
it had to justify any divergences from the recommendations of the pre-
proposal committee in writing, the same rule did not apply with respect 
to the recommendations given by experts.
A further modification followed, which among others reduced the 
decision-making and contracting deadlines, thereby making the successive 
control activities run parallel, and transferred the responsibility regarding 
minor modifications in the decision-making procedure from the govern-
ment to the ministries. In June, a decree of the minister of national devel-
opment was issued about the changes in the operation system of the NDA 
(Ministry for National Development 2012). Although this decree does not 
explicitly contain any changes of the decision-making procedure, it is obvi-
ous that the number of people and bodies participating in the screening 
and decision-making procedure has been minimized since.
In the summer of 2012, a public procurement tender was published to 
find professional and financial evaluation service providers for the appli-
cations within the framework of SROP 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 priorities. The 
individuals and companies, selected from a list of professionals and certi-
fied for this activity, that used to provide these services, were notified in 
November that the previous offers should be considered devoid of purpose.
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Risks and adjustments in the commissioning cycle
According to the evaluation report on the third priority axis (Expanzió 
Human Consulting 2011a), due to constant redesigning, delays and stopped 
payments, the seven-year implementation cycle of development plans con-
cerning public education shrank to three years in practice. This, in itself, 
proved to be detrimental to the professional effectiveness of the priority. 
Background reasons include, first, a lack of focus in planning and, second, 
problems of implementation. As for the former, in the case of strategic 
projects, the Ministry of Education failed in its dual role as the owner of 
institutions and the governing body of the profession: it was unable to 
design stable and professionally planned activities for organizations imple-
menting priority developments. As for the latter, due to the lack of capacity 
at intermediate bodies and the Managing Authority, administration was 
insufficient, resulting in delays in decision-making and the fulfillment of 
payments. The fragmentation and weakness of co-ordination and strategic 
management, leading to the dissolution of the two-year planning cycles, 
resulted in the overall instability of the development process.
The two key implementing agencies of strategic projects (Educational 
Research and Development Institute and Education Ltd., a background 
institution of the Ministry of Education) repeatedly lost the professional 
staff needed to implement professional programmes. Such losses were 
largely due to the unpredictability of funding: project management repeat-
edly found itself in a difficult position because, as projects became frag-
mented, it was impossible to secure the wages defined in the application 
to the staff hired specifically for the project. Hence, keeping the newly set 
up professional and project management teams together (providing con-
tinuous funding for their salaries and wages throughout the entire cycle) 
constituted a major difficulty for implementing organizations, putting the 
success of the development programme at severe risk.
Moreover, our expert interview pointed out a serious professionaliza-
tion problem at HU-NDA level, mainly the fact that most of the staff is 
unaware of the specifics of the regulation they are supposed to implement. 
For instance, they have no idea that EU tender monies can be invested 
in public services as well as in additional activities (i.e. innovation). The 
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reason behind this misunderstanding (i.e. the ignorance of the fundamental 
shift in legitimate tender goals) is that decision-makers at the HU-NDA 
failed to realize that new rules apply. Another example is the permanence 
of the belief that the duration of projects cannot exceed two years (the 
time span of action plans), which is not the case. As a matter of fact, most 
people at the HU-NDA work according to a set of beliefs, strictly follow-
ing rules that, in reality, do not apply. In certain cases, there is no rational 
explanation behind this behavior; in other cases, the explanation is that the 
decision-makers want to play a safe game. The informal rules they follow 
prevent what they see as future problems. This is especially true when equal 
opportunities are involved in the calls; as the system is motivated to avoid 
failures, staff try to limit the pool of possible applicants so that the winners 
should not fail. This way, those who are in the worst position (those who 
need the money and support the most) will not be able to apply, or even if 
they apply, they will not win. This way, the risk of the system is forwarded 
to the potential target group, and the selection mechanism starts.
Other major problems of implementation are owed partly to the 
bureaucratized nature of the system, and partly to misconceived rules of 
procedure, leading to difficulties concerning planning:
Unprepared and bureaucratic contracting processes and insufficiencies of the project 
flow managed by the NDA and MA severely hindered the launch of projects. It is 
encouraging that these procedures have been simplified since. However, according 
to the new rules of procedure, the background institutions possibly hosting a pro-
ject cannot take part in the planning process of strategic projects, even though they 
could become project hosts based on legal authorization and as a result of ongoing 
developments. (Breaking up prioritized developments was made necessary only by 
the Action Plan logic.) Therefore, the working groups in charge of planning cannot 
fully build on already available experiences of background institutions during the 
planning process. (TÁRKI 2010)
In addition, the electronic programme designed to trace implementation 
processes was not really suitable to accomplish this task, account for delays 
and corrections, and make information regarding the professional content 
behind project indicators available.
Breaking with the previous practice (when they had been ordered 
according to the degree of background influence), applications were 
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evaluated in the order of arrival after 2004. The two evaluators assigned 
to every application had at least three years experience in the given profes-
sional field. After pre-evaluation accomplished according to these rules, 
applications were presented before the evaluation committee that included 
representatives of civil organizations, which probably helped in constrain-
ing illicit influences. However, these mechanisms were swept away by the 
change of government: the evaluation committee was abolished, pre-eval-
uators are no longer employed, and the entire evaluation procedure was 
outsourced to a firm that processes all applications, so that the managing 
authority only gets a list of applications to be signed, without a chance to 
control the allocation of funds. Since Brussels has no means to influence 
the methodology of selection, it has no authority to inhibit this practice. 
Moreover, as nobody sees through the system, there is no social control, 
and consequently, scandals are successfully avoided.
These systemic problems are deeply interconnected with the market-
shaping decisions included in the calls for applications launched under the 
operational programmes.
Market-shaping decisions in the calls for applications
Two key areas of intervention of the HU-SROP are directly relevant 
for educational integration. These are the key areas of intervention: 3.3 
Decreasing the segregation of severely disadvantaged andoma pupils, promoting 
their equal opportunities in public education; and 3.4 Supporting the educa-
tion of groups with different educational needs, and the integration of pupils 
with special educational needs, intercultural education.
Calls pertaining to KAI 3.3 are addressed to (multiply) disadvantaged 
and Roma children, and contain objectives related to the enhancement of 
educational opportunities that the constructions seek to realize, by support-
ing desegregation efforts and equal access to quality education, providing 
tools for inclusive education, and supporting second-chance programmes 
and lifelong learning. The focus lies on developing innovative teaching 
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methodologies and providing teacher training. Besides the transformation 
of the public education system, services offered by civil organizations (such 
as a specific form of supplementary education called tanoda or ‘learnery’) 
are supported within the framework of this area of intervention.
KAI 3.4 seeks to provide for the specific needs of students belonging 
to national minorities and migrant groups, as well as students with special 
educational needs. The focus here lies on language and (inter-)cultural 
education, on the one hand, and on providing specialized professional 
services, on the other. A characteristic of calls under this KAI involves 
talent-development programmes, which have practically displaced other 
kinds of approaches more focused on educational inclusion and equal 
access to services.
Under KAIs 3 and 4 of the third priority axis, there were nine and 
eighteen calls launched, respectively. However, these figures include some 
doubles, as separate calls target non-convergence regions (Central Hungary) 
and convergence regions (the rest of Hungary), with identical content. 
The only difference between these two types of calls is that, obviously, 
different amounts are allocated to each, corresponding to the size of the 
territory covered and the number of potential applicants. Developments 
to be implemented in the framework of tenders are planned and prepared 
through strategic programmes with a single applicant. A further distinction 
represented in the code of calls refers to the generic types of applicants, 
which may be either local self-governments or civil and church organiza-
tions. Responding to the 27 calls under scrutiny, there are 483 already 
accomplished projects, altogether.
Who are the potential contractors?
Most calls for tenders regarding educational integration (SROP 3) include 
civil and church organizations besides local self-governments among eligible 
beneficiaries of funds. Schools themselves and the educational staff are, in a 
technical sense, indirect beneficiaries, as it is the maintaining organization 
that can apply for support. In reality, however, local NGOs are generally 
unable to make use of this opportunity. Owing to their meager financial 
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and human resources capacities and the structural constraints implied in 
application procedures, few of them can actually enter this market. In addi-
tion, local power hierarchies and the widespread consequences of political 
divisions also sew up the stockings of many of these organizations. As a 
result, civil actors are not just unable to meet requirements in providing 
better services but cannot fulfil their important role in controlling state 
action, either.
Potential contractors are classified into two groups: public institutions 
and institutions belonging to local self-governments and non- governmental 
organizations.
Individual calls do not contain further specification on this classifica-
tion. As a matter of fact, the obliteration of differences has long charac-
terized the Hungarian tender system: in order to compensate for the lack 
of resources of governmental institutions, non-profit/civil organizations 
established by these institutions became useful in terms of further financial 
support. Although recent legal regulations have introduced restrictions for 
gradually eliminating so-called public foundations – which are no longer 
eligible applicants – there are still foundations and associations founded 
by public agencies or individuals which are closely related to institutions 
which maintain schools, hospitals, etc., and can apply for EU funds.
Similarly, there are non-profit/civil organizations clearly associated 
with political parties, including the governing party. By way of complement-
ing the tender system, governments and ministries dispose of their ‘own 
resources’, claimed and distributed by ministers among civil actors who they 
consider to be worthy of such support (i.e. those belonging to their circle of 
potential supporters). Given that EU funds are a far greater resource, mecha-
nisms to distribute these (also along political lines) have been introduced. 
With the removal of checks and balances from the system, opportunities 
to directly influence the selection of applicants have increased; there has 
been plenty of anecdotal evidence whereby evaluation procedures were 
prolonged until one expected contractor came out as the winner. Today, 
there is no need to employ this practice.
Potential contractors of calls never include for-profit organizations, 
yet it is obvious that the business sector finds several ways to make use of 
EU funds under the calls we focus on. One of these means is to get hired 
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to write applications, which has special significance in the case of calls for 
disadvantaged segments of the population. In disadvantaged regions, for-
profit organizations with meager capacities to prepare applications – but 
with good contacts – undertake this task in exchange for having themselves 
written into the application as managers, trainers or providers of some other 
sub-contracted services, so that they can benefit from the project. The 
harm caused by such widespread practices goes beyond the misallocation 
of (a part of ) resources intended to support the target groups; they also 
cause harm by preventing the concerned applicants from learning the art 
of writing applications and thinking in terms of projects.
The above statement cannot be supported by data or other research 
results. It is based on our own experience, and the experience of the evalu-
ators. We were told stories about local project applications, coming from 
the disadvantaged regions, in which project managers, advisors or train-
ers with a significant NDA or IB experience had emerged. As one of our 
interviewees, a former NDA staff member, told us, the IB welcomes those 
projects in which they find their own former staff. They share a common 
language, they know how to communicate, and they know whom to ask 
when in doubt and what to ask. As far as formal implementation is con-
cerned, they are very successful. However, as far as the empowerment of 
the local communities is concerned, this has a very harmful influence. (In 
order to mitigate such imbalances in the opportunities of applicants, sev-
eral governmental and civil initiatives – such as the Network Supporting 
Roma Projects – were introduced.)
Not in the calls under our scrutiny, but under economic development 
operational programmes, an application-writing agency was caught and 
sued, when the evaluators realized that many applications were follow-
ing a very similar pattern, as if they had been written by the same person 
(Galambos 2008). It seemed that all the applications had been made by an 
agency, the profiting of which was built into the implementation of the local 
micro enterprises. According to one of our interviewees, the authorities 
were wrong. There was no fraud: the application-writing capacities were 
used by the small enterprises, based on expected mutual profits.
Another possibility is to create civil organizations. In Hungary, 
this opportunity is open to basically anybody; it is totally legitimate for 
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for-profit organizations to use civil organizations they have established as a 
resource. An extreme example of this practice is that, within the framework 
of the call HU-SROP 3.4.4/B-11/2 (Establishing a talent-support network – 
Hungarian Genius ntegrated programme for Supporting Talent), where HUF 
300 million (approximately EUR 1,071,429) were distributed to support 
talent-support programmes, HUF 10 million (EUR 35,714) were given to 
a golf club operating in three centres in the countryside; and two baseball 
teams also received HUF 10 million each from the same budget.3 This 
outcome obviously sharply contradicted the original objective of the call.
The appearance of churches as potential contractors in the calls is 
nothing new. At the same time, with the passage of time and especially 
after the change of government, the Roma and pro-Roma NGOs that 
used to provide outstanding results became outcasts and dismissed as 
potential contractors. A case in point is that of Roma special colleges, 
managed by the larger churches, which received huge dedicated funds in 
order to realize a form of talent management that had been undertaken 
by the Romaversitas Foundation with great success for over ten years. At 
the same time, Romaversitas had no chance to submit an application, as 
it is not a church.
Partnership structures
Partnership structures, constituting a general requirement of tenders, mostly 
refer to the co-operation of governmental and non-governmental agencies. 
Usually, no bonus points are awarded for any kind of partnership struc-
ture; however, it is often a compulsory element of the call. What is more, 
in several instances even the identity of the partner is prescribed: it is one 
or another professional or training agency. As a matter of fact, in the case 
of many successful applications, one assigned professional partner might 
not be able to perform its duties everywhere to an appropriate professional 
3 <http://atlatszo.hu/2012/12/27/tizmillios-eu-tamogatasok-veszteseges- 
golfpalyaknak/>.
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standard. Often, there is no available information regarding the capacities 
of such dedicated institutions.
The occurrence of another problematic type of partnership is not 
rare among calls, though this practice has not yet gained ground in the 
calls under our scrutiny. The participation requirement of members of 
the target group is expected to be met by identifying the National Roma 
Self Government as an obligatory partner in the case of Roma integration 
projects. This is an elected body; it is doubtful if it is in command of the 
professional competences that ensure equal opportunity measures in an 
employment or educational project.
Who are the potential beneficiaries?
The definition of potential beneficiaries of calls is very complicated. In 
practice, there are two kinds of beneficiaries: one which directly receives 
tender money, and another that benefits from it indirectly. Beneficiaries of 
the first type can be roughly categorized in three groups: researchers and 
developers, teachers directly dealing with children, and the infrastructure. 
The potential beneficiaries belonging to the second type of call, aiming 
at educational integration, are (in theory) the children to be integrated; 
however, as the calls do not specify the amounts that should be spent on 
them, the question is whether the financial support they receive in the 
form of services really serves their interests.
To find out about the potential beneficiaries is challenging from 
another point of view. Until modifications to the law in 2005, it was ille-
gal to register minority affiliation. Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights 
of National and Ethnic Minorities states: ‘It is the individual’s exclusive 
and inalienable right to take on and declare their affiliation to a national 
or ethnic group or a minority. Nobody is obliged to proclaim that they 
belong to a minority’. However, the changes in 2005 made it obligatory 
that those who want to participate in the minority self-government elec-
tions have to register at the local notary. These lists are destroyed after 
the elections; the data cannot be used for any other purposes. However, 
the mere fact that it was possible to set up a system of ethnic registration 
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was a real breakthrough in the history of sensitive data-management in 
Hungary. For targeting reasons, however, the governments have preferred 
to replace ethnic targeting with social and regional targeting, because the 
equal-opportunities guide which is an annex to most calls warns applicants 
that if they register a person as Roma or as having disabilities, they can do 
so only if they have that person’s definite, unambiguous and voluntary 
consent. There is no special form available to have this consent in writing, 
but the guide is very strict about the documentation of the consent after 
receiving appropriate information. Whether or not the applicant and/or 
contractor meets this expectation is very difficult to gauge. By now, in the 
case of certain calls, this is included in the sustainability reports, but the 
handling of these data is more than problematic.
Furthermore, according to another approach, regional specificities 
qualify certain groups as potential beneficiaries. In any case, there have 
been attempts to allocate different amounts of support from the same 
type of source to better-off regions and regions that are more in need; 
however, the calls in question did not make any distinction in terms of 
content, although disadvantaged regions not only require more, but also 
different kinds of support.
The Interim Evaluation Report of HU-SROP is informative with 
regard to the effects of centralized programmes insensitive to regional 
differences:
Independent development programmes were missing, constituting a fundamental 
planning problem, reiterating the previous HU-HRDOP period. Hungarian regions 
struggle with significantly different educational problems. It would have been pos-
sible to allocate the majority of development resources to the most disadvantaged 
regions. Instead, the content of the priority was designed in such a way that resources 
were evenly shared, targeting the widest circle of final beneficiaries. [In addition], 
some calls and measures were designed poorly, while others were over-designed and 
did not meet the applicants’ interests. (TÁRKI 2010)
The interim synthesis report suggests that the fragmentation of develop-
ments implemented in the most vulnerable micro-regions (HU-MVMR) 
justifies the revision of SROP, in order to see what integrated operations 
are needed and possible (KPMG 2011). HU-MVMR represents a specific 
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methodology of targeting vulnerable populations on a territorial basis and 
the implementation of complex development projects in such localities, 
requiring simultaneous HR and infrastructural innovations. The authors 
of the report hold that the complex and integrated approach adopted in 
the HU-MVMR regions requires the connection of European Social Fund 
and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) developments so as 
to bring better results.
The diluted definition of a target group can be compensated by better 
aiming mechanisms. Thus, the same report recommends: ‘to concentrate 
the critical part of development resources on certain strategic areas. This 
concentration can be content-related, institution-related or regional (target-
ing the most underdeveloped regions). Avoidance of the spread of invest-
ments across the entire country (spaying effect) should be a considered’ 
(Expanzió Human Consulting 2011b).
Designing services
The educational services eligible with the greatest frequency in the calls for 
applications under the two key areas of intervention analysed here belong 
to ten types: teacher training; development of competence-based educa-
tion; skills development; parenting programmes; integration activities in 
kindergarten and school (in the framework of the national programme 
called ntegration Pedagogic System); elaboration of individual develop-
ment plans; talent support; development of pedagogical methodology; 
support of school success; motivation of learning; facilitating the transi-
tion between school types.
It is noteworthy that, while it should be the ultimate objective of 
most calls, when it comes to the articulation of activities, desegregation 
of schools is mentioned only once. Theoretically, other activities may con-
tribute to desegregation as well; however, the fact that applicants do not 
explicitly refer to the problem of segregation when defining activities clearly 
shows their attitude towards the educational difficulties of Roma children. 
Namely, school staff and educational professionals readily accept new and 
innovative pedagogical methods. However, they are at a loss as to what to 
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make of the concept of social integration and are reluctant to adopt efforts 
contrary to the interests of the prejudiced majority society.
Although adult training and teacher training is mostly addressed by 
calls not included in our sample, the predominance of activities related to 
the dissemination of new methodologies – especially teacher training, but 
also partly the development of competence-based education, a complex 
category – is striking in our research material, too. Primarily, HU-SROP 
3.3 (introducing inclusive education) includes this kind of goal. As a conse-
quence, more than half of the activities (including, besides teacher training 
and the introduction of competence-based education, the development of 
pedagogic methodologies, curriculum development, etc.) concern children 
only in an indirect manner, while the special services and programmes offered 
to them directly amount to slightly less than half of the mentioned activities.
Call design
A common feature of the calls for application under investigation in this 
research (with the exception of the methodological standard of learneries 
in respective calls) is that they do not make reference to any background 
materials like professional studies or policy documents. This absence clearly 
suggests a lack in professional and legal backing of development projects. 
As repeated failures of previous attempts to solve the educational problems 
of Roma children and the permanence of segregation in education suggest, 
educational inclusion or integration are not at all unambiguous concepts 
that could direct development strategies in the right way. Furthermore, the 
lack of definition also enables serious abuses, that is, the spending of funds 
on assets unrelated or even contradicting the original goals.
At the same time, the fundamental objectives of the call are greatly 
detailed (comprising about one page out of an average forty-page application 
guide). The definition of objectives is not necessarily copy-pasted from the 
relevant sections of the OP; in many cases this is an elaborate text specifi-
cally written for the given call. The other relatively detailed description can 
be found under the title ‘activities ineligible for support’ (three pages), fol-
lowed by the specification of eligible and ineligible expenditure (two pages).
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Substantial orientation of applicants is also provided by evaluation and 
monitoring criteria; with time, these tables have become designed in a way 
so that the applicant can be more or less sure that fulfilling these require-
ments, as long as the application is submitted in time, guarantees success.
The rest of information is mainly administrative and uniform across 
different calls. Hence, some aspects of the applications under scrutiny in 
our research (like contribution to sustainable development or gender bal-
ance) may be detailed in annexes comprising several pages, but do not form 
integral part of the calls (i.e. they represent additional requirements that 
be fulfilled quasi-mechanically). Some other aspects, in turn, that appear 
to be crucial from the point of view of development projects in general 
and educational inclusion in particular (innovation, educational inclusion, 
Roma integration) are, surprisingly, entirely absent from the text of most 
calls for application under the studied KAIs.
Adjustments in the commissioning cycle
The idea behind SROP is to promote individual developments, organ-
ized in tenders, which are built upon priority developments accomplished 
in the framework of national strategic projects. However, this system of 
‘decentralized development’ did not work in the case of public-education 
innovation.
Previously, funds destined for integration in education and the inclu-
sion of Roma pupils had often been spent by schools that desperately 
needed the money to, for instance, invest in infrastructure. Such misuses 
of funds were meant to be avoided by a more focused and structurally 
elaborated development system. The expectation was that the complex call 
on competence-based education and equal access in innovative institutions 
(SROP-HU 3.1.4.) would lay the foundation of local developments, forcing 
their embedding in local policies. However, this never really happened. One 
explanation to this failure is that grant applications were over-regulated 
and thus the actions and possibilities of local governance were limited. As 
observed in the interim evaluation report, ‘essentially, school-improvement 
logic was applied in the application that was written for local governments’ 
96 Anna CSONGOR
(Expanzió Human Consulting 2011a). Another, even more fundamental 
reason was the lack of conception and coherence with other measures:
A fundamental feature of the priority – as compared with the previous development 
plan – is that it is not based on an accepted educational strategy of development 
programmes that is embedded in broader tools or a system of goals of educational 
policy. Partly as a consequence of this, and partly because of the weakness of the 
government’s strategic management, the compatibility of the development pro-
grammes with other measures of educational policy was ambiguous. (Expanzió 
Human Consulting 2011a)
Also, partly because of insufficiencies of deliberate planning, develop-
ments did not apply market-compatible tools in every case. Furthermore, 
implementation was thwarted due to operational factors as well. The time 
alignment of applications necessary for network co-ordination required by 
the decentralized development system was not realized, which is mainly 
owing to the collapse of the action-plan system, building on two-year 
development cycles. The interim evaluation report on the priority is very 
pronounced on the problem of implementation.
In this way, while the public education priority of SROP was origi-
nally supposed to adopt an integrated approach in the innovation of public 
education and rely on local agents in accomplishing goals, it failed at both 
the conceptual and operational levels. As the interim evaluation report of 
the priority states:
The priority originally included a strong development goal related to education 
management: local municipalities, quality policies, measurement and evaluation, 
evidence-based decision support, and a preparatory system, none of which was rep-
resented during implementation. This fact negatively affected the effectiveness of 
development outcomes and their sustainability. (Expanzió Human Consulting 2011a)
Other relevant aspects
During the writing of this chapter, there has been the news of the dismantling 
of the National Development Agency (NDA); up to now, this has been an 
independent institution, but the agency is going to operate in the form of 
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offices integrated into the various ministries. The positive aspect of this insti-
tutional transformation is that it supports the management of programmes 
according to different fields of expertise; the negative consequences relate 
to the accumulation of huge sums of money at ministries that henceforward 
will officially dispose of EU funds as well. As a consequence of this shift, 
the tendency of the simplification of the decision-making process will cer-
tainly be intensified. Originally, a lot checks and balances were built into 
the system of distributing EU funds (that, by the way, were readily abused); 
decisions were prepared, evaluated and reviewed at each stage of the proce-
dure, by a variety responsible persons and commissions (and if the outcome 
was disliked by certain powerful political actors, reviews went on and on 
until the desired result was produced). With time, the intent to maintain 
appearances was weakened and controlling mechanisms have loosened up 
to the point that, with the present institutional change, a major screening 
agency (i.e. the HU-NDA itself ) has been completely removed, so that the 
government now has full authority to determine the allocation of EU funds.
The lack of transparency and arbitrariness in decision-making, char-
acterizing the entire tendering system, impacts our research methodology 
as well. Annual implementation reports are not rendered available for 
the public, therefore we had to work, rather, from synthesizing reports. 
Furthermore, it is very hard, or next to impossible, to investigate the enforce-
ment of horizontal goals. Relevant data could be retrieved from mainte-
nance reports; however, it would not only be very difficult to classify such 
data, but the very access to the source of data is denied: these data are to 
be found in the very system where all raw data concerning applications are 
contained – a domain secluded from public scrutiny.
Conclusion
The Hungarian educational system is highly selective and failing to com-
pensate for the social disadvantages of children. Schools have proved to be 
unable to mitigate social differences among children, while the so-called 
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tracking starts very early and is multiply reinforced later on. Children from 
different social backgrounds follow diverging educational paths. Differences 
in the quality of educational service are exacerbated by the unequal distri-
bution of pedagogical quality and financial resources among schools. In 
order to prevent the permanence of differences, primary schools should 
become fair, meaning that they should be able to handle differences among 
children and include all kinds of students. Reforms can focus directly on the 
programmes implemented by schools, the school structure, or the means 
of professional accountability. However, none of these interventions can, 
in themselves, effectively change the public education system.
EU commissioning under HU-HRDOP and HU-SROP has primar-
ily concerned programmes within schools, focusing on methodological 
innovations and attitudinal changes demanded by the introduction of 
competence-based education and educational integration. At the same 
time, massive structural changes that could really influence selectivity have 
been dismissed. Apart from the partiality of reforms that, as it were, con-
cerned only a small segment of education, the mechanism of innovation 
(i.e. the tender system) also contains an inherent limitation: in assigning 
tasks of methodological innovation and transformation of perspectives 
to local educational agencies, the national scope of managing reforms has 
been given up.
An important step forward was that, after 2007, only institutions not 
segregating students were eligible to receive support for infrastructural 
development. This was one of the rare moments when a governmental 
conception concerning integration was represented in regulations regarding 
the distribution of national and EU funds; in addition, this conception was 
well thought out and supported by impact analyses. However, despite the 
intention to support educational integration, especially of Roma children, 
the implementation of programmes was hampered due to the inadequacy 
of mechanisms: reliance on soft incentives only, while neglecting more 
forceful instruments of compulsive power proved to be ineffective in car-
rying out major transformations.
The change of government in 2010 brought a radical change in edu-
cational policies: the programme of educational integration, announced 
in 2002, was swept away even at the level of rhetoric. The new act on 
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national public education, entering into force in 2012, just like the rules 
of implementation and governmental statements concerning educational 
matters, contains no references to equal opportunities or related terms 
like fairness, educational integration, inclusive institutions, desegregation 
or any combination these. The absence of such notions does not neces-
sarily imply the overthrow of the principle; however, the entire legislation 
and the particulars regarding its implementation presume the increase of 
inequalities in opportunities.
Such developments are manifest in the change of the content of con-
structions: calls under HU-SROP 3.3 aiming at educational integration 
were replaced by others supporting auxiliary services operating in locations 
coping with segregation, like learneries (i.e. afternoon schools) and second-
chance schools; the focus of HU-SROP 3.4 on interculturalism was, in turn, 
shifted to promote talent management. The most striking change is that 
objectives related to educational integration have been replaced by ambi-
tions related to talent management. Thus, under the exact same codes, pro-
jects with very different content have been launched. The case mentioned 
above concerning the golf club and baseball teams coming out as winners of 
a call supporting talent management is an extreme example. However, the 
tendency to overturn the programme of educational integration, elaborated 
and strongly supported by the previous government, is obvious.
The tender system is still managed by rigid – and in many ways dys-
functional – mechanisms and heavily controlled by state actors. Obviously 
biased decisions – such as the assigning a single professional organization 
(loyal to the government) as a compulsory partner in several calls – are only 
the explicit examples of favoritism to become apparent. The system itself 
is a hotbed of mild corruption, such as when training firms are selected, 
without real competition, to supply services for central strategic projects. 
Of course, the tender procedure is obligatory, but the system allows for a 
procedure where there is only one possible candidate that fits the criteria 
of the tender. However, its most important deficiency, from the point of 
view of civil involvement, remains the insistence on heavily centralized, 
bureaucratic and nontransparent procedures that not only allow for arbi-
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Cristina STĂNUȘ
5  Rule rigidity in face of public pressure:  
The case of Romania
The manner in which educa-
tional service delivery under 
the European Social Fund (ESF) 
is managed is best understood 
in terms of a welfare market or 
quasi-market (Gingrich 2011). 
However, we may expect sig-
nificant differences from one 
country to another, namely a 
variation which is strategically 
articulated by political decision-
makers. In the particular context of EU structural funding, the main mecha-
nisms for strategically manipulating the market for educational service 
delivery are programming decisions, which include all aspects concern-
ing the set up of the programmes created to pursue the ESF social and 
educational objectives, as well as the integration of these programmes 
with national educational policy. Deriving from these, the programming 
decisions made by the authorities managing the ESF funded programmes, 
further shape and direct the market for educational service-delivery. Most 
of these aspects are actually matters of domestic policy concerning ESF 
implementation, which suggests extremely different results obtained by 
very similar programmes in different EU countries might be explained 
by looking at the content of national policies and national policy-making 
processes.
From a governance perspective, the introduction of market-based 
mechanisms for educational service delivery implies more than what is 
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normally labeled as market governance (see Meuleman 2011, Peters 2011, 
2006). The particular structure of EU structural funding makes it neces-
sary to combine market governance with the more traditional style of 
hierarchical governance, and with the more recent governance of networks. 
Such a combination is an uneasy one, since it involves both formalized 
and informal aspects at the same time, so it becomes important to assess 
its impact on the effectiveness of ESF funded programmes in achieving 
policy-defined social and educational goals. The informal aspects are par-
ticularly important in EU structural policy, they are actively encouraged by 
the EC in order to improve programming and implementation and help 
cope with the democratic deficit of the EU (Peters 2006, Piattoni 2006).
From this perspective, the present chapter details the main findings 
concerning ESF implementation in Romania since 2007. It focuses on 
the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 
(RO-SOPHRD) and its components directed at the ISCED 0–3 levels of 
the national education system and the access to education of disadvantaged 
and/or vulnerable groups. It highlights aspects of domestic policy which 
are relevant for the achievement of ESF goals in Romania and attempts to 
characterize the quasi-market for educational service delivery created by 
the above mentioned programme, emphasizing the empowerment of cer-
tain categories of public service providers and the lack of empowerment of 
the users. In the following section, the RO-SOPHRD is briefly described.
The Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development
Among other EU funded programmes in Romania, the Sectoral Operational 
Programme Human Resources Development (RO-SOPHRD) is appar-
ently the most problematic (KPMG 2011), despite the fact that it seems to 
have been the most successful in terms of disbursement of funds (measured 
as percentage of total available funds contracted at the end of 2012). Its 
shortcomings were widely debated in Romanian mass media in the past 
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years, with a clear emphasis on the low absorption rate (placed at less than 
10 per cent at the end of 2012, including only funds already reimbursed 
by the European Commission) and related financial and administrative 
aspects. Beyond these, the story of RO-SOPHRD is much more compli-
cated and should be seen in a broader framework of policy learning, policy 
failure and blame avoidance (see Howlett 2012).
The RO-SOPHRD debuted under not so favourable auspices in 2007, 
with a not-so favourable ex-ante evaluation report (Panteia 2007) and some 
delay in getting the approval of the European Commission. The ex-ante 
evaluation report stresses out shortcomings in the analysis of the social and 
economic conditions and the SWOT analysis behind the strategy proposed, 
the lack of co-ordination between the different operational programmes, the 
insufficient attention given to sectoral approaches and the involvement of 
social partners, and the complexity of the proposed management structure. 
Several aspects are of particular relevance for the educational selectivity 
issues approached by this project. First, the evaluators notice that the social 
and economic analyses single out low participation in continuing vocational 
training (CVT) and the backwardness of the rural areas, yet there is little 
reliable (statistical) information on CVT, the job market for school leavers 
or even educational attainment. Second, the evaluators believe the analysis 
is missing out on the very important challenges of changing the structure 
of education and strengthening vocational education and training (VET) 
and research and development (R&D) in higher education.
The programme’s debut was marred by the discontent expressed by 
coalitions of third-sector organizations (TSOs), whom complained about 
the fact that programming did not take into account the need of the sector 
for a replacement to the defunct pre-accession funding for TSO projects. 
However, given the structure of the programme, TSOs soon found out 
that, unless working on education issues or being certified providers of 
professional training, their sole possibility to access funding was the social 
economy component of the programme. This became obvious by 2010, 
when 1,816 applications were submitted in response to a call for projects 
aimed at developing the social economy in Romania. This call for projects 
was closed in January 2011. Later, this call for applications was unilaterally 
cancelled by the managing authority of the RO-SOPHRD.
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The first implementation problems appeared as soon as the first 
calls for applications were launched, due to the initial reliance on strictly 
the employees of the management authorities for assessing applications 
(AMPOSDRU 2008). Delays in the assessment of applications submitted 
in 2008 developed into a cascade of delays affecting the launch of calls, 
assessment of applications, signing of contracts, and reimbursements to 
contractors. The interim evaluation report stated that the average time 
between the submission of an application and the signing of a contract is 
forty weeks (KPMG 2011). Moreover, the MA admitted that the average 
delay in processing a reimbursement request is about forty days (RO-RAI, 
2011), while also admitting that some projects might be delayed for as long 
as eighty-six days. Stakeholders (Public Policy Institute 2012, Council for 
National Co-ordination of Regional Pacts for Employment and Social 
Inclusion 2013) and the mass media report even longer delays.
The delays in assessing applications, signing contracts and reimbursing 
contractors have had significant social and economic consequences. The 
Romanian media reported cases of large projects catering to the needs of 
disadvantaged children shutting down in the middle of the implementation 
period and of private companies providing goods or services to contrac-
tors experiencing cash-flow problems (for one example, see Toma 2012). 
Large projects catering to the needs of disadvantaged children were shut 
down in the middle of the implementation period; private companies 
providing goods or services to contractors went unpaid and experienced 
cash-flow problems.
Moreover, media coverage of implementation repeatedly stressed that 
very expensive and very ineffective projects received funding and identified 
several cases of misuse of money involving politicians and their families or 
business partners. There was a widespread perception that RO-SOPHRD 
was a waste, spending huge amounts of money on less significant projects. 
This was helped by the inability of the Romanian government to pro-
mote the programme and showcase its potentially huge positive impact on 
Romanian society and economy. Monitoring by the EC discovered that the 
problems facing the programme were dominantly structural ones, deriv-
ing from the (in)actions of the Romanian government in general, and the 
managing authority in particular (KPMG 2011). The structural problems 
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are further enhanced by what the contractors believe to be an abusive atti-
tude and deficient communication in the relationship of the MA with the 
contractors and a ‘criminalization’ of the contractors (Council for National 
Co-ordination of Regional Pacts for Employment and Social Inclusion 2013).
In terms of national policy concerning ESF implementation, in 
Romania several key issues which should have been solved from the begin-
ning actually produced serious problems. First, implementation was hin-
dered by the failure of the central government to properly regulate relevant 
areas. These situations cover both financial and administrative aspects, such 
as provisions concerning procurement, or the eligibility of applicants with 
debts to the state, the status of civil servants working on project implemen-
tation or problems derived from the fact that Romania still uses annual 
budgeting. At the same time, such situations also cover educational policy 
aspects, such as the creation of a national agency in charge of qualifications, 
or the differentiated status of schools in terms of budget execution. The 
annual implementation reports repeatedly identify such situations. Second, 
problems arise from the institutional structure, mainly the role and func-
tions of the intermediate bodies and their relationship with the managing 
authority. Third, there is lack of a regionally differentiated approach: the 
Bucharest-Ilfov Development Region, by far the most affluent in Romania, 
is treated equally along with the North-East Development Region, which 
is the EU’s poorest region. While the entire Romanian territory is covered 
by EU convergence objectives, a regional approach was definitely needed 
given the social and economic discrepancies between Romanian regions.
The context in which EU structural funding is being disbursed in 
Romania is defined by the persistent framing of the topic in terms of money 
spent/degree of absorption, specific to both political discourse and media 
coverage. This persistent framing actually works as an incentive for the 
management authorities for all EU funded programmes to direct their 
actions towards maximizing the amount of money spent, disregarding 
aspects concerning goal achievement and programme effectiveness. At 
the same time, there is public pressure, from the EC, the central govern-
ment, some politicians and the mass media, to ensure the money is spent 
properly, which seemed to lead to a disproportionate attention given to 
administrative and financial aspects.
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An important aspect of ESF implementation in Romania, obvious in 
the case of the RO-SOPHRD, is the difficulty in admitting policy failure 
and the blame-avoidance strategies of the managing authority. Policy failure 
is obvious if we observe that the management authority failed to take into 
account aspects such as the fact that is physically impossible for seventy 
people to assess applications for a EUR four billion programme, or that 
the indicators’ system must account for individuals or organizations that 
benefit from multiple activities financed by this programme. The analysis 
of documents issued by the MA for this particular operational programme 
reveals a quite positive tone, emphasizing achievements, despite the serious-
ness of the issues affecting programme implementation, and the continuous 
blaming of the contractors and central government policy-makers (see also 
Council for National Co-ordination of Regional Pacts for Employment and 
Social Inclusion 2013). Blame avoidance goes as far as failing to explain why 
the European Commission has repeatedly rejected requests for changes to 
the programme, because they were found to be poorly supported by factual 
arguments and situation analyses.
The progress in implementation was quite slow. After the initial push 
from 2008, when sevety-two calls for applications were launched, in the 
following four years the managing authority managed to launch a total of 
forty-two calls for applications (twenty-six in 2009, thirteen in 2010 and 
three in 2011). Up until December 2011 the success rate of applications was 
35.68 per cent, while 598,324 beneficiaries were recorded (out of a programme 
target of 1,650,000). At the same moment, the managing authority reported 
worryingly low figures for several macro-indicators associated with the pro-
gramme: 20.32 per cent of the overall target for students/pupils supported in 
their transition from school to active life, 14.16 per cent of overall target for 
participants in second chance programmes. Approximately 6 per cent (EUR 
166 million) of the amounts contracted by December 2011 are for ‘measures 
for the increase of participation in education and lifelong training, including 
through the reduction of early school leaving and gender segregation’ (EU 
intervention field code 73). At the same time, a number of 102 contracts 
for a total of EUR 83.76 million were annulled, due to contractors declar-
ing it is impossible to ensure the financial resources necessary, sometimes 
because of the changes in regulations concerning pre-financing of projects.
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The institutional set-up of ESF in Romania
This segment of the analysis is dominantly a meta-analysis of data and 
findings of the MA of the RO-SOPHRD and of the external evaluators 
of the programme. It puts available data and information on programme 
implementation in the analytical framework of this book.
Formal decision-making
According to national rules, the managing authority of the RO-SOPHRD 
has large decision-making powers concerning the programme and its imple-
mentation, going as far as being given the prerogative to initiate changes 
to the programme, to draft and, if necessary, to change the general imple-
mentation framework, to draft the assessment criteria, to monitor and 
evaluate (jointly with the Authority for the Co-ordination of Structural 
Instruments, RO-ACIS) the programme. The MA has dominantly used 
its prerogatives in the areas concerning administrative and financial aspects 
of implementation, monitoring, and assessment. It has to be noticed that 
the MA has attempted to make changes to the programme proposing real-
locations of funds between and within different priority axes. However, 
the EC has found the arguments insufficient to justify the reallocation of 
funds and rejected the proposal.
One important aspect is the degree of formalization the MA attempts 
to introduce even within those parts of day-to-day activity which require 
a governance of networks approach. It is the case of the workgroup cre-
ated to approach the issue of Roma access to ESF funding, which was not 
operational for more than a year after its creation was approved because 
some formal regulations needed to govern its activity were not yet approved. 
Another symptom of excessive formalization lies in the manner in which the 
issue of co-ordination with other structural instruments is approached. The 
only course of action the MA followed was that of formally requesting the 
Authority for the Co-ordination of Structural Instruments (RO-ACIS) to 
act in this direction. Formalization or bureaucratization of the programme 
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is the most contentious issue in the relationship between the MA and the 
contractors. An analysis made by a national structure which groups together 
the Regional Pacts for Employment and Social Inclusion points out unilateral 
changes of sensitive aspects of contracts, especially those concerning pre-
financing of projects, alongside ambiguity and divergent interpretations of 
the legal framework by different employees in the MA, resulting in diverging 
solutions given to contractors for the same problem and a focus on produc-
ing documents rather than results, reflected in how the MA deals with the 
contractors and assesses the impact of the programme (Council for National 
Co-ordination of Regional Pacts for Employment and Social Inclusion 2013).
Monitoring and evaluation are relatively separate activities within the 
MA, being the responsibility of distinct units. This is partially due to the 
fact that evaluation of EU funded programmes in Romania is largely cen-
tralized in the hands of the RO-ACIS. This is also reflected in the separa-
tion of the advisory boards, the RO-SOPHRD having two distinct boards, 
one in charge of evaluation and one in charge of monitoring. There is some 
communication between the two boards, yet it is unclear to what extent it 
results into better linking monitoring and evaluation activities. Monitoring 
is deeply connected to the process of reporting and reimbursement requests, 
a fact which was also pointed out by the interim evaluation (KPMG 2011). 
This actually results in frequent mentions in the annual implementation 
reports (especially in AMPOSDRU 2008, 2009, and 2010) that there is 
more progress in reaching the quantitative targets of the programme than 
reflected by numbers, because interim reports of the contractors were not 
yet processed by the MA. This fact is due to the initial reliance on printed 
reports, an online reporting system was proposed only in 2011.
Programming within the RO-SOPHRD happens at MA kevel, where 
a special unit for drafting calls exists. In 2008, the personnel in this unit 
received training on this topic (see AMPOSDRU 2008). However, this 
unit has a very long list of prerogatives, which includes extensive supervi-
sion of the activity of the intermediate bodies, all activities related to the 
technical assistance component of the RO-SOPHRD, drafting of assess-
ment criteria, and a significant workload of administrative and financial 
aspects (such as procurement for technical assistance projects). This sug-
gests drafting of calls unavoidably became a minor activity. However, very 
little information is actually available on how the process of drafting calls 
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happens and whose decision is it to launch a call or another. It can be said 
with certainty that programming of calls happens strictly within the MA 
(and possibly IBs), without communication with stakeholders or even the 
monitoring committee of the programme.
The MA is largely unreflective on the impact of the calls for applica-
tions until very late (see AMPOSDRU 2011), when the first mentions of 
using call content to better adapt the programme to the social and politi-
cal context appear. This is mentioned in relation to two very problematic 
education-related components of the programme, namely the teacher train-
ing component (with low achievements in terms of numbers of people 
trained, just 14,507 people by 2011 out of a programme target of 75,000) 
and the number of CVT programmes developed (45 by 2011 out of a target 
of 700). Changes to the programme are reduced to some changes to the 
calls, yet these changes usually go in the direction of further bureaucratizing 
the programme (changes to eligibility criteria, lists of activities, and provi-
sions concerning the applicant’s contribution to the budget of a project).
The MA of RO-SOPHRD describes its vision in the following terms:
… we focus on reaching a high degree of absorption of ESF funding and ensuring 
a technically and administratively efficient management of projects to support of 
developing human resources in Romania and to effectively contribute to social and 
economic cohesion in an enlarged European Union’. The mission of the MA is ‘to 
strengthen [its] administrative capacity in order to be able to fulfil its role generated 
by Romania’s accession to the EU, ensuring full compliance with EU legislation.1
It is obvious from how the vision and mission of the MA are formulated 
that it assumes a purely technical and administrative role of implementer of 
a governmental policy. The mention of the degree of absorption of funds 
into the vision of the MA suggests the unwillingness (of the policy-maker 
or of the MA) to assume greater responsibility in shaping ESF implemen-
tation in Romania. The programme description is very much regarded as 
fixed, despite the changing context of implementation.





Stakeholders are formally represented in both the monitoring and evalu-
ation boards of the programme. Yet it can be observed that dominant on 
both boards are the representatives of central government institutions and 
agencies. The monitoring committee is comprised of representatives of 
37 different stakeholders, some of them with several representatives; yet 
only seven are non-governmental entities, out of which a trade union, an 
organization representing employers, three Bucharest-based NGOs, and 
the Civil Society Development Foundation (FDSC), an NGO involved 
directly in the disbursement of PHARE funding in Romania.
While stakeholders are formally represented, their impact on the pro-
gramme can only be as high as the impact of the board they are members of. 
The monitoring committee of the RO-SOPHRD is a particularly weak struc-
ture, which seems to be completely dominated by the executive leadership of 
the MA. The committee meets only twice a year, even after the programme 
enters into crisis and is suspended by the EC. Reports of the meetings pub-
lished by the MA, as well as details included in the national implementation 
reports, show that the committee is ‘told’, ‘trained’ and ‘briefed’, rather than 
consulted or allowed to make suggestions of adjustments to the programme. 
It is also the role of the monitoring committee to legitimize the introduction 
of new rules and procedures, when the MA feels it cannot legitimize them 
simply by using the argument that they are required by the EC.
Stakeholders are not involved in implementation of the programme 
in other ways than as contractors, the MA choosing not to involve them 
in programming, monitoring and evaluation of the programme.
Promotion of partnership
The definition of partnership used in national policy documents makes 
reference to the ‘principles of partnership, as defined in community [EU] 
regulations’ (RO-RAI 2007), which suggests a formalized view of part-
nership, resulting from how the MA understands that the concept can be 
operationalized in practice. National policy documents concerning ESF 
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implementation stress out two elements in terms of partnership: the extent to 
which efforts to encourage projects implemented in partnership is successful 
(percentage of projects implemented by a partnership, consistently pointed 
out to be over 70 per cent) and the effects of the Regional Pacts for Social 
Inclusion and Employment. The latter are designed to be the best practice 
in terms of partnership Romania reports as a result of ESF implementation.
The Regional Pacts for Social Inclusion and Employment are ‘partici-
patory processes of regional public policy and strategy making, by the use 
of all existing funding opportunities, especially of the ESF. The Regional 
Pacts bring together representatives of local governments, central gov-
ernment offices at the local level, civil society and clergy, with responsi-
bilities in the area of employment and social inclusion’ (RO-RAI 2007). 
Such structures are supposed to work at regional and county level, as well 
as workgroups. In 2007, the MA reported seven out of eight pacts were 
operational, and also reported the existence of county structures and 55 
workgroups. However, later implementation reports show little progress 
in actually drafting regional policy documents and strategies; in 2010, only 
preparatory activities such as trainings and preliminary policy studies are 
conducted (AMPOSDRU 2010). A year later, the MA bluntly reports that 
it is their estimate that the members of the pacts are involved in the imple-
mentation of 70 per cent of all RO-SOPHRD projects (AMPOSDRU 
2011). Some of the most notable results of the pacts are thought to be con-
sultancy services provided in the process of writing 170 applications, train-
ing for the employees of institutions represented in the pacts, and policy 
studies concerning the human resources development in regional policies 
(AMPOSDRU 2011). The most important aspect concerning these pacts 
is the fact that, in the end, as implementation problems became obvious, 
they transformed into an important vehicle to criticize the MA and its 
actions, acting as advocates of the contractors.
References to partnership are also relevant from a governance-of-
networks perspective. In the 2007 implementation report (RO-RAI 2007), 
the MA offers a glimpse into how it dealt with the process of consultation 
of stakeholders during the drafting of the programme. The list of stake-
holders consulted actually contains a list of central government institutions 
and agencies, while it is also mentioned that ‘wide-scale consultations were 
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conducted with the social partners, civil society organizations, local govern-
ments and other relevant actors’ (RO-RAI 2007). At the same time, CSOs 
complained of the lack of meaningful consultation of the sector by the MA.
Availability of information
Information is readily available on official websites, even though not always 
in the most user-friendly manner. All the documents needed for the present 
component of the analysis were available on the official RO-SOPHRD 
website. However, key aspects of implementation are opaque, most nota-
bly details referring to the projects funded (official Romanian websites 
include only lists, while some project descriptions may be found on the main 
ESF website) and the assessment and reimbursement process. This latter 
aspect is particularly important given the delays in assessing applications 
and reimbursing contractors, which leave many applicants or contractors 
wondering for months or even years about the result of their applications 
or reimbursement requests.
Civil society organizations have also pointed out opacity in terms of 
decisions and actions taken to deal with the crisis of the programme, most 
notably the refusal to make public the action plans and the progress reports 
submitted to the EC (see <http://www.romaniacurata.ro/articol-3369.
htm>) in response to the June 2012 report of the audit conducted by DG 
Employment. This comes as a particularly sensitive issue, since the interim 
evaluation report actually stated that the MA had failed in implementing 
the recommendations of the auditing reports of DG Employment (KPMG 
2011). A coalition of NGOs has actually managed to obtain the text of the 
report, from an unspecified source, and published it on a website.
Adjustments during the commissioning cycle
The key notion to this part of the analysis is ‘sunrise/sunset’ issues (see 
J. Bradley 2005). ‘Sunset areas’ refer to negative side effects of the pro-
gramme, while ‘sunrise areas’ refer to new directions that need to be followed 
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or better instruments that could be used to further help the achievement 
of desired goals. Sunset or sunrise areas may be identified both in terms 
of substance and procedure. This analysis closely follows the qualitative 
analysis of programme implementation made by the MA in order to point 
out that important sunrise/sunset issues are ignored even when pointed out 
by the external evaluations of the programme. This situation sometimes 
arises from the dominant framing of RO-SOPHRD implementation in 
terms of money spent, while sometimes it seems to be related to ignorance 
of key aspects of the social and economic context in which the programme 
is supposed to be implemented.
A key area is the disproportionate access to funds of large potential 
contractors, such as public universities, which is visible from the beginning 
(see figures reflected in AMPOSDRU 2008 – 49 per cent of all contracts 
signed in 2008 involve universities). This is a key issue which to this day 
is being ignored by the MA and the Romanian government, despite the 
fact that by 2011 they report almost 600 per cent success in the support 
to the universities (see data in AMPOSDRU 2011). 
A second area is the preference of the MA for strategic projects (vis-
ible in their expressed desire that publicity actions in 2008 would lead 
to an increase in applications for strategic projects, since these are per-
ceived to be more effective in terms of spending the financial allocation 
for RO-SOPHRD, while the contractors seem to prefer the smaller and 
more easily manageable in practice grant projects (by the MAs admission, 
73 per cent of all applications submitted in 2008, see AMPOSDRU 2008). 
It is exactly this distinction between strategic and grant projects which the 
interim evaluation finds to be not very beneficial to programme effective-
ness, which is why the recommendation is that such a distinction should 
be scrapped (KPMG 2011). This recommendation has been, to this date, 
ignored, despite supplementary findings showing the grant projects have 
been more successful in reaching the dominant MA goal, that of absorp-
tion. This has happened because the large strategic projects were prone to 
financial blockages when implemented by public sector contractors within 
the framework of annual instead of multi-annual budgeting.
The main area which should have been approached by the MA is 
reflected by macro-indicators of a quantitative nature. Numbers collected 
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by the MA itself show that the RO-SOPHRD is a programme which man-
ages to successfully target the younger and better educated segments of 
Romanian society. Warnings appeared since the ex-ante evaluation, which 
pointed out that, despite Romanian population getting older, the pro-
gramme did not address properly the issue of active ageing (Panteia 2007).
Another critical problem concerns co-ordination with other EU pro-
grammes, which seems to be largely ignored by the MA, even though 
it was already identified as significant in the ex-ante evaluation of the 
RO-SOPHRD. With one exception, the annual implementation reports 
stress the notion of complementarity between programmes usually thought 
to have been achieved in the programming process. One report stresses the 
notion of co-ordination, yet in a much-formalized manner (see above).
A problem specifically identified by the MA is the quality of the assess-
ment of applications on education-related issues, with several annual imple-
mentation reports stressing out that problems appeared because evaluators 
were not familiar enough with the structure and problems of the national 
education system. However, there is very little action in the area of technical 
assistance in this area. In the end, the MA contracts out the assessment of 
applications submitted for some calls. However, which criteria are behind 
the choice to contract out some aspect of its activity and not another is 
never spelled out.
A significant problem is the relationship between the MA and the con-
tractors. The latter accuse poor communication, abusive attitudes, the ‘crimi-
nalization’ of the contractors, and the constant abusive unilateral changes 
to contracts. The situation is further complicated when the MA decides 
to contract out the help-desk activities and ends up spending almost a year 
without a functioning help-desk because of a blockage in the procurement 
procedures. The attempt to transfer blame to the beneficiaries leads to the 
MA diverting attention of public opinion to some very eye-catching aspects. 
Thus, in 2010, there was a very public row concerning strategic projects 
implemented by National Agency for Employment under a poorly working 
key area of intervention. This was blocked by the MA, which considered 
salaries to be unacceptable in amount (Realitatea.net 2010), despite the fact 
that the pay of project personnel was actually in line with the provisions of 
the programme, and was approved and publicized by the MA itself.
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Moreover, the action plan drafted in response to the spring 2012 audit 
conducted by DG Employment identifies some serious shortcomings in 
programme implementation which were not publicly admitted by the MA.
Shaping the market for educational service delivery:  
Calls for applications under RO-SOPHRD
The institutional set-up acts as a very rigid framework for the bureaucratic 
decisions made by the managing authority during the actual commissioning 
process. In this section we analyse all relevant call for applications launched 
under RO-SOPHRD by November 2012.2 Out of 114 calls launched by the 
MA and intermediate bodies of the RO-SOPHRD, only ten are directly 
relevant to the issue of facilitating the access to ISCED 0–3 education of 
children and adults pertaining to disadvantaged groups. All these calls 
were launched under the second priority axis, within two key areas of 
intervention (KAIs) labeled Learn a trade! and A second chance in educa-
tion. Although small in numbers, these calls provide us with a clear view 
2 The analysis of calls issued under the RO-SOPHRD programme comprises one of 
the six priority axes of the programme and two different key areas of intervention, 
leading to a total of ten calls for applications analysed. These calls were selected, taking 
into account relevance to the ISCED 0–3 levels of the national educational system 
and to the issue of access to education for disadvantaged groups. The priority axis 
analysed here, Linking lifelong learning and the labor market (PA2), accounts for 
another quarter of the total RO-SOPHRD budget for 2007–13. Within this axis, 
two key areas of intervention were determined to be relevant for the educational 
inclusion of vulnerable groups, Transition from school to active life (KAI 2.1.) and 
Preventing and correcting early school leaving (KAI 2.2.). Another axis approached 
here, Education and training in support for growth and development of knowledge 
based society (PA1) lists among its key areas of intervention Access to quality edu-
cation and initial VET (KAI 2.1), which deals primarily with teacher training and 
quality assurance issues. This priority axis accounts for approximately a quarter of 
the total RO-SOPHR budget (almost EUR one billion). 
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on how ESF funding in Romania is being used to shape a quasi-market for 
educational service delivery.
The first major instrument at the disposal of the policy-maker was the 
decision concerning whether to define or not categories of projects and, 
thus, shape the commissioning process. The decision was to distinguish 
between two types of projects, in terms of duration, cost, and territorial scope. 
The first category, designated strategic projects, are longer (up to thirty-
six months), more expensive (between EUR 0.5 and 5 million), and more 
comprehensive from a territorial point of view (national or multi-regional). 
The second category, designated as grant projects, are shorter in time (up to 
twenty-four months), less expensive (between EUR 50,000 and 500,000), 
and more focused territorially (first and second tier of local government, 
regional, and multi-regional). Interestingly enough, the territorial dimen-
sion of these categories does not take into account the existence of inter-
municipal co-operation forms in Romania. A very important distinction 
between the two types of projects is in terms of application and assessment 
procedure. In the case of the strategic projects, all applications submitted 
by a deadline are assessed and then ordered so that the best applications are 
selected. In the case of grant projects, a first-come, first-served procedure is 
used, with applications passing the minimal score threshold receiving fund-
ing in the order in which they were submitted. Alongside this categorization 
of projects, we find the very distinctive situation of the different forms of 
state-aid, which are regulated separately and governed by a different set of 
general conditions as compared to the types of projects mentioned before.
There is a clear preference of the MA for large projects, as suggested 
by the fact that fifty-eight out of the 114 calls launched were for strategic 
projects. In the area of interest to this research project, six out of ten calls 
launched are for strategic projects. There is also a significant difference in 
terms of financial allocations for these calls, with 87 per cent of the funds 
allocated to the calls for strategic projects. Such a division is justifiable 
from the perspective of the need for structural reforms in the Romanian 
national education system. Yet, addressing social issues such as early school 
leaving requires individualized or community-based interventions, which 
are more easily achievable in the frameworks provided by small projects 
developed at local level, by schools or CSOs. It is unclear how the impact 
of the strategic projects is actually traceable at grassroots level.
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A second major decision concerns the degree of differentiation between 
calls launched under the same key areas of intervention. In Romania, there 
are very little differences from one call to another. Most of the differences 
actually refer to administrative and financial aspects, with no differences 
in terms of substance (social issues approached, design of services which 
projects funded should provide).
Who are the potential contractors?
Another very important instrument in shaping the market, at the disposal 
of the MA only, is the list of potential contractors included in each of the 
calls launched under the programme. In the case of Romania, we have a 
highly unregulated market, driven by the need of the MA to spend as much 
of the financial allocation as possible. Thus, with the exception of the calls 
aimed to disburse state aid for professional training, all the calls analysed 
here present very long lists of potential contractors. Of particular interest 
are the calls under KAI 2.1 – Learn a trade, seeking to disburse funding 
for the compulsory professional training of pupils and students. Under 
these calls, vocational schools are facing a not very fair competition with 
universities for funds aimed at the practical training of students and pupils.
There are no clear-cut differences in terms of lists of potential contrac-
tors between the two key areas of intervention analysed here, or between 
the two types of projects. KAI 2.1 Learn a trade has somewhat shorter lists 
of potential contractors, as it excludes local and county governments and 
churches, while it includes professional associations. Ministries and central 
government agencies, county-level government offices including school 
authorities, research institutes and think tanks, trade unions, employers’ 
associations, and NGOs are eligible under all calls except those for state 
aid schemes. ISCED 1–3 schools are treated differently from one call to 
another. ISCED 1–2 schools and public ISCED 2–3 academic schools are 
eligible under six elected calls from both KAIs, with no rule discernible 
in terms of types of interventions where they are included. For example, 
they are eligible under three out of four calls focused on early school leav-
ing (KAI 2.2.). Vocational and technical ISCED 2–3 schools are eligible 
under eight out of ten calls, being excluded from one of the several calls 
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labeled A second chance in education and from a call focused on mentoring 
programmes for young graduates at their first job.
A special situation is that of non-state universities, considered by the 
MA to be ineligible because they are not explicitly mentioned as such by 
the RO-SOPHRD official documents. Yet, technically and legally, non-
state universities are non-governmental organizations and, consequently, 
eligible for funding. The exception mentioned by the MA is more likely 
applicable to calls under key area of intervention 1.1, specifically targeted 
at universities. Another special situation refers to the eligibility of schools. 
In Romania, in a drive to reduce administrative costs in the educational 
sector, it was decided that only some schools can be entrusted to take care 
of the financial and fiscal aspects of their operation. These schools were 
designated as ‘budgetary centres’ and asked to process financial and fiscal 
aspects for other schools as well. Consequently, only the former schools 
were assigned fiscal registration numbers, which turned out to be absolutely 
necessary for being able to apply for ESF funding.
The main problem in terms of access to the market seems to be the 
extent to which rules cater dominantly to the needs of public sector con-
tractors. In the application process public sector contractors were exempt 
from some financial and fiscal eligibility checks, which turned out to be 
quite troublesome for the other contractors. In 2009, access is made even 
easier for certain categories of public institutions (universities and self-
financed institutions), calls issued in that year put their contributions to 
the budget of the project much lower than for other public institutions and 
on equal footing with third-sector organizations. This indicates a prefer-
ence towards easing access to funds for public institutions, at the expense 
of non-state potential contractors.
Partnership structures
The principle of partnership is translated into the calls for applications 
in the inclusion of partnership in the list of assessment criteria. While 
partnership is not compulsory, applicants are from the beginning well 
aware of the fact that applying for funding without a partnership structure 
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is automatically disadvantaging them as compared to other applicants, 
standing to lose between 5 and 7 points out of 100. In order to prevent 
partnerships in-name, created just to overcome this disadvantage, the calls 
provide a very clear operational definition of partnership and require the 
involvement of partners in at least two of the following components of 
the project: project preparation, project financing and project activities. 
The calls go even further and include a template for partnership agreements. 
While the use of the template was not compulsory, applicants preferred to 
use it, fearing that the use of other documents might harm their chances 
of obtaining funding for their project. Later calls (2011) go further and 
explicitly request that only entities who would be eligible to apply on their 
own are eligible partners.
There are no compulsory partnership structures. In terms of types of 
partnerships, transnational ones are explicitly recommended throughout 
the programme and even monitored by the MA (see annual implementa-
tion reports), while cross-regional partnerships are encouraged in all calls 
for strategic projects. The definition of what constitutes a multi-regional 
project, however, varies in time. In earlier calls, the requirement is that the 
partnership structures include entities from three of the eight development 
regions in the country, while in later calls this is reduced to two. This is an 
extremely important relaxation of the requirements, with the potential to 
make the calls for strategic projects more accessible to smaller contractors.
Who are the potential beneficiaries?
An important instrument in shaping the contractor’s approach to select-
ing potential beneficiaries of their services is the manner in which the 
MA requests them to register the beneficiaries and justify their belonging 
to one of the target groups. The general conditions applicable to calls, in 
all their versions, include a form for the registration of the target groups 
with a very long list of groups designated as vulnerable. While it includes 
categories such as Roma, refugees, people with disabilities, and other cat-
egories usually designated as disadvantaged, the list also includes women 
and families with more than two children. In the latter case, the designation 
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as vulnerable groups needs some nuances. It is unclear whether this nuance 
is taken into account during programme implementation, or any woman 
recruited by a contractor to benefit from its services will be considered a 
potential beneficiary, no matter her social and economical status.
As with the lists of contractors, the lists of potential beneficiaries are 
quite comprehensive and quite misleading. Under calls which identify 
school drop-out among Roma pupils and pupils from rural areas to be 
problematic, the list of potential beneficiaries actually lists ‘pupils’, leaving 
to the interpretation of the potential contractor and of the people assess-
ing the application whether other pupils can be included. The results of 
these comprehensive lists are puzzling. For example, calls issued under key 
area of intervention 2.1 are nominally focused on ISCED 4–5. However, 
interpreting jointly provisions concerning services and potential beneficiar-
ies, we find out that in certain cases lower ISCED levels are also targeted, 
namely in the case of educational counseling services.
In terms of groups specifically identified as disadvantaged in the text 
of the calls, under key area of intervention 2.2, all calls make reference to 
Roma pupils and their families, pupils with disabilities and their families, 
pupils from rural areas and their families, pupils with poor school perfor-
mance, and other vulnerable groups. The latter category appears as such 
and, combined with the fact that targeting such very specific groups is not 
specifically embedded in the assessment categories and is only rewarded at 
the decision of those assessing the application, creates room for contractors 
to focus on more accessible beneficiaries, as long as they fit into the very 
broad definition given to vulnerable groups. This is supported by official 
data released by the MA showing progress on macro-indicators. Thus, at 
the end of 2011, under priority axis 2, out of the four groups identified as 
vulnerable by the national legislation, the largest group of beneficiaries was 
classified under ‘Other’. In total, 5,988 people identified as belonging to a 
national minority (out of which 2,032 were Roma), forty-two immigrants, 
and 513 people with disabilities benefited from RO-SOPHRD funding, as 
compared to 30,748 people from other disadvantaged groups.
Macro-indicators reported by the MA need to be read with circum-
spection, as in 2011 it became obvious that a huge mistake had been made 
in recording beneficiaries, namely that of distributing indicators to specific 
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key areas of intervention of the programme (see AMPOSDRU 2011). For 
example, indicators showing progress in terms of social inclusion were only 
measured looking at projects under priority axis 6, despite the fact that 
projects funded under other priority axes also produced results in terms 
of social inclusion.
Designing services
The manner in which the MA has chosen to define the list of eligible 
activities has come under heavy criticism in the interim evaluation report. 
The authors of this report considered the lists of activities drafted by the 
MA were far too detailed, leaving almost nothing to the discretion of the 
applicants. Rather than define project activities based on their knowledge 
of the field, contractors were actually forced to pick from a predetermined 
list of activities. Given the formalization of the programme, it is likely 
that many applicants refrained from introducing additional activities, as 
it would have increased the chances of their applications being rejected. 
The details in the list of activities sometimes go as far as making a list of 
innovative activities.
These long lists are also the result of the approach to call drafting. 
Since there is not much differentiation between calls issued under the 
same key area of intervention, the list of activities designed for the respec-
tive area during RO-SOPHRD programming is maintained as such in all 
calls. Instead of launching calls for specific groups of activities, for example 
counseling services or prevention of school dropout among Roma children, 
the MA issues catch-all calls. This is probably due to the focus on the MA 
on absorption and their interpretation that catch-all calls will be more 
effective in terms of amounts of money spent.
By 2010, the MA became much more restrictive in the manner in which 
it defines and designs the services contractors are supposed to provide. Calls 
issued in 2010 requests potential contractors to include certain activities 
only in association with others (see for example call 109).
An interesting category in the lists of eligible activities concerns 
the so-called monitoring activities. These are in fact research activities, 
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and are generally restricted to certain types of contractors. Interestingly 
enough, these contractors are ministries, central government agencies, 
and central government offices at the local level. Moreover, there are no 
specific requirements oriented towards ensuring the quality of these activi-
ties. In fact, important amounts of money are directed towards research 
concerning the effects of the ESF, such as mapping the results in terms 
of professional integration of young graduates, which will probably be 
used to further orient the actions of the central government, without 
safeguarding quality.
Call design
Calls are documents difficult to cope with due to their length, some of them 
going as far as hundreds of pages, with multiple corrigenda. This length 
is also due to the fact that, despite the claim of keeping them separately, 
general and specific conditions to the calls are mixed. Large portions of 
the general conditions of the calls are copy-pasted into the specific condi-
tions. Calls are very misleading for applicants, which has resulted in large 
numbers of applications being rejected for administrative issues. The big-
gest problem has been the request of the MA that applications are made 
anonymous (they should not mention names and places), so that assessment 
is blind. Large numbers of applicants failed to fully make their applications 
anonymous and were rejected.
Improving the situation of the Roma as horizontal objective
Poor dealing of the Roma issues within the MA is obvious, starting with 
the language used, as the annual implementation reports feature a table 
titled ‘Synthesis of actions whose purpose is to intensify the integration 
in the labor force and, consequently, the social assimilation of minorities’ 
(AMPOSDRU 2011). Social assimilation is considered politically incorrect 
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terminology in Romanian policy documents and it is never knowingly used, 
yet it is used repeatedly in RO-SOPHRD annual implementation reports.
While in official documents the MA mentions improvement of the 
situation of the Roma as a horizontal objective, it has issues in proving 
this actually happens. This is pointed out by the National Agency for the 
Roma (RO-ANR), which contradicts on its website an MA declaration that 
projects worth EUR 250 million are targeted at the Roma population. The 
ANR actually shows that the projects the MA is referring to (102 in total, 
fifteen within priority axes 1 and 2) target Roma among other vulnerable 
groups (<http://www.anr.gov.ro/>).
One problem with tracking progress in ensuring equality of oppor-
tunity and reducing some form of discrimination is that initially, the MA 
considers only results under key area of intervention 6.3 projects to be 
relevant, despite the fact that this is an obvious case of a horizontal objec-
tive. As such, in 2008 they report that seven projects approach this issue 
(AMPOSDRU 2008). Moreover, the MA reports that 94 per cent of pro-
jects contracted in 2008 declare these principles will be respected. While 
this numerical approach is not essentially wrong, it is far from telling us 
the complete story, since there might be a huge difference between decla-
rations of contractors and the actual practice of project implementation. 
The numerical approach is employed in order to determine progress for 
all horizontal objectives, yet there is a significant difference in terms of 
details provided (more detailed for sustainable development), which can 
be linked to the difficulty the MA seems to have had in actually opera-
tionalizing these objectives.
Assessing progress in targeting the Roma is very difficult for the first 
years of implementation, since the MA normally reports its targeting of 
vulnerable groups, using a breakdown said to be included in national regu-
lations. This refers to people belonging to a national minority, people with 
disabilities and others. For example, for 2009, the annual implementation 
report mentioned that 1,187 people from a national minority (3.5 per cent 
of total beneficiaries at that point) benefited from projects funded under 
this programme, without distinguishing between Roma, Hungarians and 
other minorities (AMPOSDRU 2009). The distinction only appears in 
the 2011 implementation report, when the MA shows that out of a total 
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of 589,324 beneficiaries, 28,198 were Roma (4.78 per cent). These fig-
ures must be placed against the category defined as Other disadvantaged 
groups, which accounts for approximately 30 per cent of the total number 
of RO-SOPHRD registered beneficiaries at the end of 2011. The numbers 
are particularly telling if we focus strictly on key area of intervention 2.1, 
where approximately 5.16 per cent of the beneficiaries are Roma, despite 
the focus on early school leaving and the fact that Roma are dispropor-
tionately affected by this.
The slow progress in this respect also has a bureaucratic explanation. By 
2010, it became obvious that there needed to be a more effective approach 
to the Roma issues; so the monitoring committee discussed and approved 
the creation of a workgroup in co-operation with the National Agency for 
the Roma. However, they opted for a highly formalized procedure, requir-
ing that a Regulation concerning the organization and functioning of the 
technical workgroup for facilitating the access of Roma to RO-SOPHRD 
funded projects be developed and later approved by the monitoring com-
mittee (AMPOSDRU 2010). This regulation was only approved a year 
later (AMPOSDRU 2011), which meant the workgroup did not work 
and we cannot expect it to have impacted RO-SOPHRD implementa-
tion in any way.
The RO-SOPHRD dominantly manages to reach the younger and 
better-educated segments of the Romanian society, as shown by official 
data. It does not seem able to reach the multiply disadvantaged and less-
educated segments of Romanian society and be effective in educational 
inclusion. The MA fails in admitting that, so far, the programme has failed 
in reaching the multiply disadvantaged and less-educated segments of 
Romanian society.
The situation analysis is, from this point of view, a very good example 
of blame avoidance. The MA suggests in national implementation reports 
that there is nothing wrong with this trend, as it results from the ‘specific-
ity of the objectives of the priority axes and of the target groups’ and the 
‘size of the financial allocation for each priority axis’ (AMPOSDRU 2010). 
Despite programming documents pointing the other way, the MA suggests 
lower-educated beneficiaries are targeted under PAs 5 and 6, which happen 
to have a lower financial allocation. At the same time, the difference is 
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blamed on the extremely different speed of contracting under different PAs 
(higher for PAs 1 and 2 and lower for 5 and 6). Yet, this latter trend could 
have been easily corrected by the MA with minor decisions concerning 
the schedule of calls.
Conclusion
The approach to educational policy issues under the RO-SOPHRD is 
rather rigid and incomplete. Concrete steps taken in the implementation 
of the programme fail to respond to some of the problems identified in 
the situation analysis, most notably the problems of quality of teaching, 
development of pre-school education, increasing access, and participation 
in higher education of pupils from rural areas and disadvantaged groups. 
Moreover, the manner in which the commissioning cycle is managed is 
unfit to respond to the changing conditions in the educational system 
and on the labor market. The 2006 situation analysis and structure of the 
RO-SOPHRD are taken for granted, the MA focusing strictly on admin-
istrative and financial aspects. The most obvious symptom of this rigidity 
is revealed by the content analysis of calls, which shows practically no dif-
ferentiation between calls launched in specific key areas of intervention. 
In fact, in terms of definition of social problems approached, purpose, 
target groups and activities, there is no difference from one call to another.
An underlying cause to the MAs’ failure in effectively approaching 
the issue of using ESF funding to target the needs of vulnerable groups is 
the public-political context in which the implementation happened. Very 
early, the emphasis was publicly placed on the rate of absorption and the 
cases of fraud, which further pushed a highly formalistic and hierarchical 
organization into a drive to produce regulations and procedures to approach 
the administrative and financial issues raised in the public space. This 
shifted necessary attention from issues such as the extent to which Roma 
benefited from ESF funding, or the impact of overly bureaucratized proce-
dures on contractors. It became very much a matter of dominant goals and 
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the direction in which the MA chose to steer the ship of RO-SOPHRD, 
which is a matter of governance (see Peters 2006).
As public pressure increased, the MA became more defensive and less 
transparent, culminating with refusals to make public the action plans and 
progress reports requested by the EC in order to reinstate the programme. 
The blame-avoidance strategies employed have contributed to a severe dete-
rioration of the relationship with contractors, which possibly contributed 
to further obstacles to implementation.
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6  ESF as a substitute for national education 
funding: The case of Slovakia
This chapter focuses on 
how the Operational 
programme Education 
(SK-OPE) manages 
to approach the issues 
of access to education 
for vulnerable groups, 
especially Roma, in 
Slovakia. Based on an 
in-depth analysis of 
policy documents and 
the guidelines for appli-
cants issued under the above-mentioned programme, it argues that the 
institutional framework for the implementation of structural funds in 
Slovakia can be characterized as extremely complicated and unstable, with 
serious consequences (especially financial) for the contractors.
After presenting the operational programme under focus, the chap-
ter details the context of ESF implementation in Slovakia and presents 
some data about the progress in implementation. Later on, it analyses the 
institutional set-up of ESF-funded programmes in Slovakia as reflected 
in national policy documents. Then, it details the bureaucratic decisions 
associated with ESF implementation and showcases their potential to 
induce increased educational selectivity.
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The Operational Programme Education
The Operational Programme Education (SK-OPE), which is in the focus 
of this study, is one of eleven operational programmes implemented in 
Slovakia between 2007 and 2013. The global objective of SK-OPE is to 
ensure the long-term competitiveness of Slovakia by adapting the edu-
cational system to the needs of the knowledge society, in line with the 
strategic priority Human Resources set up in the National Strategic 
Reference Framework 2007–13 (SK-NSRF 2007). The SK-OPE is part 
of the European Social Fund (ESF), together with the Operational pro-
gramme Employment and Social Inclusion (SK-OPESI), within the same 
Human Resources strategic priority, and with the global objective to con-
tribute to the ‘growth of employment, reduction of unemployment, social 
inclusion and capacity building’. While the former is focused on formal 
and informal education within the educational system, the latter includes 
(re)training the labor force (employees or job-seekers). These two areas 
overlap to some extent and the borderline between the two operational 
programmes is unclear. Also, the SK-OPE is complementary to the ERDF-
funded Regional Operational Programme (managed by the Ministry of 
Transport, Construction and Regional Development), which supports 
the reconstruction, renewal and enlargement of existing school premises 
and their equipment.
Within the SK-OPE, the overall financial allocation for 2007–13 is 
EUR 600 million for the Convergence Objective (the territory of Slovakia 
except for the Bratislava Region) and EUR 17.8 million for the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment Objective (Bratislava Region). The 
SK-OPE is managed by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and 
Sport (SK-MESRS, which is also the Managing Authority of the ERDF-
funded Operational Programme Research and Development). SK-OPE 
has five priority axes, each with several key areas of interventions (KAIs 
or measures).
The KAIs 3.1. Raising the Educational Level of Members of Marginalized 
Roma Communities and 3.2 Raising the Educational Level of Persons 
with Special Educational Needs, the focus of this chapter, are part of the 
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Horizontal Priority Marginalized Roma Communities (SK-HP MRC), 
which is one of four horizontal priorities established within the SK-NSRF.1 
Its target is defined as increasing the employment and education levels of 
marginalized Roma communities and improving their standard of living, 
and should be directly achieved through implementation of six relevant 
operational programmes, including SK-OPE.
However, the horizontal priorities were set up only in the very final 
phase of programming of the SK-NSRF (SK-NSRF 2007), as a result of 
negotiations with the EC. Therefore, the objectives of the horizontal pri-
orities were not the basis for programming of the OPs. Existing relevant 
programmes, Priority Axes and KAIs had already been formally assigned 
to them (Ad-hoc hodnotenie horizontálnej … 2011: 8). As a consequence, 
the activities relevant and necessary for the fulfillment of the SK-HC 
MRC were not included in the OPs and the co-ordinator of the SK-HP 
MRC, Office of the Governmental Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities 
(SK-GPRC), has only a minimal influence on the assessment, selection 
and commissioning of projects (Strategické hodnotenie … 2012: 9). The 
participation of the civil society in the programming of the SK-NSFR was 
very problematic and ineffective, and culminated with a boycott of the pro-
gramming process by NGOs (Grambličková, Mojžiš and Zamkovský 2011: 
13–14). Additionally, at the end of programming, the government changed. 
Discontinuity in the strategic approach of the old and new administration 
had an impact on both the content and the implementation mechanism 
of the SK-OPE and SK-HP MRC.
The SK-OPE basic programming documents refer to, among others, 
the Concept of Integrated Education of Roma Children and Youth, includ-
ing Secondary and Higher Education, adopted by the Slovak government 
in 2004 as the national strategy of Roma integration in the sector of 
education (Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic 2004).2 The 
1 Other horizontal priorities are: Equal Opportunities, Sustainable Development, 
and Information Society.
2 The document, however, declares problems with the collection and processing of 
ethnically disaggregated data and subsequent problems with targeting, monitor-
ing and evaluation of interventions focusing Roma. Instead of the missing ethnic 
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Concept was replaced by a new one in 2008. The new document con-
tains an analysis of the situation, problems and needs of Roma pupils in 
the Slovak Republic, strategic objectives and indicators for their achieve-
ment. The document claims to ‘propose topics to be attained through 
national projects and calls’ within the KAI 3.1 of the SK-OPE (Ministry 
of Education of the Slovak Republic 2008). However, the SK-OPE had 
been established and launched before the adoption of the new Concept 
and therefore does not fully match the proposed measures. This chap-
ter argues that the reform policies aimed at the inclusion of Roma and 
other disadvantaged groups are implemented through centrally planned 
and commissioned national projects, which tend to substitute national 
funding for school operations and modernization, rather than demand-
driven projects.
Progress in SK-OPE implementation
The SK-OPE was approved by the EC Decision No. K(2007)5476 on 
November 7, 2007, totalling a budget of EUR 726,825,389 (the EU contri-
bution being EUR 617,801,578) for 2007–13. Of interest to this project are 
the originally planned allocations for the Priority Axis 3 of EUR 76,470,589 
(the EU contribution EUR 65,000,000); the planned allocation for KAI 
3.1 of EUR 57,294,118 (the EU contribution of EUR 48,700,000); and the 
planned allocation for KAI 3.2 of EUR 19,176,471 (the EU contribution 
was EUR 16,300,000).
data, it uses a proxy category of children from socially disadvantaged environments 
(which do not include all Roma children and also include disadvantaged non-Roma 
children).
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Table 6-1. Financial allocations for the education of vulnerable groups,  
SK-OPE, 2007–2012.

















2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2008 25 184.9 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009 16 334.1 1 13.0 1 8.0 2 21.0
2010** 8 91.5 1* 17.0 0 0 1* 17.0
2011 7 148.5 3 50.5 0 0 3 50.5
2012 17 291.0 2 14.4 1 15.8 3 30.2
Total** 72 1,066.2 7 94.9 2 23.8 9 118.7
* The call was cancelled.
** Including the call cancelled in 2010.
Source: Overview of launched calls. Webpage of the Central Co-ordination Authority. 
www.nsrr.sk/download.php?FNAME=1358759401.uplandANAME=prehlad_
vyziev_31_12_2012.xls
In the second half of the programming period 2007–13, we see an increase 
in the contracting of national projects in the Priority Axis 3, thanks to 
large national projects (see Table 6-1). That could be motivated either 
by concerns that demand-driven projects would not ensure the planned 
absorption of the allocated funds, or that demand-driven projects are not 
effective in reforming the education of vulnerable groups and bringing 
the expected results.
By June 22, 2012 the SK-OPE was the second-least performing opera-
tional programme in Slovakia, from the point of view of spending of the 
planned allocation for 2007–13. The level of absorption (as expenditures 
certified by the EC) was only 15.82 per cent. Due to the weak financial 
implementation of the SK-OPE and concerns about the real capacity to 
absorb its allocated funds for 2007–13 until the end 2015 (rule n+2), on 
May 16, 2012 the Slovak government decided on the reallocation of funds 
from the SK-OPE into SK-OPESI. The EC approved the proposed revi-
sion on September 19, 2012. The total budget of the SK-OPE was reduced 
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by EUR 70 million and the new budget of the operational programme was 
EUR 656,825,389 (the EU contribution after the reallocation was EUR 
558,301,578). The reallocation did not affect the KAI 3.1, but the budget 
of the KAI 3.2 was increased by more than EUR 1.9 million.
Table 6-2. Aggregated contracted number of projects, contracted amounts and share of 
the total allocation for 2007–2013, SK-OPE.
Year 2007 2008* 2009 2010 2011
Total 
SK-OPE
projects 0 44 440 554 596
amount 0 68.9 236.2 310.1 368.4
% 0 11.2 32.5 42.7 50.7
KAI 3.1
projects 0 0 50 49 50
amount 0 0 8.4 8.1 33.1
% 0 0 14.7 14.1 57.8
KAI 3.2
projects 0 0 22 20 19
amount 0 0 3.9 3.6 3.4
% 0 0 20.3 18.8 17.7
Priority 
Axis 3
projects 0 0 74 69 69
amount 0 0 12.3 11.7 36.5
% 0 0 16.1 15.3 47.7
*  The Annual Report for 2008 indicates only the amount contracted from EU sources. 
Without national co-financing; which financing differs by type of contractor, it is not 
possible to calculate from available data the actual total contracted amount including 
the national co-financing).
The SK-OPE and national education policy
The SK-OPE was prepared during a period of important political change, 
when a reformist right-wing government was replaced in 2006, after 
eight years of rule, with a new coalition led by social democrats. The new 
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government engaged in completely redrafting the basic documents of 
the programming period 2007–13, including the SK-OPE (among the 
consequences were delays in beginning the SK-NSRF implementation). 
Similar to other sectors in Slovakia, in education policy there is also a lack 
of strategic continuity across political cycles. According to experts, the 
substantial problem of the Slovak educational system is a ‘lack of vision 
and consensus across the whole society on what educational system we 
want to build-up’ (Krčmárik 2012). An agreement on targets and strategy 
going beyond the governmental changes is missing and each administra-
tion adopts new long-term ‘strategies’, which are immediately replaced by 
new ones.
Typically, the redrafted SK-OPE approved in 2007 by the EC refers in 
its strategic part mostly to the Policy Statement of the Government 2006–10 
and Priority Tasks of the SK-MESRS for 2006–10. The following objec-
tives are formulated for the regional system of education: drawing up a 
concept of foreign-language teaching in primary and secondary schools; 
assessing the qualifications status of pedagogical staff in regional schools 
and the standard of training of graduates from teacher-training colleges; 
drawing up a draft concept of professional teacher development within the 
career system; preparing a draft act on the situation of pedagogical staff 
of schools and school facilities; drawing up a new draft act on education 
and upbringing (school act) to address changes in the content of upbring-
ing and education in regional schools; drawing up a concept of two-tier 
educational programme model in vocational education; and drawing up 
a concept of the education information system.
As noted above, the operational programme was drafted at a time when 
the existing concepts and acts in education and upbringing were amended, 
or new ones were drafted and thus, they could not be sufficiently taken into 
account in its drafting. Therefore, all relevant concepts would be spelled 
out later, during the preparation of calls for applications (i.e. incremental 
strategy formation of using the ESF/OP Education) (SK-OPE 2007: 28–9). 
This means that the SK-OPE draft did not contain detailed descriptions 
of the needs that it was supposed to address. Instead of this, it included 
a mechanism of incremental strategy formation, meaning repeated and 
interim analysis and evaluation when preparing the various calls, focusing 
specifically on programming, channels of intervention, financial structure, 
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as well as the intervention impacts and variants. The incremental strategy 
formation should consist of the following steps:
(a) establishing an efficient partnership of the Managing Authority (MA) 
with the relevant stakeholders involved, including a certain form of 
participation of the target group representatives;
(b) a participative scoping phase co-ordinated by the MA, in which iden-
tification of possible priority areas would be complemented and con-
firmed, on the basis of pre-agreed criteria including their geographic 
dimension;
(c) a strategic decision by the MA concerning the selection of priority 
areas based on outputs from the previous stage;
(d) implementation of short (three to six months) partnership projects 
procured from a single source for which analyses of needs, key dispari-
ties and development factors would be prepared in the priority areas 
according to pre-defined clear specifications;
(e) selection of alternative instruments (activities) by which the needs 
would be addressed;
(f ) modelling and quantification of objectives and determining the finan-
cial allocation – performed by the MA. In the event of insufficient 
external capacities, consultants can be involved in the process or the 
strategic process as a whole can be transferred to a suitable partner;
(g) an ex-ante evaluation of the effects of the different variants includ-
ing an empirical verification of the intervention mechanisms in the 
2004–06 programming period and/or pilot verification of instruments 
(t months); this can be done by single-source procurement or by a call 
with sufficiently specific conditions;
(h) strategic selection of the most beneficial variant by the MA;
(i) preparing documentation for the call (in ideal cases, in co-operation 
of the IB/MA and partners, and co-ordinated by the MA, including 
model cost estimates, methodologies for the implementation of activi-
ties, methodologies of monitoring, etc.) (SK-OPE 2007: 163–64).
However, how this procedure actually worked in practice, at least in case 
of the Priority Axis 3, is not known to us.
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The problems and policy priorities in the field of education of Roma 
children were elaborated only in 2008 in the Concept of ntegrated Education 
of Roma Children and Youth, including secondary and higher education, 
adopted by the Slovak government in 2008 (Ministry of Education of the 
Slovak Republic 2008). The defined policy priorities include: the crea-
tion of adequate conditions for access to education and opportunities to 
provide quality education for pupils from a socially disadvantaged envi-
ronment; to improve pre-school preparation in kindergartens and readi-
ness of Roma children to enter elementary schools; to improve the school 
performance of Roma pupils; to increase the share of Roma students in 
secondary schools and universities; to decrease the share of Roma children 
in special education for mentally disadvantaged children; and to support 
lifelong learning for Roma adults with no completed education from the 
perspective of labor market.
These objectives were to be achieved through a set of measures, which 
should be created through national projects funded from the SK-OPE’s 
KAI 3.1. These include measures in several areas, of special interest to us 
being those focused on pre-school and primary education. Concerning 
pre-school preparation the aim is to support motivation of parents to place 
their children into kindergartens, to extend the network of kindergartens 
into municipalities with a high number of Roma children, to improve 
the methodological support to kindergartens’ staff, and to develop and 
introduce programmes for involvement of parents and improvement of 
their co-operation with kindergartens. For primary education the aim is 
to extend the network of preparatory ‘zero’ grades; to decrease the number 
of pupils in classes; to implement a day-long educational system; to create 
an attractive educational environment respecting the social, cultural and 
linguistic specificities of children; to take into consideration the educa-
tional needs of Roma children in the preparation of school educational 
programmes; to support programmes of multicultural anti-prejudice 
education; to develop school-readiness tests and differential diagnostics 
independent from social and cultural background of the child; to increase 
a number of special pedagogues in elementary schools to facilitate the 
individual integration of pupils; and to legally facilitate the schooling of 
minor mothers.
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The institutional set-up of ESF implementation  
in the Slovak Republic
The institutional framework for the implementation of structural funds in 
Slovakia can be characterized as extremely complicated and unstable, with 
several institutions issuing a high number of diverse (sometimes ambigu-
ous or contradictory) obligations, rules, and their interpretations, which 
are often updated. At the same time, all the documents are binding and 
their application rigidly controlled. Any violation of the rules (sometimes 
arbitrarily interpreted) can lead to financial damages, when funds already 
spent by contractors are considered as ineligible by the authorities. The 
rules of the game are often modified during the game. As the system of 
managing documents is hierarchical, any modification in higher document 
leads to modification of all subordinate documents. Such an environment 
de-motivates contractors to get involved in innovations, which would create 
novel situations from the point of view of application of the rules. At the 
same time, the intermediate bodies, which are subject to many controls 
and audits from the part of supervisory authorities, are afraid to interpret 
or create procedures to accommodate the novel situations.
Moreover, how ESF addresses educational vulnerabilities in Slovakia 
is largely dependent on how certain key notions are (not) defined in 
national policy documents. Thus, the operational programme, or any 
other document, does not contain descriptive or normative conceptual 
definitions of such frequently used terms as ‘social inclusion’, ‘integration’, 
or ‘social exclusion’, despite explicitly using these notions in programme 
objectives. The programme documents refer to the Anti-discrimination 
Act (2004). However, its application in the context of implementation 
of the EU structural funds is not developed (although the concepts of 
preventive and affirmative measures, banning of segregation, and Roma 
mainstreaming would be worth operationalizing in the context of project 
development).
Instead, the operational programme rather focuses on the definition 
of eligible target groups, which include ‘pupils with special educational 
needs’ as defined by the Article 3 (2) of Act No. 29/1984 Coll. on the 
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system of primary and secondary schools. Pupils with special educational 
needs refers to pupils with mental, hearing, sight or physical disabilities, 
pupils with poor health, pupils with disturbed communication capability, 
autistic pupils, pupils with development disorders in learning or behavior, 
pupils with heavy mental disability placed in social care homes, pupils 
with disorders of mental or social development, and intellectually talented 
pupils. The pupils’ special educational needs should receive special edu-
cation services corresponding to their needs, which would develop their 
individual capacity, according to the law. However, researchers conclude 
that in the case of Roma pupils placed in special education, their individual 
capacity is in reality not developed, and enrolment in special education 
rather dramatically limits the pupils’ prospect for secondary education and 
access to the labor market (Friedman et al. 2009: 35–49). The definition 
of pupils with special educational needs does not include the ethnicity or 
mother tongue of the pupil.
The SK-OPE additionally quotes a definition of ‘a child from socially 
disadvantaged environment’ from the Concept of integrated education of 
Roma children and youth, including the development of secondary and 
higher education:
… a child with learning and attitude difficulties occurring on the basis of dysfunc-
tional social conditions resulting from social exclusion (e.g. poverty, unemploy-
ment, alcohol addiction, violence, inadequate education of parents, non-standard 
housing and hygienic conditions and the like). Socially disadvantaged environment 
shall mean an environment, which – with regard to its social and language condi-
tions – leads to the assumption that a child would not master the schoolwork of the 
first grade of primary school over one academic year. As the definition of a [socially 
disadvantaged environment] suggests, those are mainly such difficult children who 
live in unfavorable social conditions. Their parents are not able to bring up their 
children and are not capable of understanding the children’s basic needs. (Ministry 
of Education of the Slovak Republic 2004)
Although the definition does not refer explicitly to ethnicity, it is mostly 
used as a proxy term for children from marginalized Roma communities. 
The SK-OPE does not develop this concept, but calls within the Priority 
Axis 3 explicitly refer to children from socially disadvantaged environment 
as beneficiaries (SK-OPE 2007: 63).
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Formal decision-making and institutional role-orientation
The SK-OPE is managed by SK-MESRS, which is also the Managing 
Authority for Operational programme Research and Development. The 
SK-MESRS entrusted, via formal delegation agreements, tasks related to 
demand-driven projects of both operational programmes to the intermedi-
ate body, the Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and 
Sport of the Slovak Republic for EU Structural Funds (SK-ASFEU). This 
is an independent organization established by the ministry and managed 
by a general director appointed by the Minister of Education, Science, 
Research and Sport. One SK-OPE key area of intervention (2.2 Support 
to Lifelong Learning in the Health Sector) has a different intermediate 
body, the Ministry of Health. The intermediate bodies are responsible 
for programming, administration of calls for applications, assessment, the 
administration of contracts, financial management and control of projects, 
communication, and other tasks in relation to demand-driven projects. 
The intermediate bodies are co-ordinated, methodologically guided, and 
supervised by SK-MESRS’ specialized departments.
The SK-ASFEU prepares an annual indicative schedule of calls for 
the submission of demand-driven projects, which must be approved by the 
SK-MESRS. The calls for submission of demand-driven projects are drafted 
by the SK-ASFEU at the request of the ministry, which defines eligible 
applicants, activities and expenditures for the call, as well as the assessment 
and selection criteria for project proposals. The intermediate body should 
theoretically create working groups for drafting of calls, which are issued 
after approval by the SK-MESRS. Calls to be prepared within the KAI 3.1 
must be consulted upon with the SK-GPRC. However, the information 
on actual preparation of calls in working groups or their composition is 
unavailable. An evaluation report states:
In some instances, the lack of consideration given to the selection of members for 
working groups engaged in preparing calls (where it was a question of calls which, 
in terms of their character were repeated, the entire process was not repeated in its 
full scope), i.e. the absence of some of the parties concerned, has had an impact on 
the quality of draft calls; the draft calls are subsequently submitted to a Managing 
Authority to be approved in a very short period of time prior to their issue, which may 
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have a direct impact on the draft call quality assessment by a Managing Authority. 
(Ernst and Young 2010: 28)
The monitoring of demand-driven projects is ensured by intermediate 
bodies and aggregated by the Managing Authority, which also monitors 
the national projects. Evaluations of the SK-OPE are procured centrally 
by the SK-MESRS’ specialized departments responsible for respective 
OPs; they are typically subcontracted to external consultancies via public 
procurements. There is no specialized body or committee supervising the 
evaluations of the operational programmes (terms of references, public 
procurement, reports). The evaluations’ terms of references are not pub-
lished, only the final reports are available, after a process of review by the 
managing authority and intermediate bodies. This fact has been criticized 
by a member of the SK-OPE’s Monitoring Committee, who requested 
that the terms of references are made available to both the members of 
the Monitoring Committees and the public on the ministry’s webpage.3
The SK-OPE is managed by the SK-MESRS, which is the central 
administrative authority for national education policy. The ministry is 
responsible for policy-making and implementation, including the develop-
ment of the national educational strategy; state educational programmes 
and educational standards; authorization of curricula and schoolbooks 
and educational materials; experimental testing of innovative managerial, 
organizational, and educational processes and educational contents; estab-
lishment and management of system of educational fields; accreditation 
of projects and organizations providing training for teachers; and others.4 
The SK-MESRS became Managing Authority for the SK-OPE in 2006.5 
The ministry charged its Section of EU Structural Funds with the tasks 
of the Managing Authority. The SK-MESRS entrusted its tasks related to 
demand-driven projects to the two above-mentioned intermediate bodies.
3 Minutes from the 5th regular meeting of the Monitoring Committee for the 
Operational programme Education. June 6, 2011. Available at: <http://www.minedu.
sk/data/att/2570.pdf>. 
4 By-laws of the SK-MESRS.
5 Slovak Government Resolution no. 832/2006 (October 8, 2006).
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We can therefore conclude that the SK-MESRS is at the same time the 
policy-maker for general educational policy in Slovakia and implement-
ing institution for national projects. This should facilitate co- ordination 
of the national education policy and use of the ESF for its purposes. 
Implementation of the demand-driven projects was entrusted to other 
institutions. While the KAI aimed at education of personnel in the health 
sector is directly implemented by the other central authority responsible for 
the health policy, the Ministry of Health; other KAIs are delegated to the 
implementing agency, SK-ASFEU, which is independent (although linked) 
from the policy-making. This could be the reason why demand-driven 
projects can be more disconnected from the reform policies in education, 
compared to the national projects managed directly by the SK-MESRS.
Promotion of partnership
The SK-OPE declares that it applies the partnership principle in implemen-
tation: ‘participation of social partners and regional and local government 
authorities is foreseen in the gradual shaping of strategy, in progress moni-
toring, evaluation and selection from the submitted grant applications and 
in ensuring publicity’ (SK-OPE 2007: 9). The defined eligible activities of 
all KAIs specifically mention the notion of partnership.
However, in practice, as described in previous sections, the application 
of the partnership principle in programming on the operational level was 
weak and rather formal. Application of the partnership principle in the 
programming of the calls, at least in case of the priority axis under focus of 
this study, and promotion of partnership principle in project development 
and implementation is also absent.
Key aspects of the commissioning cycle
One aspect worth mentioning in the context of commissioning is the 
inequity in contracts between the MA (or the intermediate body) and the 
contractor. The contract template is issued by every MA and published 
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together with every call. The contract is extensive (sixty-two pages long – 
eight pages of contract and fifty-six pages of binding General Contract 
Conditions to the Contract on Provision of Non-Refundable Financial Grant). 
Moreover, the contract includes provisions stipulating that the contractual 
relation is regulated also by the Guide for Contractors issued by SK-ASFEU 
and other documents (Management system … 2013; Financial Management 
system … 2013), which can be modified unilaterally. The contractor must 
accept these modifications or request termination of the contract. This 
fact is criticized by watchdog NGOs:
… the contracts between [Managing Authorities] and [contractors] are very unbal-
anced in what concerns the rights and obligations of the contractor on one hand and 
of the state on the other. In the past, there were published cases, when contractors, 
without being at fault, were not receiving payments for activities delivered exactly 
according to the project and reported in line with guidelines and rules. Contractors 
are not protected against arbitrary actions from the side of the [Managing Authority], 
which can terminate the contract for any minor violation of the contract [by the 
contractor] with serious financial consequences for the contractor. On the other 
side, the contractors must, in case of violation of the contract by the [Managing 
Authority], circuitously seek the protection of their rights in court. (Grambičková, 
Havlíček and Nemcová 2010: 8)
Availability of information
The information concerning SK-OPE implementation is available on the 
webpage of the Managing Authority and the intermediate body under 
the Managing Authority. The SK-ASFEU webpage includes the SK-NSRF, 
the full SK-OPE description, the programme Manual of the SK-OPE, other 
basic documents at the national and EU levels, guides for applicants and 
contractors, all current and past calls for submission of demand-driven 
projects and lists of approved projects and contractors.6 However, the list 
6 However, information on one cancelled call is missing and neither the SK-MESRS 
nor SK-ASFEU provided the text of the respective call for applications, despite 
several requests.
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of contractors is unsearchable and not very user-friendly. Moreover, there 
is no information available to the general public on unsuccessful applica-
tions or on the names of people involved in the assessment of applications.
However, the documents are dispersed in diverse places of the webpage 
and it is difficult to find the needed information if the user is not familiar 
with the site. Moreover, the documents are written in very technical lan-
guage and are unintelligible for those persons without good knowledge 
of the structural funds machinery.
Open and critical information on problems in programming and 
implementation of the SK-OPE cannot be found in the evaluation reports 
either; problems are usually indicated indirectly or in technical terms. 
According to the owner of one consultancy involved in OP evaluations, if 
an evaluation report would be openly critical the company would never be 
contracted again. The best information sources on actual problems are the 
minutes from the meetings of the monitoring committee, where members 
representing non-governmental actors (self-governments, social partners) 
and, especially, the EC, express them openly. However, the minutes are very 
long and probably the public and journalists do not pay attention to them.
Other relevant aspects of the institutional settings
The main features of the use of the EU Structural Funds in Slovakia and 
their effectiveness are: extreme formalism; rigidity of rules; and a lack of 
result-oriented logic. The progress in implementation is monitored and 
reported in terms of spending of funds and in regularity, rather than the 
results and impacts that the spent funds have brought. Similarly, the audits 
and evaluations focus on the financial aspects, rather than assessment of 
achievement of results and impacts and their effectiveness and efficiency. 
Typically, with very few exceptions, Slovakia has not implemented any 
of the financial simplifications, proposed by the EC (flat rates, unit costs 
and lump sums) with the aim of ensuring smooth delivery (reduction 
of administrative burden), positive impact on results, legal certainty for 
contractors, and reducing errors in the system. According to the author’s 
personal experience with other Slovak operational programmes, the reasons 
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for not adopting the simplifications consist in rigidity of the Certifying 
Authority and Auditing Authority (Ministry of Finance), which underline 
the risks of misuse of funds. Consequently, the Managing Authorities of 
respective operational programmes lack methodological guidance for the 
introduction of financial simplification and are afraid of possible irregu-
larities within ex-post checks by the Ministry of Finance.
Calls for applications and their educational selectivity impact
In this section, we analyse the calls for applications launched under SK-OPE 
in an attempt to assess their educational selectivity impact.
Who are the potential contractors?
According to Slovak rules, ESF interventions can be delivered through 
two types of projects: national projects and demand-driven projects. The 
former, commissioned by the Managing Authority (SK-MESRS) are to 
be used for the implementation of education reforms (in line with legal 
or national strategic documents) for the entire country; the Ministry of 
Education directly commissions such projects to specific entities.7 The latter 
are submitted by diverse eligible entities following calls published by the 
intermediate body working under the Managing Authority, the Agency for 
EU Structural Funds of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and 
Sport of the Slovak Republic (SK-ASFEU) and awarded on a competitive 
7 The calls for submission of national projects are formally issued and published, and 
they specify the entity that they address and who is authorized to submit the pro-
posal. Both calls and proposals are usually prepared in close co-operation between 
the Managing Authority and the entity, which would later be eligible to submit the 
national project.
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basis. The assessment and selection criteria for demand-driven projects 
are formally extremely rigorous and constrictive. Such formalism, on one 
hand, limits the access of many potential applicants to the funding and 
requires the assistance of professional consultants or for-profit consultants, 
specialized in writing applications for and administering structural-funds 
projects. On the other hand, it does not prevent – but, together with a 
lack of transparency and public control, rather facilitates – the biased and 
corrupt commissioning of projects. Moreover, the formalism in the assess-
ment process leads to the commissioning of relatively conventional and 
standardized projects8 rather than projects made to the measure the target 
groups and innovative projects, which can be more effective and efficient 
in dealing with the social inclusion of disadvantaged children.
Potential eligible applicants within the analysed Priority Axis are both 
from the public and private (non-for-profit and for-profit) sector. The 
former includes state, regional and municipal authorities and organiza-
tions established by them, the Slovak Academy of Sciences, state and public 
universities, and public media. The latter includes NGOs, social partners, 
private and church schools, non-for-profit counseling organizations, and 
for-profit companies.
However, the actually launched calls were much more restrictive. 
Out of four published calls for the submission of demand-driven pro-
jects within the KAI 3.1, which focused on educating children from mar-
ginalized Roma communities, three calls (SK-OPV-2009/3.1/01-SORO, 
SK-OPV-2011/3.1/02-SORO and SK-OPV-2012/3.1/04-SORO) limited 
the eligibility of applicants to public and private primary or secondary 
schools and school authorities (and their subordinate institutions). The 
remaining call within the KAI 3.1 launched in 2011 (SK-OPV-2011/3.1/03-
SORO) was also open to regional authorities and NGOs. The reason for 
such an extension of eligible applicants was that the call was linked to the 
implementation of the Local Strategies for Comprehensive Development 
8 In the case of the scrutinized KAIs, a typical project contains the elaboration of 
a new educational programme in a given school and the purchase of new teaching 
equipment.
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(SK-LSKxP) of Roma communities, which had been prepared by munici-
palities and micro-regions and approved by the SK-GPRC between 2008 
and 2010. These could contain project aims to be delivered by other enti-
ties involved in SK-LSKxP; and without an enlargement of the scope of 
eligible applicants, the approved SK-LSKxPs could not be implemented. 
The single call for submission of demand-driven projects within the KAI 
3.2 (SK-OPV-2009/3.2/01-SORO), aimed at the secondary education of 
persons with disabilities, was open for special secondary schools established 
and run by state, regional governments, churches or private secondary spe-
cial schools, public counseling and prevention centres, NGOs, and other 
private non-for-profit entities providing services in the field of education 
and special education. The concentration of calls on schools can lead us to 
a hypothesis that the use of the ESF resources is intended, at least partially, 
as a substitute for funding schools by the state (in Slovakia, all primary and 
secondary schools, including private and church schools, receive equal fund-
ing from the State per pupil).9 Although such a practice can be perceived 
as positive from the point of view of sustainability of the ESF investment, 
it seems to be in contradiction with the principle of additionality of the 
EU Structural Funds.
A second factor shaping the market is the contractors’ obligation to 
financially contribute to the implementation of the approved projects. The 
applicant has to provide a sworn statement on the availability of financial 
resources for compulsory co-financing, as well as a stable and sufficient cash-
flow for smooth project implementation. Moreover, the SK-OPE managing 
authority or the intermediate body can request the applicant to prove its 
financial capacity. No financial contribution is requested of contractors 
9 The so-called normative funding includes resources for the wages of school employees, 
the educational process, heating, operational costs and teacher training. The fund-
ing depends on the type of school, weather conditions in the area where the school 
is located, and the qualifications of teachers. In 2013, the funding ranges from EUR 
768.48 (for centers of practical education in mildest climatic conditions and with 
the lowest qualification of teachers) up to EUR 4,448.04 (for centers in harshest 
climatic conditions and with better-qualified staff ) per pupil and year. (Source: 
<http://www.minedu.sk/data/att/4373.pdf>). 
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directly funded from the state through the state budget, or the budget of 
central authorities (such as central authorities and organizations established 
and funded by them, state universities, state elementary and secondary spe-
cial schools, School Regional Authorities, pedagogical and psychological 
guidance centres, special pedagogical guidance centres founded by school 
regional authorities, diagnostic centres, re-education homes, curative and 
childhood sanatoria, public media, and the Slovak Academy of Sciences). 
The logic of this rule is that in the case of state-funded organizations, the 
co-financing would be paid from the state budget resources anyway. Other 
contractors, both public (regional and municipal authorities and organi-
zations established and funded by them, public universities) and private 
(NGOs, social partners, church and private schools, and others), have 
the obligation of 5 per cent co-financing. While this can seem an equal 
approach to diverse types of contractors, the consequences handicap poten-
tial not-for-profit contractors. Unlike public entities (regional or municipal 
authorities, schools and other organizations established and funded by 
them, public universities), and churches10 (including church schools or 
other organizations established and funded by churches), not-for-profits 
are not connected to any public financial resource. At the same time, not-
for-profits often provide services of public interest (social services, work 
with marginalized populations, and others) and, in many cases, substitute 
missing or insufficient public services which should be provided by public 
authorities according to the Slovak law.
Long delays of payments and reimbursement from the SK-OPE and 
other OPs in Slovakia create additional problems for contractors (Košťál 
and Plesch n.d.). According to the law and the implementation rules (inter-
preted by the Ministry of Finance as Certifying Authority for the Structural 
Funds), entities, which have debts to the public budget, are not eligible for 
funding from the Structural Funds. At the same time, delays in payments 
10 Churches recognized by the State receive yearly contributions for the remunera-
tion of priests and operational costs of church administration (head-quarters) and 
they are exempt from several tax obligations. Additionally, the state restituted large 
properties to churches after the fall of the communist regime.
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(of several months, in extreme cases of several years), often due to over-
complicated administrative structures and procedures at the national level 
and the unceasing instability of rules, make many contractors unable to 
fulfil their fiscal obligations (typically to pay social and health insurance 
for their employees involved in the project implementation). As an extreme 
paradox, we identified a state agency, which was established and funded by 
the SK-MESRS, that received delayed payments from the SK-MESRS.11
Additionally, the contractor’s contribution must be financial (in-kind 
contributions are not accepted) and applies on each expenditure within the 
project. This rule is seen as very restrictive by many, as some entities, typi-
cally private not-for-profits, which are dependent on grants, are not able to 
ensure the co-funding of certain types of expenditures. For example, while 
a corporate donor would be willing to financially support a direct activity 
with children even at a higher intensity than the obligatory co-financing, 
it would not support the co-financing of ESF publicity or other indirect 
project activities requested by the SK-ASFEU.
A third factor limiting the access of possible contractors of projects is 
the minimum project budget required by the calls for applications, which 
is at least EUR 100,000. Such a high threshold limits the access of worse-
off entities, for example small or low-budget schools,12 or private non-for-
profits with more complicated access to funds for co-funding of the project. 
Higher budgets lead to higher requirements in terms of project manage-
ment and administrative procedures. Additionally, smaller entities cannot 
effectively and efficiently spend high project budgets for eligible activities.
The SK-OPE calls for applications do not place any restrictions on the 
territorial scope of the projects submitted by different types of applicants. 
Projects can have any territorial coverage if they are in line with provisions 
concerning eligible activities. For example, a regional authority is allowed to 
11 See: National Institute for Education, <http://www.educj.sk/buxus/generate_page.
php?page_id=168>. 
12 It is also the case of better-off schools where, due to the poor economic situation, 
pupils’ parents cannot afford to support the school through the otherwise common 
practice of diverse semi-obligatory/semi-voluntary contributions approved by par-
ents’ council.
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apply with a single project, which includes several or all schools established 
and financed by the regional authority (in such cases, individual schools 
included in the project cannot submit individual projects). NGOs (which 
were eligible applicants within only calls SK-OPV-2009/3.2/01-SORO 
and SK-OPV-2011/3.1/03-SORO) can plan activities in several regions or 
within the whole territory of the country (except the Bratislava Region, 
which is not eligible under the Priority Axis 3) within a single project.
In addition to calls for demand-driven projects, the SK-MESRS has 
commissioned three national projects with country-wide coverage to two 
state organizations. According to Slovak rules, calls for national projects 
had to be published, even if there was only one potential eligible applicant. 
The Methodology and Pedagogy Center, responsible for the continuing 
education and training of teachers of pre-school, primary and secondary 
schools within the whole country, was commissioned with two national 
projects aimed at supporting the education of Roma children in elementary 
schools (SK-OPV/K/NP/2011–1) and the pre-primary level of education 
(SK-OPV/K/NP/2012–2) to be funded from the KAI 3.1, with respective 
allocations of EUR 28.5 million and 7.4 million. The remaining call for 
submission of a national project (SK-OPV/K/NP/2012–4), addressing 
The Research Institute for Child Psychology and Patho-psychology, has 
a budget of EUR 15.8 million and concerns counseling activities for and 
the prevention of social pathologies in schools.
Partnership structures
All scrutinized calls, both for national and demand-driven projects, specify 
that the ‘partnership principle is not applied under this call’. However, 
the partnership principle in the design and delivery of projects is envis-
aged in the SK-OPE. Its SWOT analysis states among the weaknesses 
of the current Slovak educational system the ‘low level of partnership 
between sectors, self-governments, employers, labor offices, educational 
institutions and other social partners in creating the content of educa-
tion’ (SK-OPE, 2007: 76). At the same time, among the opportunities 
we find references to:
ESF as a substitute for national education funding 153
… facilitating the involvement of the private sector and businesses in drawing up of 
learning programmes, creating partnerships for the development of education on the 
regional level, with an emphasis on the relationship between the regional development 
strategies and the structure of branches of studies and training. (SP-OPE 2007: 79)
The partnership principle is developed in both Roma-oriented KAIs 3.1 
and 3.2, focusing on the education of persons with special educational needs 
and including eligible activities which could benefit from these partner-
ship structures: ‘on-the-job vocational education and training’; ‘design of 
programmes to develop co-operation between schools; pedagogical and 
psychological guidance centres; special pedagogical-guidance centres; 
children-integration centres; re-education homes; curative and childhood 
sanatoria; specialized facilities reporting to the Health Ministry (e.g. chil-
dren’s psychiatric department in hospitals, curative and upbringing facili-
ties); and other professionals’ and ‘programmes supporting international 
co-operation in sharing experience (best practice)’ (SK-OPE 2007: 110–11). 
Also, other eligible activities defined in the SK-OPE could bring added 
value if designed and implemented in an effective partnership. However, 
this never materialized, as the calls for submission of projects never included 
the possibility to apply in partnership. Paradoxically, the assessment criteria 
of submitted projects award applicants with extra points for ‘partnership, 
participation in international networks and level of involvement’ within 
the assessment category Administrative, Expert and Technical Capacity of 
Applicant.
Although the SK-OPE rules do not encourage formal partnerships 
of applicants and contractors and the actual launched calls disable them, 
informal, even illegal, partnerships between applicants/contractors and 
for-profit companies, which specialize in Structural Funds operations, 
are common practice. Most potential applicants do not have the technical 
capacity for SK-OPE project preparation and the management of successful 
projects. Additionally, many activities cannot effectively be implemented by 
the contractor itself (for example, training of teaching staff ). Instead of the 
transparent formal involvement of other entities capable of delivering such 
activities (for example, entities with proven skills in ESF project manage-
ment or with a certified effective training programme for teachers, whose 
capacities could be scrutinized within the project application assessment), 
154 Marek HOJSIK
these are procured by contractors through manipulated tenders.13 The 
common practice is that a consultancy helps the applicant to write the 
project (often for free) and ‘ensures’ that the application is successful. After 
receiving the funding, the contractor subcontracts via manipulated public 
procurement the same or other previously agreed entity for the delivery of 
certain services (management, training) or goods, often overpriced. Many, 
including several interviewees, believe that without such ‘assistance’ or 
without political backing, it is almost impossible to be successful in apply-
ing for the funding. Therefore, potential applicants who are not involved 
in clientelistic networks, or are not willing to participate in corruption are 
discouraged, or even disadvantaged in accessing EU funding in Slovakia. 
An academic survey among 520 municipalities in Slovakia, shows that 
93–7 per cent of municipalities believe that ‘over-standard relations with 
persons or organizations directly or indirectly involved in the distribu-
tion of EU funds (authorities, evaluators, consulting agencies connected 
to political parties controlling respective ministries’) are indispensable or 
crucial for the success of a project. Within the same survey, 45–54 per cent 
considered that a bribe must be offered in order to have a successful project 
(approximately 20 per cent of municipalities did not want to answer this 
question) (Mindová 2012).
Who are the potential beneficiaries?
The SK-OPE defines the persons with special educational needs, who are 
the target group of Priority Axis 3, as: ‘1. Pupils with a special upbringing 
and educational needs; 2. Pupils coming from a socially disadvantaged 
environment; 3. Persons with disabilities; 4. Members of the marginalized 
Roma communities’ (SK-OPE 2007: 63).
13 This leads to high numbers of audit findings resulting in ineligible expenditures at pro-
ject level and financial irregularities at the OP level (leading to financial corrections 
applied by the EC at the national level).
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However, the SK-OPE and other programmatic documents do not 
contain any methods for the identification of individuals from marginal-
ized Roma communities (or any other ethnic minority), who are among 
the target groups. There are no guidelines for ethnic identification and data 
processing (including rules for data protection) on beneficiaries from the 
target groups, which could be used for monitoring and evaluation. The 
general formal rule in Slovakia is ethnic self-identification of individuals. 
However, within the projects, this principle is not operationalized and 
project contractors alone report on the number of participants (beneficiar-
ies) from marginalized Roma communities and ethnic minorities in the 
monitoring reports. They do not have to sustain these numbers with any 
consent forms or self-identification acts made by beneficiaries. Interestingly, 
in the case of beneficiaries with disabilities, the contractors must docu-
ment the belonging of beneficiaries to the eligible target group by written 
declarations and copies of documents certifying the disability.
The only available data source used in relation to the identification 
of marginalized Roma communities is the Atlas of Roma Communities 
(2004). This contains only hard data on all identified Roma communi-
ties in Slovak municipalities. The degree of marginalization, segregation 
or social exclusion of any identified community should be assessed based 
on available indicators in the Atlas. In policy practice, any of the Roma 
communities included in the Atlas is considered a marginalized Roma 
community. Moreover, there is no operational mechanism for linking an 
individual (project participant/beneficiary) with an identified (marginal-
ized) Roma community. The other three target groups of this priority axis 
are legally defined and their operational identification is possible.
The calls under focus of this analysis refer to potential beneficiaries 
that can be grouped into two categories: personnel of providers of edu-
cational services (teachers, employees of school authorities, NGOs and 
others) and clients of the educational services (pupils, students, trainees, 
parents). While identification of the former is relatively easy, the latter is 
very problematic, as described above. The first call (SK-OPV-2009/3.1/01-
SORO) required that pupils from marginalized Roma communities must 
be at least 15 per cent of all pupils in the schools where the projects’ activi-
ties were to be delivered. Two other calls (SK-OPV-2011/3.1/02-SORO 
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and SK-OPV-2011/3.1/03-SORO) required that pupils from marginal-
ized Roma communities comprise at least 50 per cent of all beneficiaries 
of projects. In all three cases, the participation of Roma children from 
marginalized communities in project activities must be proven only by 
the sworn statements of the applicants and later, if the application is suc-
cessful, by declarations of contractors in narrative reports. However, the 
information provided cannot be objectively verified. Thus, it is hard to 
assess whether vulnerable children from marginalized Roma communi-
ties are actually benefiting from the projects. The remaining call under the 
KAI 3.1 (SK-OPV-2011/3.1/03-SORO) scrutinized here does not contain 
any requirements concerning the share of beneficiaries from vulnerable 
groups. The single call under the KAI 3.2 is reserved for special second-
ary schools, which are, by definition, attended by disadvantaged students 
with disabilities.
An additional problem to the very weak monitoring of the partici-
pation of disadvantaged beneficiaries in the projects results in improper 
SK-OPE monitoring and its inadequate and incorrect set of indicators. 
According to an independent evaluation commissioned by the SK-GPRC, 
the outputs, results, and impact indicators are incorrectly categorized (for 
example, most SK-OPE indicators are labeled as result indicators, but in 
reality they are either input or output indicators) and do not the fulfil 
criteria of SMART indicators14 (all indicators have low relevance, most 
are not specific enough).
Designing services
All launched calls include among their eligible activities the preparation and 
development of teaching materials, innovative methods and forms of teach-
ing, the development and implementation of educational programmes, and 
teacher training. Additionally, all calls allow the procurement of educational 
equipment, including computers and software, textbooks, and other school 
14 Specific, Measurable, Available, Relevant, Timebound.
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equipment used within the educational process. This suggests the explicit 
use of ESF funding to substitute national funding for the day-to-day opera-
tion of schools. In the opinion of several people interviewed by the author 
of this chapter, the possibility of gaining modern and expensive equipment 
is the main motivation for many schools to apply for ESF grants. Activities 
aimed at the training of teachers and development of teaching methods, 
materials and programmes, which the schools should implement according 
to Slovak law, often serve to reward teachers (the training increases their 
formal qualifications and consequently their wages) and are often subcon-
tracted through manipulated public procurement to consultancy compa-
nies, which help the schools obtain funding (and are supposedly involved 
in corruption in the commissioning of projects). The perception of ESF 
projects as primarily opportunities for the renewal and supply of equipment 
of schools, rather than for innovations in the education of disadvantaged 
pupils (as several experts from private consultancies specialized in project 
development for schools have admitted), is strengthened by the attitudes 
of many teachers, who do not believe that a more effective education of 
Roma children from marginalized communities is possible at all.
Alongside eligible activities aimed at training of teachers and develop-
ment of teaching methods, materials and programmes, and the purchase of 
equipment and technologies, which are always included, individual calls 
for applications also contain distinctive eligible activities such as: tutoring, 
education in Roma language and culture; the further education of persons 
with disabilities; alternative forms of education, counseling, prevention of 
social pathology; and the establishment and operation of detached classes 
of secondary schools.
Some of the above-mentioned activities have proven to be effective 
tools in education of Roma children (for example, tutoring within several 
NGO pilot projects of education in the Roma language and culture cur-
riculum has developed since pre-accession PHARE programmes). These 
are not, however obligatory activities and applicants can decide to pot for 
other eligible activities, which are less specific for the needs of Roma chil-
dren. Taking this into account with an ineffective monitoring system (it 
is not possible that Roma children can actually benefit from the project, 
and project’s impact on them is not measured), and a biased assessment 
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and selection of submitted projects, the scrutinized calls for submission 
of projects do not guarantee that supported projects actually respond to 
particular problems of education and the inclusion of vulnerable children 
in the Slovak educational system and provide additional (complementary) 
support to them. Eligible activities enumerated in the published calls are 
too extensive and insufficiently specific, and therefore the substitution of 
national funding is highly probable.
Stumbling blocks in the commissioning cycle
The calls for applications have a standardized design, with a very compli-
cated structure and technical language. Therefore, they are almost unin-
telligible for persons with no experience in the Structural Funds technical 
aspects and jargon. A call in itself (for example, SK-OPV-2012/3.1/04-
SORO) is fourteen pages long, but encompasses seventeen annexes, includ-
ing among others the entire SK-OPE with its nine annexes and Management 
system of Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds with its thirty annexes. Most 
of the texts of the calls are identical and copy-pasted from the SK-OPE 
or other programming documents. Approximately only two pages (aggre-
gated) contain specific information on the call: eligible activities, eligible 
applicants and eligible target groups. These parts are also copy-pasted 
from the OP documents (SK-OPE and the programme Manual) and are 
therefore not specific enough, which can lead to ambiguities. The calls do 
not contain any definition of concepts or requirements related to terms 
like desegregation, educational inclusion, vulnerable groups, Roma inte-
gration/inclusion, anti-discrimination, equal opportunities, equal access 
or other features which are crucial for inclusion and development policy. 
SK-OPE documents often use these terms normatively. It seems that these 
terms are used without any understanding of the concepts behind them.
The formal procedures of commissioning are described in detail in the 
internal procedure manuals of both the SK-ASFEU, as intermediate body 
under the Managing Authority (which manages demand-driven projects) 
and SK-MESRS, as Managing Authority of the SK-OPE, which manages 
the national projects. The project must be submitted both online via an IT 
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Monitoring System (SK-ITMS) and in hard copy (the application deadline 
requires both an online and a hard-copy submission). The SK-ITMS is 
perceived as user-unfriendly and many applicants fail to input the project 
properly, with the consequence that the application is not assessed at all. Hard 
copy submissions also have detailed requirements, which increase the risk of 
rejection for formal reasons (for example, requirements for the envelopes).
The first step of assessment is a formal check of the application. The 
SK-ASFEU or SK-MESRS’ staff check the eligibility of applicant, the pro-
ject’s location in an eligible territory, compliance with the call’s objective, 
financial limits, time frameworks, the eligibility of the target group, the 
use of compulsory programme indicators (however, the indicators are not 
properly set up at the level of the SK-OPE itself ), the applicant’s financial 
contribution, and the completeness of the application (absence of some of 
the eleven mandatory annexes leads to applications being rejected; others, if 
missing, can be requested by the SK-ASFEU), and eligibility of the budget 
items. This phase of the commissioning cycle is exercised by administra-
tive staff of the SK-ASFEU. Project managers within the SK-ASFEU are 
often not experts in the topic being addressed by the projects (i.e. educa-
tion of disadvantaged pupils), but rather in administrative procedures, and 
therefore their ability to assess innovative or non-conventional project’s 
compliance with formally defined objectives, target groups and, to some 
extent the eligibility of some budget items, is limited.15
Only project applications successful in the first stage become the sub-
ject of expert assessment exercised by internal or external evaluators. The 
applications are assessed according to a set of criteria approved by SK-OPE’s 
monitoring committee and published together with the calls. There are 
five groups of criteria with different weights: project relevance (22 per 
cent), methodology of implementation (32 per cent), budget and efficiency 
(20 per cent), administrative, expert and technical capacity of applicant 
15 This risk is not so high in case of national projects, as they are developed within the 
SK-MESRS with participation of specialized departments and before the official 
submission, all ministries’ departments comment it; the national project’s assessment 
is rather formal.
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(20 per cent) and project sustainability (6 per cent). Finally, the projects 
are selected based upon scores received within the expert assessment and 
available financial allocation. The final decision on selected projects is 
in the hands of the Minister of Education, Science, Research and Sport.
The requirement of approval by OPs’ monitoring committees 
(Government of the Slovak Republic – Central Co-ordinating Authority 
2013a) of the assessment and selection criteria, leads to lack of flexibility. 
Consequently, approved assessment criteria do not take into consideration 
the specificities of calls and refer to concepts not used in the respective 
calls or in the OP at all. In case of the scrutinized calls of the Priority Axis 
3, the partnership principle in project design and implementation is not 
applied; however, it can be rewarded within the assessment. Similarly, the 
pilot testing of new approaches at the national/international levels, and 
the transfer of knowledge from abroad can be rewarded, although such 
activities are eligible only in one call (SK-OPV-2011/3.1/03-SORO). Or, 
the assessment includes a question on the principle of equal access and equal 
opportunities, and the prevention of all forms of discrimination, although 
these important concepts are not at all developed and operationalized in 
the Structural Funds’ implementation in Slovakia.
Another important aspect is linked to the issue of integrated approaches 
to social problems identified in calls. The call SK-OPV-2011/3.1/03-SORO 
is part of the implementation of a comprehensive approach, so only munici-
palities with SK-LSKxP approved by SK-GPRC are eligible applicants for 
this call. Otherwise, the contribution of proposed projects to integrated 
approaches is not assessed at all (the evaluation criteria do not include ques-
tions about whether the proposed project is linked to any strategic devel-
opment document relevant for the field/territory covered by the project).
Conclusion
Some of the main features of the use of the EU Structural Funds in Slovakia 
are extreme formalism, rigidity of rules and the lack of a result-oriented 
logic. More specifically, this chapter finds that the reform policies aimed 
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at the inclusion of Roma and other disadvantaged groups are implemented 
through centrally planned and commissioned national projects, which tend 
to substitute national funding for school operation and modernization, 
rather than innovative demand-driven projects bringing an added value 
to the mainstream educational system.
References
(2011). Ad-hoc hodnotenie horizontálnej priority marginalizované rómske komunity 
[Ad-hoc evaluation of the Horizontal Priority Marginalized Roma Communi-
ties]. Bratislava.
(2012). Final Evaluation Report – Periodical evaluation of the Operational programme 
Education. Bratislava: Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic.
(2012). Strategické hodnotenie Horizontálnej priority Marginalizované rómske komunity 
[Strategic evaluation of the Horizontal Priority Marginalized Roma Communi-
ties]. Bratislava. <http://www.minv.sk/?hodnotenie_MRKandsubor=161016>.
Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak 
Republic for EU Structural Funds (SK-ASFEU). (2008). Annual Report on the 
mplementation of the Operational programme Education for 2007. Bratislava: 
SK-ASFEU.
Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak 
Republic for EU Structural Funds (SK-ASFEU). (2009). Annual Report on the 
mplementation of the Operational programme Education for 2010. Bratislava: 
SK-ASFEU.
Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak 
Republic for EU Structural Funds (SK-ASFEU). (2009). Annual Report on the 
mplementation of the Operational programme Education for 2008. Bratislava: 
SK-ASFEU.
Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak 
Republic for EU Structural Funds (SK-ASFEU). (2010). Annual Report on the 
mplementation of the Operational programme Education for 2011. Bratislava: 
SK-ASFEU.
Consulting Associates. (2011). Strategic evaluation of the Horizontal Priority Margin-
alized Roma Communities for the Government of the Slovak Republic, Office of 
the Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities, Department of co-ordination of HP 
MRC. Bratislava: Consulting Associates.
162 Marek HOJSIK
Ernst and Young. (2010). Evaluation of Effectiveness of the Management System imple-
mented in the Operational Programme Education. Final Evaluation Report. Bra-
tislava: Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic.
Friedman, E., Gallová Kriglerová, E., Kubánová, M. and Slosiarik, M. (2009). School 
as ghetto: Systemic overrepresentation of Roma in special education in Slovakia. 
Budapest: Roma Education Fund. <http://www.romaeducationfund.hu/sites/
default/files/publications/school_as_ghetto.pdf>.
Government of the Slovak Republic – Central Co-ordinating Authority. (2013a). 
Systém riadenia štrukturálnych fondov a Kohézneho fondu na programové obdo-
bie 2007–13, verzia 4.8 [Management system of the Structural Funds and the 
Cohesion Fund for the period 2007–13, version 4.8]. Bratislava: Government 
of the Slovak Republic.
Government of the Slovak Republic – Central Co-ordinating Authority. (2013b). 
Systém finančného riadenia štrukturálnych fondov a Kohézneho fondu na progra-
mové obdobie 2007–13, verzia 7.0 [The financial management of the Structural 
Funds and the Cohesion Fund for the period 2007–13, version 7.0]. Bratislava: 
Government of the Slovak Republic.
Grambičková, M., Havlíček, R. and Nemcová, R. (2010). Správa o dodržiavaní opatrení 
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7  The educational selectivity effects  
of bureaucratic discretion: Conclusion  
and policy recommendations
Most academic and prac-
titioner approaches to 
EU structural funding 
emphasize the role these 
might (and do) play in 
the fulfilment of the 
social contract between 
the EU and its citizens. 
Consequently, the dis-
cussion is often framed 
in terms of effectiveness; 
efficiency; and compliance with EU standards in terms of expenditures, 
public procurement, publicity, environment, and equality. However, effec-
tiveness, efficiency, and compliance are to a large extent dependent on an 
institutional framework which is the direct result of domestic policy to 
accomplish EU objectives codified in the structural funds programming 
documents (or the lack of it).
This chapter approaches the extent of the gap between the social policy 
objectives set through regulatory competences in multi-level governance 
and the structure of incentives it breeds in practice, with a broad range of 
implications for the capacity of the government to control for an equitable 
distribution of services at the community level. In order to do this it studies 
the managing authorities of ESF-funded national programmes and their 
role in transposing the general regulation of market driven service funding 
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of educational inclusion policy objectives into effective commissioning-
procurement-purchasing cycles (quasi-markets).
The topic of this chapter lies at the intersection between the analyses 
concerning the role and impact of structural funds (Aiello and Puppo 
2012, Barca 2009, J. Bradley 2005, Lennert and Robert 2010, Tomé 2012, 
Varga and in’t Veld 2011) and the notion that (quasi-)markets for educa-
tional services are created through a somewhat imbalanced demand and 
supply mechanism in an environment defined by political and policy deci-
sion (Adnett and Davies 1999, Bradley and Taylor 2010, Gingrich 2011, 
Lang 2001, Waslander, Pater and van de Weide 2010). A key aspect of the 
comparative effort rests on the notion that, despite the introduction of 
quasi-market mechanisms in welfare provision in the five countries via 
the same mechanism (ESF funding), there might be significant variation 
from one country to another, in the manner described in the literature for 
mainstream welfare state reforms.
Three research objectives are pursued. First, the chapter analyses the 
institutional set up of the management authorities for ESF funds in the 
five countries. Key aspects approached here are the framing of social and 
educational inclusion in national policy documents, the fact that manag-
ing authorities are still developing and shaping informal and formal rules, 
and the degree to which national governments have given policy-making 
discretion to these institutions. Second, the chapter empirically assesses 
the characteristics of the educational welfare markets created through ESF-
funding in the five countries, emphasizing the actors involved and their 
degree of empowerment, rules concerning competition, and the motivations 
behing the market-shaping bureaucratic decisions. At the same time, we 
focus on the extent to which bureaucratic discretion influences positively 
and negatively the achievement of broad social and educational inclusion 
goals in a democratic and effective manner.
The analysis in this chapter is based on comparative data collected as 
part of the Public Sector Stream of the Educational selectivity of the European 
Social Fund Project, as well as on the meta-analysis of the country case-
studies included in this book.
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The institutional dimension:  
Complexity and over-formalization
The analysis of national policy documents has pointed out several areas 
in which domestic policy decisions concerning ESF programming have 
created conditions with the potential to hinder the social and educational 
inclusion outcomes expected of the national ESF programmes. The relative 
inexperience in dealing with the complex set of formal rules and proce-
dures used for the implementation of EU structural funds has affected the 
manner in which policy goals were balanced, how it has led to increased 
formalization and to a relatively poor use of partnership as a governance 
mechanism, as well as to relatively poor monitoring of the programme 
and delayed responses to unexpected situations. These were aggravated by 
the public-sector discomfort with the informal aspects of governing ESF-
funded programmes and significant shifts in national sectoral policies as 
a result of changes in the political composition of national governments. 
All these aspects have produced effects in all areas of intervention of the 
ESF-funded programmes, not just in the education sector.
Balancing complex public goals
Managing authorities, like any other public sector actors, need to balance 
several goals in their operations (for the distinction between different types 
of public goals see Peters 2011). The balancing of these goals has the poten-
tial to influence the behaviour and decisions of the managing authorities, 
down to the market-shaping decisions mentioned above. Democratic and 
efficient implementation is a sweeping goal associated with ESF-funded 
national programmes. At the next level, we find cross-cutting goals such 
as environmental protection and gender equality, which derive from how 
the structural instruments are set up. ESF-funded programmes are sup-
posed to achieve strategic levels in terms of social inclusion, education, 
and employment. Programme-level goals are usually defined in terms of 
their absorption of funds. Rather than balancing these goals, the managing 
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authorities seem to prioritize them, with programme-level, absorption-
focused goals usually coming first.
While democratic ESF implementation is nominally assumed in all 
countries, at least some of them fall short of democratic practices. For example, 
in Hungary, there is a major discussion on how the managing authority for 
HU-SROP makes available information concerning programme implementa-
tion, because it is widely believed that technicalities used in reporting make 
any democratic oversight of the programme quite difficult. This can also be 
said of the SK-OPE. An overly technical approach to implementation and 
public communication about it also works as a mechanism of blame avoid-
ance. At the same time, during the implementation, democratic elements 
constantly disappear (for example, preparatory working groups). In Romania, 
civil society stakeholders repeatedly stress that the managing authority rejects 
any kind of outside input and assumes its independence equals accountability 
to nobody. Moreover, it even manages to actually dominate the monitoring 
committee of the RO-SOPHRD, which leaves the question of accountability 
wide open. The critical aspect in terms of ensuring democratic implemen-
tation seems to be the ability of the managing authorities to effectively use 
partnership as a governance mechanism. In this respect, with the exception of 
the Czech Republic, there seems to be quite some resistance of the national 
managing authorities (see Partnership as governance mechanism).
Nominally, all the managing authorities studied here pursue social 
inclusion, education and employment goals; they attempt to reach a stra-
tegic level for social and economic service that affects all or most mem-
bers in society. This also applies to the cross-cutting goals embedded in 
many of EU’s structural programmes: environmental protection, gender 
equality, and others. However, in day-to-day operations, the five managing 
authorities seem to give priority to the programme goals of absorption. 
In Hungary, this happened specifically after the refined modular struc-
ture of the HU-SROP fell apart, as mutual interlinking between strategic 
developments and tenders for projects was not enforced. In Romania and 
Bulgaria, this prioritization seems to be linked to increasing political and 
public pressure over the managing authorities to increase the degree of 
absorption. At the same time, it could be linked to the broader frame of 
administrative capacity or the quality of national institutions.
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The emphasis on the technical, financial and administrative aspects 
of the MA’s duties suggests an unwillingness of the MAs (by their own 
initiative or incentivized by national policy-makers) to assume greater 
responsibility in shaping ESF implementation in the five countries. The 
MAs regard programme descriptions as fixed and, even when taking steps 
to do some changes to the programmes, seem to be very careful not to 
overstep this boundary. They usually make use of their prerogatives to 
change the programme only for such aspects. When challenged on this 
topic, MAs usually hide behind their apparent lack of policy discretion, 
diverting blame towards national policy-makers or, more often, towards 
unspecified decision-makers in Brussels.
The prioritization of technical programme goals in the sense described 
above is intertwined with an over-formalization of the day-to-day opera-
tion of the managing authorities.
Over-formalization
Public organizations are more complicated and formalized with regard 
to the activities that are regulated or overseen by the central government 
(Rainey and Bozeman 2000: 451–6), and ESF-funded programmes are no 
exception. Managing authorities for ESF programmes are public organiza-
tions, working in a complex political and administrative context, which 
requires them to balance formal aspects deriving from EU rules with spe-
cific formal aspects of the national administrative system. At the same time, 
managing authorities are imposing these formal, public-sector specific 
rules to all the contractors, be they public or private. In the case of the 
managing authorities analysed here, there is an obvious over-formalization, 
usually blamed on EU rules and procedures; yet it is more likely that MAs 
being overwhelmed by bureaucratic procedures results in severe delays in 
processing applications, contracts and reimbursements in three of the five 
countries analysed here.
Procedures and interactions with contractors most often suffer from 
over-formalization. For example, in Romania the RO-SOPHRD has experi-
enced severe problems due to the under-staffing of the managing authority. 
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Yet all these problems were addressed with higher formalization of pro-
cedures and interactions with contractors, resulting in long lists of bind-
ing instructions and decisions usually changing implementation rules for 
projects which had already commenced. This also happens in some of the 
other countries. Communication with contractors is also affected by for-
malization; in Romania communication is most often reduced to contacts 
through a help-desk which has been working intermittently. Moreover, 
communication with contractors is impersonal, with MA employees avoid-
ing personal responsibility for their communication with contractors. This 
latter aspect can be said to affect, to a large extent, the managing authorities 
in Romania, Hungary or Bulgaria. The analysis of Slovak and Hungarian 
domestic-policy documents shows that all communication around the 
ESF-funded programmes can be hidden behind structural-programmes 
jargon. While over-formalization of interactions with contractors and 
procedures makes implementation difficult, managing authorities reject 
proposals for simplification (as has been proposed by the EC in Slovakia 
and the interim evaluation in Romania).
We also find stances of over-formalization in the relationship of the 
managing authorities with diverse governmental bodies. In Bulgaria, for-
malization affects the relationship between the managing authority and the 
intermediate bodies with whom it has shared responsibility. Concerning 
implementation, formal communication channels seem to be the norm, 
while more dynamic and informal communication is discouraged. The most 
notable symptom of formalization in Hungary is the slow disappearance 
of the working groups designed to assist with planning (drafting of the 
two-year national action plans used as reference in implementation). Their 
dual formal/informal nature, designed to help the managing authority cope 
better with the demands of implementation, did not seem to fit the modus 
operandi of the managing authority. Another example of over-formalization 
in Romania is the stance taken by the MA on co-ordination with other 
operational programmes, namely reporting that it has taken the necessary 
steps to ensure co-ordination by making a formal written request to the 
Authority for the Co-ordination of Structural Instruments (RO-ACIS).
Another area of over-formalization concerns how more-or-less unex-
pected situations, which appear during implementation, are dealt with. 
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When the degree to which the Roma population is being reached by 
RO-SOPHRD comes unexpectedly under discussion, the MA responds 
by requesting the establishment of a formal working group on the topic, 
guided by a set of formal rules endorsed by the monitoring committee. 
Over-formalization in this case results in the actual establishment of a 
working group taking more than a year. No results of the working group 
were identified a year later after it being established. Not unexpectedly, 
given previous experience in the Czech Republic, over-formalization mani-
fested itself in calls to have rules concerning partnership structures for 
project implementation specified in a law, despite the obvious rigidity 
which could have been introduced by having this aspect regulated in a 
law rather than an executive decision. Before dealing with partnership at 
the project level, managing authorities had to deal with partnership as a 
governance mechanism.
Partnership as governance mechanism
Managing partnerships is a task that management authorities in the five 
countries approach quite differently. While partnership, in any form, is 
usually associated with network governance and deemed to be essential 
to reaching societal goals in a democratic manner and without placing a 
too heavy burden on the state (Fenwick, Johnston Miller and McTavish 
2012, Geddes 2000), it soon becomes obvious that the management of 
partnerships depends to a great extent on its definition.
In all the five countries, partnership is first and foremost discussed in 
relation to the programming process. In this respect, all countries present, 
to various degrees, significant shortcomings. In most countries, the civil 
society organizations express discontent at how far their suggestions and 
ideas were taken into account into the programming process. In Slovakia, 
things went as far as having coalitions of NGOs openly boycotting the 
programming process, which they described as problematic and ineffec-
tive. In Hungary, a coalition of NGOs had to exert a great deal of public 
pressure during programming to get the central government to make some 
key documents public. In Romania, documents were relatively public, yet 
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third-sector organizations found themselves in the position of not being 
able to significantly influence content. This suggests central-government-
driven programming processes were the norm, despite the formal involve-
ment of non-central government stakeholders. Hierarchical governance has 
kicked in, despite formal rules creating conditions for inclusive program-
ming processes (network governance).
A second area of interest in terms of partnership is the actual involve-
ment of non-central government stakeholders in the evaluation and moni-
toring of the programmes, as well as in the drafting of calls for applications. 
This would normally be a continuation of the partnerships established 
during initial programming. In this respect, in all five countries, we find 
nominal representation of stakeholders such as NGOs, trade unions, pro-
fessional associations, local and regional governments, etc. Discontent is 
expressed concerning the meaningfulness of representation, or the actual 
influence these actors are able to exert during the implementation process. 
For example, in Romania, we find the dominance of central-government 
actors in the bodies supposed to take charge of the monitoring and evalu-
ation programme, and an obvious dominance exerted by the managing 
authority over the monitoring body, a fact pointed out by the description 
of the relationship included in the annual implementation reports of the 
RO-SOPHRD, as well as by other analyses (see Public Policy Institute 2012).
In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, different mechanisms 
to involve these actors in drafting calls for applications (drafting of national 
action plans in Hungary) have been set up, yet they do not seem to work. 
In Hungary, the working groups involved in drafting these plans disap-
pear at some point during implementation. In the Czech Republic, a 2011 
evaluation report suggests this possibility was not explored, despite its 
potential beneficial effects, and recommends it to be used in the following 
stages of implementation (Potluka et al. 2011). In Slovakia, stakeholders 
were not involved at all in call drafting. In Bulgaria and Romania, the man-
aging authorities prefer an in-house drafting of calls. In the former case, 
transparency is so low that only very late during implementation did the 
BG-OPHRD managing authority submit the text of the calls to public 
debate before making a final decision.
A very interesting aspect of partnership as a governance mechanism 
comes from Romania, in the form of Regional Pacts for Social Inclusion 
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and Employment. These are designed to be ‘participatory processes of 
regional public policy and strategy making, by the use of all existing fund-
ing opportunities, especially of the ESF. The Regional Pacts bring together 
representatives of local governments, central government offices at the local 
level, civil society and clergy, with responsibilities in the area of employ-
ment and social inclusion’ (AMPOSDRU 2008). Such structures work at 
the regional and county levels, and help policy co-ordination and provide 
assistance to potential contractors. As the implementation problems of the 
RO-SOPHRD became more and more visible, the regional pacts assumed 
a very critical position of the MA, emphasizing that problems facing the 
programme are structural in nature, the result of the action or inaction of 
the central government and the MA, and emphasizing the blame-avoidance 
strategies of the MA (Council for National Co-ordination of Regional 
Pacts for Employment and Social Inclusion 2013). In fact, a coalition of 
over 800 stakeholders, created by the MA to aid its efforts of implementa-
tion, became one of the fiercest critics of the attitude and behavior of the 
managing authority.
The most important issue seems to be the extent to which programme-
level partnership is being defined by the national MAs in a manner remi-
niscent of hierarchical governance, which either leaves no room for shaping 
the partnership according to the preferences of the members or, in all, 
gives immense leverage or control to a single member of the partnership 
structure. The propensity of managing authorities to act as such, or to 
attempt to control this partnership structure, leaves with them a significant 
responsibility concerning programme failures.
Programme failures
The five ESF-funded programmes analysed in this book are, nationally, 
considered to be some of the worst-performing structural programmes. 
The similarities between the five programmes become highly visible if we 
attempt to describe their failures.
A major failure seems to be in not pursuing the underlying goals and 
rules which were the result of national programming. In Hungary, a very 
complicated system aimed at ensuring the co-ordination of interventions 
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funded by HU-SROP has never been implemented. In the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania, the set of pre-established monitoring indicators was 
poorly used in practice. Moreover, changes to the political composition of 
the national governments (Hungary, Slovakia) led to sectoral policy shifts, 
which resulted in sudden shifts in terms of programme goals and rules.
The lack of predictability in the relationship with potential contrac-
tors is a key aspect here. We found significant delays in the assessment of 
applications, contracting, and reimbursement to contractors in all coun-
tries. Delays in the assessment of applications, quite common in all five 
countries, raise question concerning the viability of projects which finally 
receive funding. In Romania delays in reimbursements are so large that 
they produced significant social and economic consequences: third sector 
organizations had to halt projects and effectively abandon beneficiaries, 
some financially over-exposed universities are now in technical bankruptcy, 
and private companies who provided goods and services to RO-SOPHRD 
contractors are experiencing cash-flow problems. Moreover, reports from 
all countries suggest constant changes to the administrative and financial 
implementation rules, some applied retroactively. Unilateral changes to the 
contracts are frequent in Romania and Slovakia, in the case of RO-SOPHD 
the behavior of the managing authority is, in this respect, labelled as abusive.
All the programmes analysed here have significant structural prob-
lems, deriving from the (in)action of managing authorities, and potentially 
affecting the entire commissioning cycle. Managing authorities in Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia fail to implement recommendations from the DG 
Employment and interim evaluators concerning these structural problems. 
The recommendations refer to the publication of comprehensible infor-
mation concerning the programme (Hungary), financial simplifications 
(flat rates, unit costs, lump sums, and others; Slovakia and Romania), and 
the introduction of the global grants (Romania). Structural problems are 
deemed severe enough to produce suspension of payments in three coun-
tries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania.
Moreover, central governments fail to regulate key areas for success-
ful programme implementation in time, or make fiscal and procurement 
related decisions without taking into account their potential effect on 
structural programmes. The Romanian government makes fiscal policy 
changes which seem to make sense in the short term (such as provisions 
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concerning the frequency of tax payments for private companies) and man-
ages to hinder RO-SOPHRD implementation (companies are not longer 
able/willing to meet the fiscal eligibility criteria of the RO-SOPHRD). The 
same government delays the implementation of the key area of interven-
tion by several years, by failing to create a national agency for professional 
qualifications in time, and fails to see that not all schools in Romania are 
technically eligible to apply for RO-SOPHRD funding. The Hungarian 
government fails to provide the necessary framework for the completion 
of key national projects, the results of which were supposed to guide the 
selection of small grass-roots projects. This raises questions concerning 
the co-ordination with national education policy during implementation.
Ensuring co-ordination with national education policy
The links with national education policy are embedded to various degrees 
in programming documents, since these are based on a situation analysis 
which comprises the national education system. Differences between the 
five countries appear during the implementation process, in the form of 
changes to national education policy not followed by changes in pro-
grammes implementation, or changes in implementation not triggered by 
shifts in national education policy.
The countries analysed here present various degrees of consistency 
and continuity in national education policy. For Hungary, Slovakia and 
Romania, we can emphasize the lack of continuity across political cycles, 
associated with the lack of a national consensus on what the educational 
system should look like or achieve. This lack of consensus reflects in ESF 
programming.
In the Czech Republic, a national policy shift was triggered by a 2009 
decision of the European Court for Human Rights which found the Czech 
state guilty of systemic discrimination against Roma children. A national strat-
egy soon followed; yet by 2011, its implementation status, including through 
CZ-ECOP, was still unclear. In Hungary, a shift in national education priori-
ties is reflected in programme implementation, resulting in a scaling back of 
efforts directed at vulnerable groups and the introduction of components 
targeting socially and economically better off groups. For example, Romania 
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experiences a significant shift in education policy at the beginning of 2011, 
with changes in the sphere of VET important enough to justify a discussion 
on the validity of VET-related interventions in RO-SOPHRD. To this day, 
such an issue was not approached by the managing authority, the supervi-
sory boards of the programme, the Ministry of Education or the Romanian 
government. In Slovakia, a change of government produced major changes 
in terms of programming and, lacking the time to fill in the details, resulted 
in the introduction of a mechanism of incremental strategy formation.
Sometimes it is the institutional structure itself which leads to ESF-
funded interventions being disconnected from national education reforms. 
In Slovakia, the decentralization of implementation led to demand-driven 
projects (smaller projects) being disconnected from the national projects 
deeply linked to education reforms. In Hungary, such a situation was taken 
into account and a mutual interlinking of programme components was 
introduced, yet it was never put into practice. Romania and Bulgaria do not 
seem to have taken this into account. In the Czech Republic, the use of the 
global grants model seemed designed precisely to approach this particular 
aspect. Further analysis is necessary to determine whether this model has 
produced better results in terms of linking small projects/interventions 
to national strategies and national education reforms. In this respect, a 
key factor are the regulatory decisions of the managing authorities, which 
actually shape the market for educational service delivery.
Bureaucratic decisions shaping the markets  
for educational service delivery
The commissioning process within the framework of ESF programmes 
involves managing a market for the delivery of educational services. This 
market results from the allowance of entry decisions made in policy docu-
ments on topics such as who is to provide practical training for pupils 
enrolled in ISCED 2–3 vocational and technical schools, who is to provide 
assistance to children at risk of early school-leaving, who is allowed to train 
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teachers, and so on. At the same time, this market is regulated via decisions 
on the characteristics of the educational services provided, as well as through 
conditions in terms of users of these services. It involves competition for 
funding, which raises questions concerning the relative power of providers 
allowed to enter the market and what are the best mechanisms to ensure 
competition is fair. It also involves consideration of the relative power of 
providers in their relationship with service users and, maybe, even of the 
degree of protection of users. An important question is thus how aware 
the management authorities of ESF funded programmes are of the market 
principles applicable to techniques and instruments they are using, and 
how they govern and steer this market in practice. The first step in shap-
ing the market is determining its size, through the allocation of resources 
for education in the national ESF-funded programmes.
Resource allocation
Resource allocation under ESF should be a matter of differentiation and 
negotiation between different agencies and networks at the national level. 
While there is some negotiation between the members states and Brussels, 
the process is (or should be) determined by national specificities. In this 
section, we point out some of the major decisions concerning the alloca-
tion of resources made in the five countries, which have impacted the 
disbursement of funds on issues concerning access to quality ISCED 0–3 
education of vulnerable groups. Two types of decisions are relevant from 
this point of view: those concerning the breakdown of funds in different 
operational programmes, priority axes and key areas of intervention; and 
those concerning the manner in which funding is distributed, namely types 
of projects and their accessibility to potential contractors other than the 
central government. It must be said that resource allocation seems to be 
mandated and hierarchically managed by the central governments, with 
very little or no involvement of other stakeholders.
As shown in Table 7-1, there are significant differences between the 
countries studied here in terms of ESF spending for education and training, 
with per capita programme expenses being five times smaller in Bulgaria than 
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in the Czech Republic or Hungary. On the one hand, these figures detail the 
prioritization of education in national policy-making. On the other hand, 
they show that any analysis of the extent to which these programmes reach 
vulnerable groups has to take into account not only the ratio of funds allo-
cated to these groups, but also absolute amounts. It must be noted that, for 
the Czech Republic, in addition to the CZ-ECOP, this step of the analysis 
also includes the Operational Programme Prague Adaptability.
Table 7-1. ESF spending on reforming education and training systems  
in the five countries, 2007–2013.
Country Operational Programmes
Reforming education 
and training systems – 
total expenses
Reforming education 



































233,660,000 € 43.32 €
Notes: Per capita expenses calculated using total population in January 2007. Sources of 
data: EC for spending data, Eurostat for population data
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The Czech Republic divides ESF funding into three different operational 
programmes, separating the human resources development interven-
tions from interventions centred on the national education system. The 
Educational Competitiveness Operational Programme (CZ-ECOP) is 
managed by the Ministry of  Education and clearly separates interventions 
by level in the national education system. Moreover, these interventions 
are decentralized through the mechanism of global grants for regions. 
There is a clear differentiation between interventions aimed at inducing 
structural change throughout the national education system (the national 
individual projects and multi-regional individual projects) through policy 
and methodologies development, and interventions at grass-roots level 
(grants available in each region as a result of the global grants scheme) 
focused on educational service provision.
In Hungary, the core of ESF education-related interventions hap-
pens within the Social Renewal Operational Programme (HU-SROP), 
which has two major components: one focused on labor-market par-
ticipation, and the other focused on sectoral objectives, projects and 
interests. Two key areas of intervention are focused on decreasing the 
segregation of severely disadvantaged and Roma pupils, promoting their 
equal opportunities in public education, and supporting the education 
of groups with different educational needs. Many of the interventions 
seem to have focused on the grass-roots level with little attention paid to 
structural change, especially after the politically induced 2010 reshuffle of 
the HU-SROP. In terms of types of projects, Hungary opted for several 
instruments: key/strategic projects, which are supported without a call 
for applications, in a two-stage assessment process, and are supposed to 
produce infrastructure of public benefit or investments having priority 
employment effects; global or indirect grants, which result in bodies such 
as non-governmental organizations acting as grantors for small grass-
roots projects; and tenders, which may involve one or two stages in the 
application process, with more complex issues subject to two-stage calls. 
The system is highly complicated, as it also takes into account the types 
of potential contractors, with some not eligible to apply for certain types 
of projects. The global grants component, introduced in 2008, was never 
made operational.
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Slovakia also has a dedicated programme for education, the Operational 
Programme Education (SK-OPE), while a completely different ESF pro-
gramme is focused on employment and social inclusion. The SK-OPE 
singles out the reform of the VET and defines separate areas of interven-
tion for marginalized Roma communities and children with special edu-
cational needs. In a clear co-ordination of ESF interventions with reforms 
in the national education system, there is a distinction between national 
projects, aimed at strategic policy and methodologies development and 
commissioned directly by the ministry of education to different entities, 
and demand-drive projects which are the core of grass-roots interventions.
Romania and Bulgaria have opted for general human resources devel-
opment operational programmes, which include, among many other things, 
interventions focused on ISCED 0–3 education. In both countries, there 
is a very poor separation between different types of intervention, resulting 
in areas of intervention comprising primary and secondary education and 
higher education at the same time. In Romania, interventions of interest to 
this project are divided into two different priority axes, under three labels: 
quality of education, transition from school to active life, and correcting 
and preventing early-school leaving. There is no funding specifically set 
aside for Roma and other vulnerable groups, nor for children with special 
educational needs, nor for bridging the rural-urban gap or even for ISCED 
0–3 level education as a whole. Moreover, Romania opts for a distinction 
between strategic and grant projects, which is made in terms of territorial 
coverage, duration, and minimum and maximum amounts of funding 
available per project, and which is not accompanied by any kind of linking 
between the two (i.e. some mechanisms to ensure grant projects take into 
account results of the strategic projects). In Bulgaria, it is easier to identify 
areas of intervention focused on ISCED 0–3 education, yet the labelling 
is equally unclear and general in nature: access to education and training 
for disadvantaged groups and the place of children and youth in education 
and society. In terms of types of project, Bulgaria has made no distinctions 
in macro-programming, but has chosen to differentiate between calls in 
terms of potential project budgets and duration.
The breakdown of available ESF funds, as well as decisions concern-
ing how many ESF programmes to establish and how to divide priorities 
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between them are the starting point of an even more elaborate effort to 
shape the market for educational service delivery. The next step is detailed 
in the following sections and is concerned with the process of defining the 
issues at stake and the types of educational services to be provided.
Defining the issues at stake
The issues at stake are defined similarly in the five countries, yet with very 
different degrees of detailing. Each of the five countries identifies issues 
such as territorial disparities in terms of access to and quality of education, 
in urban-rural terms (Romania and Bulgaria) or in regional terms (the 
Czech Republic). Each country identifies majority-minority gaps in terms 
of access to education, with special reference to the Roma and, in the case 
of Bulgaria, the Turkish minority. Most importantly, all countries try to 
link ESF-funded interventions with national reforms of education, with 
Bulgaria introducing a structural reform prior to 2007, Romania quoting 
the need to reinforce recent reforms of VET and doctoral studies, and 
Slovakia trying to correlate a loosely defined operational programme with 
a major shift of strategy in educational policy. Some of the countries take 
quite some time in identifying the problems facing the Roma as a substan-
tial issue, the most notable examples being the Czech Republic (under EC 
pressure following a case lost in the European Court of Human Rights), 
Romania (failing to properly account for Roma beneficiaries until 2010), 
and Slovakia (policy priorities concerning education of Roma children 
are formulated in 2008). Concerning the Roma and children with special 
educational needs, de facto school segregation is an important problem in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
There are significant differences between countries in terms of 
details, as reflected by the analysis of the social problems identified 
in the texts of the calls for applications. From this perspective, we can 
place the five countries into three different categories: 1) countries using 
generic calls (Romania); 2) countries using a mix of generic and very spe-
cific calls (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic); 3) countries using very specific 
calls (Hungary, Slovakia).
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The social problems addressed by the RO-SOPHRD calls for applica-
tions are early school leaving and the poor correlation between the national 
education and professional training system and the labor market. The 
framing of these issues emphasizes their nation-wide applicability, with 
restrained mentions of vulnerable groups disproportionately affected, and 
seems to prescribe one-size-fits-all solutions, without references to special-
ized approaches to issues such as school drop-out among Roma children. 
The situation analysis fails to address narrower problems, which appear 
in the other countries, such as those associated with teaching Romanian 
to national minorities or the results of Romanian pupils in international 
comparative assessment.
Bulgarian and Czech calls for applications mix this approach with a 
more specific one: emphasizing education for members of marginalized 
Roma communities and special-needs education. In Bulgaria, these prob-
lems are framed quite specifically, with emphasis on the need for both 
individual approaches and alternative methodologies. The wording used to 
frame these issues is very telling: there are calls separately approaching the 
inter-related phenomena of ethnic discrimination in the national education 
system, the failure to integrate children with special educational needs and 
the problem of school drop-out among minorities. A specific feature in 
Bulgaria is the high emphasis placed on the need for out-of-school activi-
ties to help solve the problems of the national education system. Among 
the calls analysed here, only two are defined in very general terms (social 
inclusion, access to education), while the rest are quite specific in nature. 
There are multiple calls making reference to education for people with 
special educational needs, as well as to ethnic discrimination in the national 
education system. The Czech Republic uses some catch-all calls, making 
reference to lists of very specific problems including, among others, the 
situation of multiply disadvantaged children and those with special educa-
tional needs, or even of highly specific groups such as children of migrants. 
Some other calls are quite general in nature. Multiple calls emphasize the 
insufficient development of inclusive education, while a very specific call 
links general issues to delinquency, violence and substance abuse.
Hungary uses highly specific calls making references to very narrowly 
defined problems. Approximately a quarter of all calls emphasize the 
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cumulative disadvantages and learning challenges affecting children, with 
three singling out Roma children and two highlighting the problem of unre-
ported segregation of these children. Almost a quarter emphasizes the issue 
of school drop-out. Multiple calls approach the issue of children with special 
educational needs, emphasizing the controversial definitions still in use in 
Hungary, where 70 per cent of multiply disadvantaged children are defined 
as having special educational needs. There are huge discrepancies between 
micro-regions. Specific to Hungary are calls which approach the problem 
of educating minority children in their native tongue, and the problem of 
teaching Hungarian as a second language to the children of migrants. As 
national policy shifted in another direction after 2010, we also find more than 
one call with a focus on the inadequate talent development in the national 
education system. The situation is similar in Slovakia, where we find very 
specific calls targeting the education of members of marginalized Roma 
communities in two different problem-solving frames, one focusing on the 
need to approach such issues by the use of comprehensive local strategies, 
and the other emphasizing that the problem needs to be seen through the 
filter-notion of special educational needs addressed in specialized settings.
The extent to which the issues at stake are defined in a broader frame-
work, linking ESF interventions with other policy areas, is obvious by refer-
ences or the lack of references to national policy documents and instruments 
or to policy research. In Bulgaria, we could find no references to national 
policy documents and instruments. In Romania, there are solitary references 
to an anti-crisis plan of the Romanian government in two calls launched 
in 2010. In Hungary, there are some references to the act on public educa-
tion, the tanoda programme, and national policy on equal opportunities. 
All references in calls from Slovakia focus on national policies concerning 
the Roma; while in the Czech Republic, only some calls make references 
to policy documents, especially national policy concerning youth and 
children. Generally, references appear in the case of calls for applications 
for large strategic projects (global grants in the Czech Republic, strategic 
projects in Romania, etc.).
An important aspect of how the social issues at stake are framed 
in ESF interventions is linked to the notion of integrated approaches, 
defined here as comprising the full cycle of methodology design, piloting, 
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implementation and dissemination. The issues at stake are at the same time 
economic, social, and educational; they require both individualized and 
community interventions and, sometimes, national policy and interven-
tions. In Hungary, the need to integrate approaches to the issues identi-
fied is very commonly found. It is compulsory in calls focused on gifted 
children and two calls focused on migrant children, and explicitly recom-
mended in seven calls focused on equality of opportunities, in four calls 
on inclusive education for children with special educational needs, and in 
two calls on quality assurance. The use of the integrated approach seems 
consistent, as it is compulsory in areas where there is a lack of methodol-
ogy in the national education system. In Romania, integrated approaches 
are explicitly recommended in calls on second-chance education. In the 
Czech Republic, it is explicitly recommended or compulsory in some calls 
on equality of opportunities, especially for children with special educational 
needs, including calls for global grants on this topic.
Defining services and their users
ESF is centred on the notion of capacity-building, at the individual and 
community level. Consequently, this notion is frequently mentioned by 
the managing authorities analysed here. However, empirical analyses of 
the workings of EU development funding have pointed out the ambigu-
ity surrounding this concept, its frequent detachment from the reality of 
disadvantaged groups and communities (due to an overwhelmingly eco-
nomic definition and over-quantification), as well as the failure to account 
for the attitudes and motivations of target individuals (Fudge 2009). An 
important aspect of our comparative approach to ESF implementation 
in central and eastern Europe is how the notion of capacity building is 
translated into demands for educational services.
From this point of view, a key distinction is the one between core 
educational services and additional or support services. By core educa-
tional services, we mean those services delivered to pupils through the 
traditional education system, such as curriculum/educational programme 
development and implementation, but also second-chance programmes or 
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practical training programmes for pupils enrolled in vocational education 
programmes. Additional or support services comprise, among other things, 
counseling for parents or the creation of networks to improve co-operation 
and information transfer between providers of educational services. Core 
educational services are very well represented in the demands formulated 
by the five states through ESF mechanisms, as shown in Table 7-2, with 
curriculum development and implementation (a key aspect of educational 
reforms in all countries) being best represented.
Table 7-2. Number of calls for applications requesting the provision of core educational 
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None 2 0 3 1 1 7
One 0 0 10 3 2 15
Two 9 0 13 2 5 29
Three 0 5 11 1 0 17
Four 
(all) 0 8 6 3 0 17
Total 11 13 43 10 8 85
The only other called-for service with a comparable presence is teacher 
training (see Table 7-2, Table 7-3). However, it is the case of teacher train-
ing on specific issues relevant to the social problems approached by the 
calls which we analysed. At the opposite end, we find requests for services 
related to the reintegration of juvenile delinquents into schools, as well 
as for policy elaboration on topics relevant to the call. Other additional 
or support services which are in highly in demand by the five states are 
information campaigns, activities to promote partnership, the creation of 
networks and the transfer of best practices.
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Table 7-3. Eligibility of additional educational services/activities under ESF-funded 
programmes in the five countries, 2007–2013.




Literacy and second chance programmes 34.1%
Remedial education 42.4%
Educational counselling and orientation 70.6%
Additional services
Information campaigns 70.6%
Development of family kindergarten and 
home schooling 16.5%
Counselling for parents 46.1%
Activities focused on health issues of 
school population 22.4%
Activities to promote partnership 
between schools and local actors 60.0%
Reintegration of juvenile delinquents 
into schools 9.4%
After-school programmes 55.3%
Research on education and educational 
policy 30.6%
Teacher training on specific issues related 
to the call 75.3%
Development of social skills 31.8%
Creation of networks 56.5%
Policy elaboration on topics related to 
the call 17.6%
Transfer of best practices, study visits, etc. 65.9%
The frequency of these additional services in the lists of demanded/
eligible project activities raises an important question concerning the 
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proportion of ESF funding for education and social inclusion which is 
in fact dedicated to them. Unless the calls for applications contain very 
specific constraints, we can theoretically think of successful applications 
for projects in the area of education which do not involve the direct 
provision of educational services to the specified target group, and limit 
themselves to such support activities. The relative weight of research 
activities and policy elaboration also needs some discussion. While only 
17 per cent of the calls analysed make references to policy elaboration, 
many more (30 per cent) make reference to research on education and 
educational policy. In the broader ESF context, granting funding for 
research activities without linking them to the policy-making needs of 
the state seems an unnecessary diversion of funding otherwise dedicated 
to social interventions.
Besides these aspects, we found some differences in approach between 
the countries we analysed. The BG-OPHRD grants significant discre-
tion to contractors in selecting project activities from a catch-all menu 
included in each call for applications. There are also some very specific 
national requirements, beyond the lists of activities mentioned in the 
above tables, such as the development of activities that would help an 
understanding of the culture and history of ethnic minorities, scholarship 
disbursement, different activities involving the use of Roma language, 
and the development of software to be used by pupils with special edu-
cational needs.
In the Czech Republic, we find significant changes to the demands for 
educational service throughout the implementation process in the form of 
more and more refined descriptions of the services to be provided/ eligible 
activities. In terms of educational services not included in our list, the 
emphasis is on the inclusion of disadvantaged pupils in mainstream schools. 
Interesting is the request for the development of tools to assess the qual-
ity of educational services provided in non-formal settings. The emphasis 
on the inclusion of pupils defined as having special educational needs in 
mainstream schools is accompanied by an over-specification of details. 
For example, the calls request potential contractors to develop methodo-
logical and consultative centres for pupils with disabilities, which will be 
requested to provide support to other schools as well. This specification of 
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details suggests certain methodologies are endorsed nationally and imposed 
on the potential contractors, an aspect which seems to be missing in the 
other countries. While from certain perspectives this can be interpreted 
as hindering innovation, it also suggests a deliberate decision to prescribe 
methodologies thought to be the most effective in the respective national 
context.
In Hungary, the demands for educational services articulated in 
HU-SROP calls for applications seem guided by the belief that EU funds 
can and should be invested in supporting fundamental public services, 
in this case, core educational services. In Hungary, the activities outside 
our predefined list are structurally oriented, focusing on regulatory and 
operational aspects of educational service provision, support activities, 
infrastructure development, project development, restructuring of school 
districts, and stimulating self-assessment by schools. This strategic approach 
seems to be undermined by a national policy shift; in recent years we find 
significant changes in the contents of the calls launched under the same 
KAIs, with educational integration being replaced by talent management, 
even though the programme goals and objectives were not reformulated 
in any way.
The demands for educational services embedded in RO-SOPHRD 
calls are thought by the interim evaluator to inhibit innovation on behalf 
of the contractors, with lists of eligible activities working like a menu from 
which contractors cherry-pick for fear that going outside the list might make 
their applications ineligible (also reinforced by widely held perceptions of 
the poor quality of the assessment of applications). Another important 
aspect is the fact that, by 2010, some of the potential activities/services 
can only be provided by certain categories of contractors, which suggests 
efforts on behalf of the MA to ensure that the programme targets benefi-
ciaries better. Among the eligible activities not included in the above list, 
the emphasis falls upon labor-market-related aspects, such as workplace-
learning activities and the training of mentors in enterprises, as well as on 
very specific services such as summer/Sunday schools and kindergartens, 
and school debut methodologies.
In Slovakia, the manner in which the lists of eligible activities and 
eligible expenses are defined reinforces the perception of SK-OPE as an 
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opportunity for the renewal and equipment of schools, rather than an 
investment into education. Consequently, calls do not provide manda-
tory guidelines nor do they recommend types of interventions proven to 
be more effective in areas such as education in inclusive settings, including 
of Roma children; they leave a lot to the discretion of contractors in terms 
of defining activities.
Table 7-4. Eligibility of different categories of potential beneficiaries, ESF-funded 
programmes in the five countries, 2007–2013.
Categories of potential 
 beneficiaries of projects




























Disadvantaged groups (pupils 
and others) 10 13 38 4 8 73
ISCED 0–4 pupils 11 11 33 9 1 65
ISCED 5–6 students, 
participants in adult education 
programmes
3 7 9 7 1 27
Parents 6 9 26 4 5 50
ISCED 0–4 teachers 7 13 35 5 8 68
University professors and 
researchers 1 2 5 1 1 10
Employees of governmental 
institutions or NGOs 0 9 23 2 6 40
Total number of calls 11 13 43 10 8 85
The definition of services to be provided comes hand in hand with 
the distinction between eligible and non-eligible groups and the spe-
cificities of national definitions of vulnerable/disadvantaged groups. 
As shown in Table 7-4, while disadvantaged groups of school age are 
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eligible beneficiaries of projects in most of the calls analysed here, the 
more general category of ‘pupils’ appears in a similar number of calls 
for applications. Our selection of calls to be analysed took into account 
their relevance for social inclusion and ISCED 0–3 education, yet we 
find among the eligible beneficiaries of large numbers of calls ISCED 
5–6 students or employees of governmental institutions and NGOs. In 
the case of Romania, we must note that some of the calls mention more 
frequently general categories rather than specific ones. In Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic, teachers are eligible beneficiaries in all calls and 
employees of governmental institutions and non-governmental organi-
zations in most of the calls, which could be linked to the specific need 
of overcoming the discrimination and segregation problems within the 
national educational systems.
Looking within the broader category of disadvantaged groups, we find 
some significant differences between our five countries in terms of targeting 
such groups (see Table 7-5). In the case of Hungary, not all disadvantaged 
groups are eligible beneficiaries in all calls for applications, which suggests 
that there are attempts to refine targeting. Only in the Czech Republic 
and Romania are juvenile delinquents specifically included among the 
lists of beneficiaries of educational services to be targeted by potential 
projects. Only half of the Romanian calls specifically target these groups, 
while others seem to take a more general approach. In Slovakia, calls make 
specific reference to Roma pupils and pupils with disabilities and exclude 
other definitions of disadvantaged groups.
All countries seem to operate with long lists of potential beneficiaries 
of services, which leave a lot to the discretion of contractors. In Bulgarian, 
Czech or Romanian calls for applications for projects focusing on educa-
tional inclusion issues, we frequently find general labels such as ‘pupils’ on 
the lists of potential project beneficiaries. This is an invitation to dispro-
portionately include mainstream children who are more accessible than 
multiply disadvantaged children from Roma families. There are, however, 
differences. In Bulgaria some of the calls targeting ethnic minorities nar-
rowly specify target groups. In the Czech Republic, the main problem seems 
to be the fact that calls nominally target children with special educational 
needs, using a very specific meaning of the term.
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Table 7-5. Eligibility of disadvantaged groups in calls for applications  
under ESF-funded programmes in the five countries, 2007–2013.
Disadvantaged groups




























Roma pupils 8 13 25 4 6 56
Pupils with disabilities 9 13 14 4 3 43
Pupils at risk of early-school 
leaving 7 13 20 4 0 44
Pupils from disadvantaged 
families 6 13 28 2 0 49
Juvenile delinquents 0 13 0 3 0 16
People who did not finish 
 compulsory education 2 10 13 3 0 28
Total number of calls in country 11 13 43 10 8 85
Another aspect concerns the distinction between two groups of benefi-
ciaries: the pupils and students in need of support and the teachers and 
support staff that need to be trained in order to provide the requested 
educational services to the first group. None of the countries analysed here 
properly distinguished between the two groups and limited the extent to 
which money is invested in teachers and support staff. Technically, there 
is the possibility that ESF-funded projects in the five countries spend 
more resources on these staff than on the end-users of educational services. 
Although money spent on teacher training or research indirectly benefits 
the end-users, the matters of proportion and cost-effectiveness of invest-
ments are not properly approached by national ESF programmes.
In Romania, there is something even more damaging than the list of 
potential beneficiaries. The procedure for target group registration used 
until 2011, widely known to all potential applicants, uses a breakdown of 
beneficiaries into vulnerable groups which does not distinguish between 
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Roma and other ethnic groups. This had the potential to stimulate con-
tractors to include beneficiaries from other more accessible ethnic groups 
in their projects. Moreover, the targeting of disadvantaged groups such as 
Roma pupils and their families, pupils with disabilities and their families, 
and other vulnerable groups is not automatically rewarded when an applica-
tion is assessed; all rewards are completely left to the discretion of the person 
doing the assessment. The breakdown into vulnerable groups is so damaging 
that MA have reported figures showing the largest of the four vulnerable 
groups reached by the RO-SOPHRD under priority area 2.1. is Others. 
This is almost six times more than all beneficiaries belonging to ethnic 
minorities, fifteen times more than Roma, sixty times more than people 
with disabilities. Women or families with two children, despite their socio-
economic status, may be categorized as vulnerable under RO-SOPHRD 
rules and included in the others category. Something similar also happens 
in Slovakia, where we have the same kind of failure on behalf of the man-
aging authority in defining the programme indicators.
Beyond the long lists of potential beneficiaries/users of services, there 
is the matter of how each of the national programmes defines the most 
educationally vulnerable groups. In Bulgaria, we find the specific iden-
tification of Roma pupils (in most calls, very few contain references to 
ethnic-minority students), pupils with disabilities, children with special 
educational needs and school dropouts. In the Czech Republic, emphasis 
is on pupils and students with special educational needs enrolled in differ-
ent levels of the national education system, early school leavers (without 
completed secondary education), the parents of children and pupils with 
disabilities or social disadvantage, and institutionalized children. It must 
be noted that gifted children are also included on the lists of beneficiaries 
of interest to some of the calls analysed here. In Hungary, the emphasis 
falls on multiply disadvantaged children (including Roma and/or pupils 
form socio-economically disadvantaged areas), pupils and students with 
migrant backgrounds, and children with special educational needs. Some 
calls also mention students lagging behind, children in state care or young 
school dropouts. A very special category is of ISCED 1 students who had 
been qualified as having special educational needs but, after revision, were 
transferred from a segregated educational environment to an integrated 
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one. Like in the Czech Republic, later calls for applications identify gifted 
children as a group of interest for the national programme. In Romania, 
Roma pupils, pupils with disabilities and pupils from rural and/or socio-
economically disadvantaged areas are identified as groups of interest for 
education-related calls under RO-SOPHRD. The identification always 
mentions pupils from these groups alongside parents, which suggests that 
the demand for comprehensive approaches to the problems facing these 
groups goes beyond the limits of the education system. Early school leav-
ers or pupils lagging behind are also mentioned in some of the calls. Calls 
also identify ‘other vulnerable groups’ as being important, much in line 
with the national breakdown of vulnerable groups approached by the 
RO-SOPHRD, discussed elsewhere in this book. Calls for applications 
in Slovakia emphasize the notion of marginalized Roma communities and 
target pupils and parents in these communities, especially in the case of 
primary education. Some calls make specific mention of pupils with spe-
cial educational needs enrolled in special schools; pupils with disabilities 
enrolled in special schools, and, most importantly, marginalized Roma 
pupils enrolled in special schools or being affected by a disability.
Very relevant here is the meaning attributed to the ‘special educa-
tional needs’ label in national policy documents and national ESF pro-
grammes. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania use orthodox interpretations 
of this notion. In the Czech Republic, despite the formal steps taken to 
address this issue in response to pressure from the European Commission, 
it is obvious that the national government and the national educational 
establishment are unwilling to let go of the definition in use, which places 
Roma children automatically in the category of children with special edu-
cational needs and on a special educational route. Starting from similar 
premises, Slovakia presents significant progress in addressing this issue, a 
fact reflected by how it identifies vulnerable groups. This combines rela-
tive unease with ethnic identification in the wider society and a reliance 
on self-identification with regional or local targeting, or the statements 
of the contractors in determining whether this specific group has been 
reached by ESF interventions.
An aspect relevant to all countries involved concerns the identifica-
tion of vulnerable groups which are defined ethnically. In Hungary, ethnic 
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registration is actually considered a sensitive issue, so the contractors have 
to be able to demonstrate they have the consent of the beneficiaries they 
report to be of a certain ethnicity. In Slovakia, there is complete reliance 
on the statements of the contractors concerning beneficiaries belonging to 
ethnic groups. However, some calls contain eligibility provisions concern-
ing the share of beneficiaries from certain marginalized groups included 
in ESF-funded projects. Both countries use social or local and regional 
characteristics to target groups such as the Roma; however these only 
work partially.
Reaching these vulnerable groups involves (in the case of potential 
contractors outside the national education system) some problems con-
cerning access to the potential beneficiaries. At the same time, there is the 
question of how many educational services are to be provided by actors in 
the national education system (especially schools), and how many are left 
to other actors. In this direction, the following two sections approach the 
issue of potential contractors/providers of educational services and the use 
of partnership as a project methodology.
Market competition and the empowerment of actors
In all the countries analysed, the contractors seem to enjoy significant dis-
cretion in making decisions which induce educational selectivity, namely 
the choice of project activities/services to be delivered and the choice 
of beneficiaries/users of services. Equally empowered are the managing 
authorities, which enjoy significant discretion in the power relationship 
they establish with applicants and contractors. The least empowered are 
the beneficiaries/users of services. There are, of course, some differences 
between the countries, with the Hungarian attempt to include Roma rep-
resentatives in designing better projects addressing Roma issues standing 
out. However, beyond this, beneficiaries/users seem to have no influence 
over the design and delivery of educational services meant to address their 
specific situation. While this is the general approach of ESF implemen-
tation in the five countries, there might be a different situation at grass-
roots level. Moreover, it is unclear in what way the guides and calls direct 
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contractors towards participatory approaches to project implementation. 
An in-depth approach to the types of projects or educational interventions 
which appear more frequently could help in this respect.
Table 7-6. Eligibility of potential contractors under ESF-funded programmes  
in the five countries, 2007–2013.
Categories of potential contractors

























Central government 11 10 20 9 6
Local and regional government 10 13 35 3 2
Universities and research institutes 1 7 6 9 1
Schools 7 7 32 8 7
Other national actors (churches, trade 
unions, etc.) 0 6 27 9 0
For profits (includes certified providers 
of professional training) 1 5 14 7 0
Third sector (includes social economy) 1 8 34 9 1
Total number of calls in country 11 13 43 10 8
Within the broader category of contractors, we do find some differences, 
as shown in Table 7-6. In all the countries, regular schools are eligible 
contractors in most but not all calls for applications. In Bulgaria, the sur-
prise comes from the absence of third-sector organizations from the lists 
of eligible contractors included in most calls, given the emphasis placed 
by the domestic policy-maker on finding solutions to the social problems 
approached by the calls outside the traditional education system. Moreover, 
the only category of contractors mentioned in all calls is central government 
entities. In the Czech Republic, the lion’s share belongs to local and regional 
governments, followed closely by the central government. In Hungary, very 
similar to what we previously found out, we find a distribution of potential 
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contractors per calls which suggests a deliberate attempt to target vulner-
able groups. In the case of Romania, what is striking is the limited presence 
of local governments among the eligible contractors, as well as the much 
stronger presence of universities and research institutes when compared to 
the other countries. Almost all calls for applications from Slovakia strictly 
limit potential contractors to governmental actors and the actors from the 
national education system. Third-sector organizations are only eligible in 
calls which specifically mention the need for the comprehensive or inte-
grated development of Roma communities.
Being admitted on the market for ESF-funded educational service 
delivery and actually making the most of it are two different things, as there 
are significant differences in terms of know-how and resources between 
these actors. In at least three of the five countries, small potential contrac-
tors (NGOs, schools) are at a clear disadvantage, either because of decisions 
concerning the size of potential projects, or because they have to compete 
against actors with superior know-how and resources, such as central gov-
ernment agencies or universities.
Several implementation decisions shape the market in terms of com-
petition. First, it is important to look at the frequency with which MAs 
launch calls which have a single potential applicant, which is quite high 
(fourteen out of eighty-five calls analysed here). In Bulgaria, it is the case 
for more than half of the calls analysed here (six out of eleven), while in 
Slovakia it is the case for three out of eight cases. At the other end, we 
find Romania, where no such calls could be identified, with Hungary and 
the Czech Republic somewhere in the middle (approximately one in ten 
calls). Second, and equally important is the size of the potential projects, 
which differs significantly from country to country. While Bulgaria and 
the Czech Republic allow potential contractors to seek funding for small 
projects with budgets as low as EUR 10,000, in Romania and Slovakia the 
smallest projects should have budgets of EUR 50,000 and EUR 100,000. 
This acts against small grassroots NGOs and schools. Third, there is the 
matter of the financial contributions of the applicants to the budget of the 
projects. Romania treats not-for-profits and public entities equally in most 
calls and requires them to contribute with 2 per cent of the total budget 
of the project, while for-profits are supposed to contribute with at least 
5 per cent. In other calls, public entities are exempt from contributing to 
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the budgets of the projects. In Slovakia, public entities are also exempt, 
while all other contractors are required to contribute with 5 per cent of 
the total budget of the project.1
In shaping a market for educational service delivery, the decision to let 
some actors inside the market and keep others out is usually followed by 
decisions concerning when and how different categories of actors compete 
against each other. In the case of educational services, this is particularly 
important given that the providers mentioned above are extremely diverse 
in terms of know-how and resources. Our data show that national govern-
ments and managing authorities did not pay enough attention to this. In 
approximately a quarter of the calls analysed here, universities and research 
institutes are eligible potential contractors alongside schools. In a third of 
the calls, schools are made to compete with for-profits, while in more than 
half of the calls, schools are set against the central government ministries 
and agencies. This raises questions concerning the fairness of competition 
on the market for educational service delivery created in the five countries.
Nationally, some other factors further influence competition nega-
tively. In Hungary, public institutions used an unusual strategy to maximize 
their access to European funding and established non-profit/civil organiza-
tions to apply for financial support. Very late during implementation, steps 
were taken to gradually eliminate these so-called public foundations from 
the competition for funding. In Romania, the managing authority noticed 
after some time that not all schools in Romania were actually eligible for 
funding. This happened due to the fact that not all were judged capable 
by the Ministry of Finance of managing their own budgets. Consequently, 
some schools were designated as budget centres and asked to manage, along-
side their own, the budgets of neighboring schools. Only schools acting as 
budget centres had fiscal registration numbers and were eligible to apply 
for funding. This effectively excluded any schools from socio-economically 
disadvantaged areas (rural and urban periphery schools). A correction was 
made only in 2011 when, following the adoption of a new law on educa-
tion, the budget centres were disbanded and each school gained the right 
to manage its own budget.
1 This information could not be compiled for the other three countries.
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Moreover, in at least three of the countries analysed here, the competi-
tion is influenced by professional for-profit consultants, able to capitalize 
upon previous experience in other EU countries or local political con-
nections. In Slovakia, our analysis points toward an ever-increasing role 
of such actors, due to the complexity and formalization embedded in the 
commissioning process. Romania is where we find the most convincing 
data on this topic, due to the use in RO-SOPHRD commissioning of the 
‘first come, first served’ principle. Thus, calls for grant projects would close 
when the total amount of money requested by applicants equals the amount 
of money allocated to the respective calls. It was administered through an 
electronic platform, which performed this automatically. Using specifically 
designed software, professional consultancies managed, on behalf of their 
customers, to upload large numbers of applications in minutes, triggering 
the automatic shutdown of the call, before other categories of applicants 
were able to submit their own applications. In Hungary, for-profits get 
themselves hired as consultants or otherwise involved into projects or use, 
much like public institutions, the option of establishing civil organizations 
in order to access ESF funding. This leads to anomalous cases such as the 
funding of golf clubs under calls aimed at supporting gifted children.
These imbalances might be corrected by a proper use of the provisions 
concerning partnership as a project methodology. Competing against 
central government agencies might put regular schools at a disadvantage. 
Yet, such a disadvantage might be easily compensated if other categories 
of contractors were somehow stimulated to include schools in the projects 
they develop. The instrument at their disposal in this respect is partnership 
as a project methodology.
Partnership as project methodology
During the implementation of ESF-funded national programmes, cen-
tral governments and managing authorities have several alternatives at 
their disposal to stimulate partnerships in project implementation. First, 
partnerships can be stimulated by granting bonus points during assess-
ment to the applications submitted by a partnership between two or more 
actors. Second, partnerships could be made compulsory. Third, a certain 
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partnership structure could be made compulsory, e.g. making NGOs or 
churches eligible applicants only if they partner one or more schools or 
make trans-national partnerships compulsory under certain key areas of 
intervention.
The approach to partnership as project methodology provides some of 
the most striking differences between these countries. In Romania, provi-
sions aimed at stimulating partnership in project implementation seem to 
work, since the managing authority reports it is the case for 70 per cent of 
all contracted projects. However, because partnership structures benefited 
from bonus points during the assessment of applications, it is quite difficult 
to distinguish between meaningful partnerships and ones which are simply 
window-dressing. Some steps to ensure meaningfulness are provided, start-
ing with calls for applications (requiring applicants to describe the actual 
involvement of partners in several areas), yet these could be quite easily 
circumvented. Moreover, while partnership is rewarded in such a manner, 
it is not used to steer projects’ implementation in directions which could 
increase the quality of interventions and their long-term sustainability. For 
example, while so many of the educational services requested by calls were 
supposed to be delivered in or around schools, there are no specific provi-
sions requiring a contractor to partner with a school. Consequently, while 
the overall capacity of Romanian society to address problems such as early 
school leaving might increase it becomes unclear if the capacity of schools to 
address such problems on their own will increase. Like Romania, Bulgaria 
promotes partnership in project implementation but does not make it 
compulsory, nor does it use it to steer interventions in certain directions.
Hungary has a completely different approach, making partnership 
compulsory under some calls and even going as far as identifying a compul-
sory partner, usually a professional training agency or, in the case of Roma 
integration projects, the National Roma Self-Government. The practice is 
judged by Hungarian experts as questionable, due to the manner in which 
the selection of compulsory partners is made as well as to the fact that the 
National Roma Self Government does not seem to have the professional 
expertise necessary. Moreover, these compulsory partners may be selective 
and may refuse to partner some potential contractors, meaning a selection 
would have been made before there was an application. Despite this prob-
lem, the practice of involving the National Roma Self-Government seems, 
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in itself, promising because it suggests attention is being paid to the need 
to empower beneficiaries of the projects as well.
In the Czech Republic, partnership as project methodology has a 
complicated history since the 2004–06 programming period. Partnerships 
between public institutions and other actors in the implementation of 
EU-funded projects were subject to some provisions of national public 
procurement legislation which made them de facto not functional. While 
the legal issues were overcome, the extent to which public sector project 
promoters/potential contractors are still discouraged to engage in partner-
ship issues remains an important issue (Potluka et al. 2011). Probably deriv-
ing from the same earlier problems, current ESF programmes in the Czech 
Republic distinguish between financial and non-financial partnerships 
(Stott 2008) and provide potential contractors with rules and template 
which are judged to induce some rigidity in project implementation. It 
must also be noted that there is one priority axis in an ESF programme in 
the Czech Republic which makes international partnership compulsory.
In Slovakia, the SK-OPE develops the partnership principle in pro-
grammatic documents with reference to programming and the full cycle of 
implementation and evaluation, yet in the text of the calls of relevance to 
education and social inclusion, it is absent. None of the calls analysed by us 
allows for partnership structures. Yet, in many projects, these partnerships 
seem necessary. Data from Slovakia suggests that informal, underground 
partnership structures do exist, usually between main applicants/contrac-
tors and consultancies able to assist them in the very complicated process 
of applying for, contracting and running an ESF funded project. The part-
nership structures needed to develop and implement essential projects are 
thus transferred into a grey area, where the relationships between partners 
are not regulated.
In terms of types of partnerships encouraged, the calls from the Czech 
Republic are the only ones explicitly encouraging partnerships between 
public and private entities. The Czech Republic is also the only country 
which systematically encourages partnership structures comprising both 
local and national actors. Trans-national partnerships seem to be specifi-
cally encouraged in Romania, as all calls include mentions of this direction 
being taken. This is also reflected in the annual implementation reports 
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of the RO-SOPHRD, which invariably report how many projects funded 
involve a trans-national partnership structure. Multi-regional partnerships 
are encouraged in most countries.2 Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic provide (in the text of the calls) specific definitions of partner-
ships, while Bulgaria and Hungary leave the matter to the discretion of the 
applicants and assessors of applications.
In some countries, management authorities go as far as providing tem-
plates for the partnership agreements and tend to do it consistently, with 
the exception of the Czech Republic where this template is provided only 
for some of the calls under CZ-ECOP and for none of the calls under the 
CZ-PA (Prague Adaptability Programme). In terms of the financial capac-
ity of the partnership structures, all countries except for Hungary require 
applicants to provide data concerning all partners, and not just the main 
applicant/project promoter. Romania rewards the existence of a partnership 
structure during assessment, while in Hungary this only applies to certain 
calls focusing on education for children with special educational needs, 
education for children of migrants, talent development in school and sup-
port to ‘learneries’.3 This suggests a differentiated approach based on the 
topics approached by the calls, yet it must be corroborated with the fact 
that in some cases, the partner is predetermined in the content of the call.
Some policy recommendations
The ESF-funded programmes analysed in this chapter have, to various 
degrees, structural problems related to their institutional set-up and the 
(in)actions of the national authority entrusted with managing them. 
2 This information is not available for Hungary, which accounts for the largest por-
tion of the calls analysed here.
3 ‘Learneries’ refers here to the tanoda, extra-curricular learning programmes aimed 
at addressing social exclusion.
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These structural problems thwart the capacity building efforts of all actors 
involved, including those who take as their own the issue of access to educa-
tion for vulnerable groups. Beyond the structural problems, which affect 
all potential contractors and beneficiaries alike, these programmes present, 
to various degrees, significant problems in accessing the most vulnerable 
groups in society, due to the decisions being made in the commissioning 
process. Without ignoring the structural problems, which were repeatedly 
approached recently by both national actors and the European Commission, 
this book has focused on the programming and implementation issues 
more likely to hinder the realization of access to education and quality of 
education goals. From a market perspective, this book has analysed the 
demand side and pointed out the decisions that have contributed signifi-
cantly to shaping supply.
The analytical framework used to assess whether ESF-funded pro-
grammes in the five countries act as enabling environments for increased 
access to quality education of vulnerable groups emphasizes two dimen-
sions: the institutional and the bureaucratic ones. The institutional dimen-
sion covers aspects related to the set-up of the national ESF-programmes, 
or the domestic policy decisions made during programming, as well as 
policy decisions of general applicability made during implementation. The 
bureaucratic dimension covers decisions made during implementation of 
direct relevance to the creation and operation of an educational service 
delivery quasi-market.
The main findings concerning the institutional dimension stress the 
fact that the managing authorities analysed in this book take on the role 
of technical-administrative implementers of ESF-funded programmes and 
rarely attempt to use the policy-making prerogatives which were granted 
to them during programming. This is linked to how they manage (not) 
to balance the complex public goals normally associated with such pro-
grammes. Most of the managing authorities analysed by us seem to make 
a hierarchy of goals and place the programme goal of absorption above 
all, either because they cave in to public pressure, or because they prefer to 
avoid politically sensitive areas. Among the sweeping goals, the democratic 
character of programme implementation is largely ignored by most of the 
five managing authorities. This links with the resistance to partnership as 
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a governance mechanism, reflected by the protests of civil society organiza-
tions regarding their involvement in programming, the apparent inability of 
the monitoring committees to exercise democratic control over the manag-
ing authorities, and the slow disappearance of all stakeholder involvement 
in implementation: namely the drafting of calls for applications.
The focus on absorption rather than substantive goals and over-formal-
ization of the modi operandi of the managing authorities mutually reinforce. 
Over-formalization affects the relationships that managing authorities 
establish with other central government agencies, the intermediate bodies 
working under their authority, and most of all, with the applicants and con-
tractors. It leads to significant delays in assessing applications, contracting, 
and reimbursing contractors in most of the five countries. Despite these 
problems, managing authorities tend to reject all suggestions towards easing 
procedures and interactions with contractors and other actors, even when 
such suggestions come from the EC or the interim evaluators.
Hierarchical governance kicked in during programming and imple-
mentation, resulting from the discomfort of the central governments and 
managing authorities with the informality deemed necessary for good 
programming and commissioning. This leaves the managing authorities 
and, to some extent, national governments with most of the blame for the 
significant programme failures visible in all five countries, despite their best 
efforts to avert blame elsewhere (toward Brussels or contractors).
From the institutional perspective, and going closer to the field of 
education, it is also relevant that the institutional structure itself seems to 
lead to ESF-funded interventions in the five countries being disconnected 
from national education policy-making and implementation: the most 
striking example being the failure of Hungary to implement a carefully 
planned mutual interlinking of strategic and grass-roots components of 
the HU-SROP. Moreover, it can be argued that, to different degrees, in 
all countries the implementation of specific ESF educational and social 
exclusion objectives is pushed to the background by the efforts of the 
national governments to use such financing to substitute national fund-
ing for school operation and modernization. Less obvious in Romania 
and Bulgaria, this aspect is quite striking in the cases of Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic.
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From the bureaucratic decision-making perspective, the reality of ESF 
implementation in the five countries is even more complex. There are a 
significant number of common features. All countries define the social 
issues approached in a similar manner, emphasizing territorial disparities in 
terms of access to and quality of education, and identifying groups such as 
Roma pupils or pupils with disabilities among the must-have beneficiaries 
of the educational services being funded. In terms of educational services 
demanded, the emphasis falls upon core educational services. However, none 
of the countries manages to formulate and enforce provisions concerning the 
division of funds allocated to the projects between the end-users of educa-
tional services (pupils) and groups such as teachers and support staff. The 
decisions concerning access to the market and who is allowed to compete 
with whom for funding generally empower governmental actors, to the 
detriment of schools and, in some countries, of third-sector organizations.
There are, of course, national specificities. Bulgaria provides to 
some extent an enabling framework for social and educational inclu-
sion, as it allows for very small grass-roots projects to be funded from the 
BG-OPHRD, and issues separate calls for applications for projects targeting 
the two groups identified as problematic: Roma and Turkish children in 
the national education system. The positive effects of these decisions are 
diminished by the significant discretion granted to contractors in terms of 
selecting the services they provide and the end-users/beneficiaries, and by 
the fact that provisions concerning partnership are not used to counteract 
competitive disadvantages.
The Czech Republic has to effectively deal with the effects of the defi-
nition of ‘special educational needs’ embedded in the national education 
system before it can effectively provide an enabling framework for social 
and educational inclusion. This seems to happen in a top-down process 
aided by the descriptions of the educational services demanded by calls 
for applications issued in the two operational programmes analysed here. 
As implementation progresses, the description of the services requested 
become more and more detailed, as the central government endorses cer-
tain intervention methodologies and imposes them on contractors. There 
is significant rigidity in implementation though, mostly associated with 
how the issue of partnership as a project methodology is dealt with, and 
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with the deliberate choice to empower local and regional governments in 
educational service provision.
Hungary is by far the country with the most elaborate system of targeting 
vulnerable groups, resulting from the sensitivity surrounding ethnic identifica-
tion and the subsequent use of regional and socio-economical targeting. This 
is obvious in how calls for applications define the problems approached and 
the educational services required to address these social problems, identify 
potential beneficiaries, and deal with competition among contractors. The 
positive effects of this are, however, severely undermined by the lack of trans-
parency and predictability in HU-SROP implementation, as well as by a shift 
of emphasis in national education policy from the strategic approach to social 
inclusion to support for better-off segments of society. Guidance concerning 
methodologies of intervention is not provided to small grass-roots projects, 
despite being embedded in the description of the HU-SROP, because the 
managing authority fails to properly implement the mutual interlinking of 
programme components. It must also be noted that HU-SROP is alone in 
the programmes analysed here to show programme-level preoccupations 
with the empowerment of the users of educational services.
Romania presents the case for a limited approach to social and edu-
cational inclusion. It empowers large potential contractors, such as central 
government agencies and universities, in a drive to maximize absorption with 
a minimum of projects funded. It fails to address in due time the issue of 
eligibility of schools, resulting from inconsistencies between national sectoral 
policy and the RO-SOPHRD implementation framework. It provides no 
guidance concerning preferred interventions and methodologies to approach 
social and educational inclusion issues, mainly because the implementation 
framework has not included any type of linking mechanism between stra-
tegic and grass-roots interventions. RO-SOPHRD records notable results 
in the use of partnerships as a project methodology, even though the mean-
ingfulness of some of the partnership structures is debatable.
Slovakia disproportionately empowers central and local government 
actors as potential providers of educational services to vulnerable groups, 
and (more than the other countries) disadvantages small contractors such 
as schools and NGOs. Moreover, focusing on vulnerable groups is severely 
affected by the use of regional and socio-economical targeting and the 
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reliance on the statements of the contractors concerning the ethnic iden-
tification (Roma) of the beneficiaries of projects. The most striking aspect 
of ESF implementation in Slovakia is the fact that partnerships as a project 
methodology is not enforced at all.
A common feature of ESF-funded programmes in these countries seems 
to be the choice to maintain and enhance the role of the state as an educa-
tional service provider. While in Hungary and the Czech Republic, this is 
obvious in the general framing of the programmes, which focus on structural 
developments of the national education systems, in the other countries this 
is visible in the policy choices concerning potential contractors and the rules 
of the competition in the market for educational service delivery. This is 
linked to the fact that central government remains as a power-broker, even 
when there is openness to partnership as a governance mechanism.
Another important common feature concerns the partial acknowledg-
ment by central governments and managing authorities of the fact that this 
is indeed a market for service delivery, which needs to be governed taking 
into account aspects such as competition, asymmetries of information, or 
the interests of the users/beneficiaries of services. This leads to a deficient 
use of market regulatory instruments: namely calls for applications, not 
taken seriously enough in some of the countries.
Our analysis shows, once more, the importance of domestic policy deci-
sions in pursuing the overarching goals of the EU structural instruments. 
This dependence on domestic policy also makes it easier to at least fine-tune 
existing policy. In any of the countries analysed in this book, a national set 
of policy recommendations would have to address several aspects.
•	 Even	in	the	cases	in	which	the	entire	territory	of	the	country	falls	
under the EU convergence objectives, programming and commission-
ing have to account for territorial disparities identified in each of the 
countries, possibly in the form of regional calls for applications with 
budgets which take into account the social and economic develop-
ment of the region.
•	 A	mutual	interlinking	of	strategic	and	grass-roots	interventions	needs	
to be embedded and enforced in future ESF programmes.
•	 More	attention	should	be	paid	to	schools	as	potential	contractors,	
and their capacity to compete on this market. There should be greater 
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attention in national programming to targeting areas of intervention, 
and calls for applications should be designed so that schools and grass-
roots organizations do not have to compete with actors such as central 
government agencies and universities. At the same time, situations 
when there is no competition at all (all schools receive ESF-funding 
almost automatically) should also be avoided.
•	 Partnership	as	project	methodology	mechanisms	can	be	used	to	ensure	
the national education system fully benefit from the intervention and 
methodologies developed with ESF funding. It could be useful, in 
some areas of intervention, to make it compulsory for schools to be 
partners in grass-roots projects.
•	 The	meaningfulness	of	partnership	as	governance	mechanism	needs	
to be enhanced. This is potentially approached by the European 
Commission in its preparation for the following budgetary cycle, 
and could take the form of compulsory rules concerning the involve-
ment of stakeholders in programming and commissioning.
The analysis in this book is limited by its focus on the demand side of 
the educational service delivery markets created through ESF in the five 
countries. Our evidence suggests that, under these circumstances, the social 
service delivery contracting as an instrument of governance is no longer 
regulating against risks for beneficiaries, but fuels increased social division 
in access to public services. The conclusions and policy lessons could, and 
should, be refined by an analysis of the supply side of the market, namely 
the reaction of potential contractors to ESF-funded programmes.
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Annex 1. Operational programmes and priority axes  
analysed in the book
Bulgaria – Human Resources Development Sectoral Operational Programme
Priority axis no. 4. mproving the access to education and training
4.1. Access to education and training for disadvantaged groups
4.2. Children and youth in education and society
Czech Republic – Operational Programme Education for Competitiveness
Priority Axis No. 1: nitial Education
1.2.  Equal opportunities for children and pupils, including the chil-
dren and pupils with special educational needs
Priority Axis No. 4: System Framework of Lifelong Learning
4.1. A system framework of lifelong learning
Czech Republic – Operational Programme Prague Adaptability
Priority Axis No. 3: Modernization of nitial Education
3.3.  Support for pupils and students with special educational needs
Hungary – Social Renewal Operational Programme*
Priority Axis No. 3. Providing quality education and ensuring access for all
3.3.  Decreasing the segregation of severely disadvantaged and Roma 
pupils, promoting their equal opportunities in public education
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3.4.  Supporting the education of groups with different educational 
needs, and the integration of pupils with special educational 
needs, intercultural education
Romania – Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development
Priority axis no. 2. Linking lifelong learning and labour market
2.1. Transition from school to active life
2.2. Preventing and correcting early school leaving
Slovakia – Operational Programme Education
Priority axis no. 3. Support to Education of Persons with Special Education 
Needs
3.1.  Raising the educational level of members of the marginalized 
Roma communities
3.2.  Raising the educational level of persons with special educational 
needs
*  In the case of Hungary, the large number of calls for applications under 
the two selected key areas of intervention led to the selection of the calls 
for applications most relevant for the educational inclusion of vulner-
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